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8 November 1983

USSR REPORT

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No 8, August 1983

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language monthly journal SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences.

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DOMESTIC OPPOSITION TO REAGAN 'CONFRONTATION' POLICY SEEN GROWING

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 83 (signed to press 15 Jul 83) pp 3-6

[Article by N. D. Turkatenko: "The Worries of Thinking Americans"]

[Text] Thinking about the unthinkable. These two terms would seem to be mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of Americans, just like people throughout the world, are constantly, and with growing anxiety, thinking about the unthinkable: the prospect of nuclear war and its potential fatal effect on present and future generations. Average Americans, many political, public and religious leaders and prominent learned men have not contented themselves with simply contemplating this prospect. They are demanding Washington's official renunciation of the policy of forceful confrontation with the Soviet Union and with many other countries and are actively and logically defending the only reasonable alternative: a return to detente in Soviet-American relations, the resumption and maximal development of economic, scientific and cultural contacts and the creation of a favorable atmosphere for constructive talks on vital current issues, especially the issues of nuclear arms limitation and reduction.

The current Washington administration, which took power on a wave of chauvinism and of its extreme form, jingoism, a wave artificially whipped up by forces and groups on the extreme Right, such as the Committee on the Present Danger, has obviously miscalculated. Neither the attempts to revive the myth of the "Soviet and world communist threat" nor psychological warfare in its most rabid forms could make the American public overlook, for any appreciable length of time, the indisputable fact that the escalation of the arms race weakens, and does not strengthen, international security, including the national security of the United States itself.

This is probably the first time since the Caribbean crisis (of 1962) that America has experienced such strong shocks. What is more, each new shock has followed hard on the heels of the previous one and has been more violent than the previous one. These have been the hundreds of billions of dollars that have been hurled into the furnace of the nuclear arms race, Washington's declared plans to move the arms race into outer space and the concepts of "limited" and "protracted" nuclear war, the scenarios of which are constantly related in public statements by U.S. leaders and in research by political analysts serving the politico-military complex.

Regardless of the degree to which pragmatic Americans have been deafened by slogans about the need to "restore America's previous strength and role in world affairs" even if this should necessitate the use of force or a "crusade" against socialism, they realize that using the nuclear bludgeon would be tantamount to committing national suicide.

Broad segments of the U.S. population are rising up in struggle against the nuclear threat and against the policy line of total confrontation. It is no secret that there is a mass antinuclear movement in this country and that resolutions demanding a nuclear freeze have been passed by the municipal governments of dozens of American cities. Even American religious leaders have responded to this mood and have joined the antinuclear movement. The strength of their influence can be judged by the fact that the majority of Americans belong to a particular religion. American bishops who attended a conference in Chicago in May approved the text of a message which says, in particular: "As a people, we must refuse to legitimize the idea of nuclear war.... We are growing increasingly aware of the political madness of a system threatening mutual destruction; of the psychological harm this inflicts on people, especially the young; of the distortion of economic priorities when billions of dollars are readily spent on destructive forces while fierce battles are waged each day in our legislative chambers over much smaller sums for the homeless, hungry and defenseless.... There must be overt public opposition to statements about 'winnable' nuclear war, to the unrealistic hope of survival after an exchange of nuclear strikes and to the strategy of 'protracted nuclear war.'"

The message was approved despite administration pressure for the inclusion of phrases suiting Washington. When the text was being drafted, President R. Reagan himself, Vice-President G. Bush and Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger became involved in the matter. At a press conference in Washington shortly before the Chicago conference, however, the organizers of the conference denied the administration's statements about the "moral basis" of its policy and announced: "We are deeply disturbed by the picture painted by this year's federal budget (the administration planned military expenditures totaling 232 billion dollars--N. T.). It paints the picture of a country in stubborn pursuit of an egotistical and dangerous policy of social cruelty and arms buildup. It equates efforts to keep the peace with the buildup of military strength and therefore minimizes our security by adding more and more destabilizing weapons to the already excessive stockpiles."

Many leading American scientists and experts on international relations have been authoritative and influential in informing the general American public of the scales of the nuclear threat, the potential effects of nuclear war and the extreme urgency of seeking and finding ways of curtailing and stopping the arms race. They include people who are famous outside the United States as well as in the country, such as R. Garvin (Watson Research Center), C. Sagan (Cornell University Laboratory of Planetary Research), holders of the Nobel prize in physics H. Bethe and I. Rabi, C. Kraft (former director of the Johnson Space Center), L. Dabridge (honorary president of the California Research Institute), Professors W. Panofsky, G. Rathjens and H. York and the head of the Union of Concerned Scientists, C. Gottfried. By virtue of their knowledge and experience, they and many other scientists are well aware of the consequences of

nuclear war when they think about the unthinkable. They have issued warnings and called for action. For example, the abovementioned H. Bethe (incidentally, one of the "fathers" of the atom bomb) and C. Gottfried recently wrote an article for the WASHINGTON POST in which they commented that people in the United States are realizing that "the administration is rushing headlong into a catastrophe." The scientists asked the U.S. Congress to take legislative action to bring about the radical revision of official Washington policy.

The protests of scientists and experts on international relations against the arms race escalated by Washington, and the appeals for the normalization of relations with the Soviet Union and for constructive cooperation between the USSR and United States reflect the mood of broad segments of the American public. This is attested to, in particular, by the results of a public opinion poll conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. Reporting the results of this poll in FOREIGN POLICY, President J. Reilly of the council stresses that questions connected with Soviet-American relations occupy a prominent place in the American public's view of foreign policy issues. American public opinion and its leaders (the leaders surveyed by the initiators of this poll were the heads of government agencies, members of Congress, businessmen, labor leaders, scientists and representatives of religious organizations, organizations concerned about foreign policy issues and "special interest groups"), the report states, are still interested in cooperation with the Soviet Union: 77 percent of the public and 96 percent of the leaders want "negotiated arms control agreements." As for cooperation with the USSR in other spheres, 64 percent of the public and 78 percent of the leaders favor joint efforts to resolve the energy crisis.

A special issue of the influential magazine FOREIGN AFFAIRS, published by the New York Council on Foreign Relations, analyzed reactions in the United States and the allied countries to the administration's tough--or, more precisely, reckless--line in world affairs. In the issue's introductory article, S. Rosenfeld, a prominent member of the WASHINGTON POST staff, stated that the American public is most disturbed by certain administration moves like the "disruption of the arms control talks, which, despite their limitations, were a stabilizing factor for a long time" and the cessation of the talks on the total nuclear test ban, the ban on chemical weapons and the ban on weapons in outer space. The author writes of the "impression," which has acquired the "force of a political fact," that "in his simplistic anticommunism" Reagan has "assumed the risk and burden of gambling on war" and comments on the "continuously growing opposition to Reagan's policy," the policy of this "cold war advocate who states his views on nuclear war in his characteristically straightforward and definite manner."

The desire expressed by thinking Americans for a constructive dialogue with the USSR and for the normalization of Soviet-American relations for the sake of stronger international security was also displayed at the end of May in Minneapolis (Minnesota) at a Soviet-American gathering attended by public spokesmen, specialists from the Washington Institute for Policy Studies (a "think tank" associated with the Democratic Party) and the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and journalists. The long-planned meeting was put on the verge of cancellation by the position taken

by the administration and several members of Congress. Nevertheless, through the efforts of Mayor D. Fraser of Minneapolis and Governor R. Perpich of Minnesota, it was held, although in a slightly reduced form (not all of the Soviet participants were granted visas, and we were not allowed to visit Washington and New York, where certain events were to take place in connection with the meeting).

Of course, the meeting did not run smoothly in all respects. When the reasons for the current dangerous friction in U.S.-Soviet relations were discussed, some American participants were inclined to put "both superpowers" on the same level. They did not display a thorough awareness of the extremely important Soviet initiatives aimed at curbing the arms race and minimizing the danger of nuclear war. They demanded that the Soviet Union take unilateral steps to create a favorable political climate for the resolution of problems in arms limitation, particularly to prevent the deployment of new American nuclear weapons in Europe, planned for the end of this year. They often overlooked the fact that the Soviet Union has already taken unilateral action. For example, it has pledged not to use nuclear weapons first, has put a moratorium on the deployment of SS-20 medium-range missiles within its own European territory and has withdrawn a large military contingent and around a thousand tanks and other pieces of combat equipment from the territory of the GDR.

Nevertheless, American and Soviet participants agreed on many issues. For example, they stressed the extremely dangerous implications of Washington's efforts to attain military superiority and to disrupt the existing balance of military strength between the USSR and United States, which represents the basis for arms limitation and reduction agreements. These, in turn, would minimize the threat of war. Furthermore, as speakers pointed out, these efforts are simply unrealistic in view of current Soviet and U.S. economic potential, as neither side will allow the other to attain superiority.

During the meeting in Minneapolis, the problem of creating a stable atmosphere of trust between the USSR and United States, of certainty that both sides would adhere unconditionally to negotiated agreements, was discussed in detail.

But how can the Soviet Union trust the United States if a new administration can so easily disregard all of the Soviet-American agreements and treaties of the 1970's that took so many years to negotiate?

As for the Soviet Union, everyone has known for a long time that it has always been scrupulous in the fulfillment of agreements--both with the United States and with other countries--and has always advocated peaceful coexistence by states of different social systems.

The Soviet Union has taken an absolutely clear position on the vital issue of curbing the arms race and minimizing the threat of nuclear war: The arms race must not be started in places where it does not exist, and it must be stopped in places where it does exist. This position was reaffirmed by the June CPSU Central Committee Plenum and session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. After noting in his speech at the plenum that "we certainly do not approve of the military competition we have been forced into by imperialism," General Secretary of the

CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Yu. V. Andropov stressed that the USSR will not permit the disruption of the military-strategic balance between socialism and imperialism, the attainment of which is one of the greatest achievements of recent decades.

The USSR Supreme Soviet adopted a decree on the report of USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, in accordance with which the Soviet Government addressed the governments of other nuclear powers with the proposal of a quantitative and qualitative freeze on all nuclear weapons.

The USSR and the other socialist countries are thinking about something that is completely thinkable. As the joint statement issued by the party and governmental leaders of these countries in Moscow (on 28 June 1983) stresses, "meeting participants regard the quickest possible cessation of the arms race and a move toward disarmament, particularly in the case of nuclear weapons, as the key issue of our time and believe that all necessary steps must be taken to carry out these urgent tasks and to preserve peace, civilization and life on earth. They reaffirm their willingness to make every effort to solve these problems through negotiation."

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NATO SEEN UNDERMINED BY GROWING AMERICAN-EUROPEAN DISTRUST

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 83 (signed to press 15 Jul 83) pp 7-17

[Article by A. I. Utkin: "Washington and NATO's Problems"]

[Text] For the United States, the North Atlantic alliance is still the most important of the politico-military alliances it has set up during the postwar period, just as it was 20 or 30 years ago, and secures its dominant position in the West. At the same time, its leadership, the plans for bloc policy in the future and the nature of the relationship between the military alliance's strongest member and its increasingly strong partners are being questioned more pointedly now than ever before.

The intensity of the questioning is compounded by the struggle being fought in Western Europe against the deployment of American medium-range missiles in five West European NATO countries, scheduled to begin this year. These plans, which are aimed directly at turning Western Europe into a nuclear hostage of the United States, concern something of vital importance--national security.

This struggle and the tendency of increasingly broad segments of the popular masses to participate in it constitute one of the factors indicating that deep-seated processes within the bloc are giving rise to a new balance of power among its principal members.

Prerequisites for Change

The main prerequisites for change are the increasing relative military and political influence of the West European branch of NATO (following the consolidation of its economic influence); increased coordination in the inter-relations of West European NATO members; the more pronounced "crisis of faith" in U.S. "nuclear guarantees"; the growth of local nuclear potential (England and France); the diverging American and West European views on international detente and on the tendencies and actions deterring and promoting this process.

The first prerequisite was more than a decade in the making, but by the beginning of the 1980's the military strength of the West European countries had demonstrated absolute and relative (within the NATO framework) growth. Whereas in 1970 the United States' European allies spent slightly over 24 billion

dollars on military needs while the United States spent 76 billion (or three times as much), in 1980 the expenditures of the West European NATO countries totaled 84.4 billion dollars and the United States spent 142.7 billion--in other words, the 1:3 ratio had already fallen to 0.6:1 by the beginning of the 1980's. At the beginning of the 1980's American naval ships of all categories numbered 1,888, while the West European NATO countries had 2,086.¹ The balance was tipped, so to speak, even more in Western Europe's favor in the case of troops and armaments in the European theater, where the West European NATO countries account for 91 percent of all ground forces, 86 percent of all air-borne forces and more than 90 percent of all tank divisions (including armored carriers).² These changes are reflected in the quality as well as the quantity of armaments. A decade and a half ago, American armed forces had better military equipment than West European forces; now, however, military planes built in Western Europe, such as the Alpha-Jet, Jaguar, Harrier and Mirage, are not inferior to American models. The West German Leopard-2 tank is acknowledged to be NATO's best tank, the bloc's best training plane is the English Hawk, and the best antitank system is the Franco-West German Roland. The list of the West European NATO members' military advances could be continued.

The second important prerequisite is the intensification of internal coordination by the West European NATO countries. In the 1960's the United States' partners in the bloc were weak and disparate. In the last decade and a half the NATO Eurogroup has played an increasingly important role. This is an organization in which the West European countries discuss military matters without dominant participation by the Americans. In essence, the Eurogroup has become a kind of coordinating center, and although it does not usurp the prerogatives of the supreme NATO command, it does allow the West Europeans to pursue their own coordinated line to some extent. Another contributing factor in this process was the formation of the independent European program group in 1976, a group through which the West European countries began to coordinate the production of their own weapons. This complicated the "standardization" of NATO weapons, as the United States had previously taken advantage of the disparate nature of the group of West European partners to impose its own weapons on bloc members.

The third prerequisite is the increasing distrust in U.S. "nuclear guarantees." The fear that the United States will make a choice in favor of regional war--war in the European theater of combat (that is, that Western Europe will be sacrificed in order to protect the United States in the event of a conflict threatening an exchange of nuclear strikes between the United States and the USSR)--has penetrated even groups once loyal to the Americans. The term "disengagement" has entered political terminology. It signifies that some kind of watershed exists between U.S. armed forces in Europe and American strategic forces and that a conflict involving the use of Soviet and U.S. nuclear weapons will not necessarily lead to the use of the main American strategic forces. According to a group of prominent American "Atlanticists," "the fear of disengagement is constantly present in the West European capitals."³

The fourth prerequisite was the buildup of English and French nuclear potential in the mid-1970's. In 1974, then English Prime Minister E. Heath publicly advocated Anglo-French nuclear cooperation and the creation of "European nuclear

forces" on this basis, proposing an agreement to this effect within the framework of the NATO Eurogroup. France proposed more active West European efforts, not within the NATO Eurogroup but within a West European alliance having no direct connection with NATO or the United States (this proposal was made by, in particular, President V. Giscard d'Estaing).⁴ But the creation of "European nuclear forces" on the basis of an Anglo-French bloc did not suit the FRG. Reflecting its views, the West German magazine AUSSENPOLITIK commented: "Anglo-French cooperation might be of technical, economic and operational benefit, but it will serve exclusively national interests. As far as other partners are concerned, it will not promote the establishment of unified nuclear forces and the corresponding reinforcement of European integration."⁵ The fear of the military development of neighboring countries was one of the main reasons for the West German proposal put forth by Chancellor H. Schmidt in the London Institute of Strategic Studies in 1977, regarding the advisability of the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Western Europe.⁶ The American side viewed this initiative as a long-awaited opportunity to neutralize the tendency toward separatism in a most important field and proposed a related plan for the nuclear "rearmament" of NATO in Europe. This was the plan that was adopted by the NATO Council in December 1979 for the deployment of 108 American Pershing-2 medium-range missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM's), capable of traveling up to 2,500 kilometers at low altitudes, in five West European countries in 1983-1986.

The fifth important circumstance was the divergence of views on the process of detente, its results and its future. The current administration's approach to this matter has been distinguished by attempts to intensify its active opposition to the socialist community and its struggle against the socialist world. This has led to disagreements among the Atlantic allies. "The most ticklish problems in relations between Western Europe and America," the FINANCIAL TIMES commented, "are those lying at the center of the East-West axis."⁷ Analyzing the allies' reaction to the American diplomatic reversal, President T. Hughes of the Carnegie Foundation wrote that the Reagan Administration's attempts "to create a worldwide alliance against the USSR have not evoked a positive response from the West Europeans: The Western allies, including Mrs. Thatcher, do not intend to follow the lead of many members of the Reagan Administration in confusing political problems with military ones, regarding nationalism as communism and viewing all regional conflicts through the prism of East-West relations."⁸

The United States' allies do not regard the colossal budget deficit, shipments of weapons to dictatorships and the advice to rely on capitalist "free enterprise" as an effective world policy for the 1980's. On the contrary, the West Europeans believe that this policy could alienate many developing countries and exacerbate conflicts between the centers of present-day capitalism.

"The divergence of views on detente is one of the most serious problems" among those that are "creating friction in relations between Atlantic allies," Harvard University Professor E. Cohen wrote. "The root of the problem lies in the fact that the Europeans believe that detente can and must continue, while the United States is insisting on the opposite: Detente cannot and must not continue."⁹ "Only the most inveterate optimists," Johns Hopkins University

Professor R. Tucker remarked with uneasiness, "could fail to notice the increasing speed of disintegration. Today it is a fact that Western Europe, including--and this is most important--West Germany, is just as committed to detente as to the Atlantic alliance.... As long as this situation continues, the corrosion of the alliance will continue."¹⁰

Disagreements over the value of the policy of detente and the approach to it have become a constant factor in the interrelations of NATO members, and Washington's renunciation of the policy of detente has exacerbated conflicts within the West.

Growing Criticism of NATO in the United States

Signs of the growing dissatisfaction with the Atlantic alliance are visible everywhere in the United States today. Feelings of disillusionment and dissatisfaction with the behavior of our chief allies have suddenly come to the surface and have met with widespread agreement, R. Tucker wrote.¹¹ E. Cohen remarked that "on both sides of the Atlantic the structure and the very spirit of the alliance with which the new generation grew up are being attacked." "The intensity of the debates, stemming from stronger feelings of mutual distrust," led him to the conclusion that "the present crisis of the alliance is extremely serious."¹²

Confirmed "Atlanticists" felt it was "natural" that the United States, after "overexerting" itself by disposing of material resources in "many directions," could reduce its contribution to the "reinforcement of Western military strength" in regions with considerable financial potential of their own. In their opinion, the primary region of this type is Western Europe, where the allies have "lost their previous loyalty" and are using American aid and support to, in the words of Z. Brzezinski, "pursue their own egotistical national goals."¹³

The external features of the U.S. relationship with NATO have remained unchanged and, judging by the quantities of material resources and armed forces sent to Europe, NATO is still the most important alliance to the United States. Skepticism is growing in the United States, however, under the cover of mutual avowals of loyalty. It is indicative that a particular line of reasoning is being encountered more frequently now: that during the pre-nuclear era the acquisition of strong allies strengthened the chief power of the military alliance in proportion to the forces unified under its auspices; in the nuclear age, however, the situation is different. "If a great nuclear power is absolutely vulnerable to another opposing great nuclear power, the creation of an alliance will not reduce its vulnerability to any appreciable extent and it certainly cannot eradicate it. Furthermore, whereas alliances cannot strengthen the physical security of the great nuclear powers, they can weaken this security, as the prospect of the use of nuclear weapons is more likely to arise when the security of allies is endangered by another great nuclear power," R. Tucker speculates, for example, and concludes that it is no longer possible to assert, as people did in the past, that America's alliance with Western Europe is dictated by U.S. security interests. On the contrary, under certain circumstances this alliance could be the greatest threat to American security.¹⁴

A theory known as "global universalism" has begun to take shape in U.S. political and academic circles as a specific reaction to the complication of interally relations in Western Europe. One of its central postulates is that U.S. policy in Europe should be put on the same level as other lines of Washington's global policy. For "Atlanticism," which has been dominant for more than three decades in the United States and has aspired to exclusivity in international policy, the advancement of "global universalism" (its more active pursuit in all the main areas of world politics) would mean that inter-Atlantic relations would be assigned less significance.

Arguments in favor of a departure from "Atlanticism" are put forth by Carnegie Foundation researcher R. Steel in an article entitled "The End of the American Protectorate over Europe." Close ties with Western Europe, he declares, are only a waste of American resources; they do not strengthen U.S. positions in the world and they weaken Washington as a "power center." Steel says that the maintenance of American troops attached either directly or indirectly to Western Europe cost 81 billion dollars in fiscal year 1981. The transfer or disbandment of six of the nine divisions now attached to NATO would save 30 billion dollars a year. He regards the excessive emphasis on Europe and what he calls the "overinvolvement" in European affairs as an outdated tradition and the result of pressure from monopolies with European connections. The NATO bloc, in his opinion, is essentially only an obstacle to the more efficient and effective use of American power in the world. "The time has come to put an end to the once necessary but now obsolete and undesirable military ties with Europe. The United States no longer has the means to protect Europe and extinguish the flames of social dissatisfaction throughout the noncommunist world.... The United States no longer has the economic surplus to do for others what they have long been able to do for themselves."¹⁵

Another advocate and ideologist of the "departure from Europe"--I. Kristol--goes even further by questioning the value of NATO as an alliance: "What is the point of insisting on consultations with our partners? If we want to move ahead, we must rid ourselves of the alliance." He believes that NATO should be replaced with a system of bilateral agreements.¹⁶

Of course, the statements by these and some other American political analysts contain a certain element of blackmail, an attempt to pressure Western Europe through intimidation. But there is no question that these statements also contain an element of serious disillusionment with the alliance with Western Europe and a desire to find new means and methods of strengthening American influence in the world.

American political analysts are not only displaying a noticeable loss of faith in the allies, but also a tendency to place more emphasis on the deployment of American troops in potential crisis regions without any substantial help from the allies. There is a growing conviction that what the United States needs most during the present stage of the development of international relations is its own pair of "long arms"--that is, a much larger navy and mobile "rapid deployment force," and not the dubious loyalty of allies. The advocates of "maritime strategy" point out the fact that Western Europe has not been able to generate enough strength in the past decade to make NATO superior to the

Warsaw Pact countries in Europe and has actually refused to allow the use of West European resources to help the United States attain such strategic objectives as control over the Persian Gulf or the creation of a force capable of intervening in the development of "Third World" countries at "times of crisis."¹⁷

Changes in the views of legislators are indicative. In spring 1983 the U.S. Congress voted to set limits for the first time on the number of American servicemen in Europe and to refuse to finance several important NATO-related programs.¹⁸

Preliminary Results of Reagan's Policy Line

There have been noticeable changes in the West European policy of the Republican administration which took office in 1981 and was dissatisfied with the performance of its predecessors. The deliberate and purposeful cultivation of ally relations with Western Europe and Japan, stemming from Carter's "trilateral" ideas, gave way to a less flexible and more detached view of West European processes and the treatment of this region more as a junior partner than as an equal. The main features of this new approach are the following.

The first is the considerably reduced desire for coordinated action (presupposing political consultations), previously cultivated by the advocates of "trilateral" relations. Proceeding from the fact that no effective mechanism of coordination had ever been established and that the allies had demonstrated their obstinacy and inclination to take independent action, Reagan's Washington resolved to strengthen its leadership. Important decisions concerning the West European allies have been made unilaterally by the Reagan Administration: the production of neutron weapons (intended for use on the European "battle-field"); the curtailment of economic contacts with the USSR and Poland (actions with the greatest impact on Europe); the assertion of views radically different from West European views with regard to the developing countries at the "North-South" meeting in Cancun (October 1981); the pursuit of a policy objectionable to Western Europe in El Salvador.

The second is the much greater emphasis on anti-Sovietism as the main criterion of ally relations between West European countries and the United States.

Thirdly, questions of West European integration have ceased to be a matter of any particular concern to the American administration and have been relegated to a position of secondary importance by Washington. The Reagan Administration has taken a fairly indifferent view of the integration process in the EEC and of its intensive (the extension of integration to new spheres) and extensive (the acquisition of new members) aspects.

As mentioned above, the North Atlantic alliance is still the main pillar of U.S. foreign policy, and the NATO bloc is the foundation of Washington's military strategy, but the Reagan Administration has reordered the priorities of American policy within the bloc. To a considerable extent, it has abandoned the attempts to unify the bloc by stimulating the "collective" discussion

of important matters at sessions of the NATO Council. On the contrary, NATO problems are now investigated primarily during visits by West European leaders to Washington--that is, primarily on a bilateral basis and under circumstances in which negotiations are initiated by the West Europeans.

This reflects the Republican administration's general distrust in the NATO "collective" and its desire to regain and consolidate the United States' role as the indisputable leader of NATO. It has strengthened ties with individual members of the alliance on a bilateral basis. For example, an agreement was reached with the West German Government on the preparation of reserve bases and warehouses for the immediate transfer of supplementary contingents in the event of a crisis in Central Europe (which would virtually double the number of American troops). The same kind of agreement was concluded with Norway, Denmark and some other NATO countries. This reflected a quite definite trend: The United States wants to increase its own freedom to maneuver and to choose the goals, the place and the time of action by American troops in Europe. The dramatic increase (double) of military aid to Turkey in 1981-1982 can also be regarded as a preference for contacts on a bilateral basis and with selected allies and simultaneously as a means of strengthening U.S. influence in a strategically important country without paying any particular attention to the reactions of other members of the alliance. One of the most far-reaching "initiatives" in U.S. NATO policy in 1981-1983 was the attempt to extend the sphere of bloc influence in the Southeast to the Middle East and Persian Gulf oil route. Concentrating on bilateral agreements, the Reagan Administration obtained consent for additional efforts in this area from the Conservative government in England¹⁹ and from Paris (for the reinforcement of the French squadron in Djibouti). Joint U.S.-West European contingents were also formed in Sinai (under the command of a NATO general from Norway) and in Lebanon.

The West European policy of the Reagan Administration is distinguished by the further "legitimization" of French and English nuclear missile potential. In the 1980's the United States is again relying on England to promote American policy in Western Europe (for example, in the efforts to expand the NATO zone of action). Washington's behavior during the armed conflict in the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands was a reciprocal act of loyalty to London.

Therefore, the selection of key bloc members, the development of bilateral contacts with these countries and their inclusion in a broader sphere of action than that envisaged in the agreement on the NATO zone, both in geographic terms and in fact, represent the very essence of Reagan Administration policy in NATO. Washington has reserved the right to take unilateral actions affecting other members of the bloc, similar to its decision to produce neutron weapons. As a result of previous disillusionments (particularly the failure of the many attempts to alleviate economic conflicts by means of consultations, including talks on the highest level), the current administration has virtually lost interest in joint declarations and "collective programs" (like the "New Atlantic Charter" of 1973).

Summing up these new developments, the NEW YORK TIMES remarked on 2 November 1981 that whereas the United States had made Western Europe the focal point of its foreign policy during the previous 30 years of NATO's existence, "now it is

working on a global strategy envisaging the broader use of air and naval forces in other parts of the world, although the European NATO countries are still in first place." "Europe will play only a subordinate role in the plans of this administration (Reagan's)," a State Department spokesman said. "We have other priorities."²⁰

Judging by all indications, we are witnessing a definite turnabout in Washington's West European policy: Although contacts with NATO allies are still extremely important to the United States, it will no longer view all other world processes strictly from the "Atlantic" vantage point. After Carter's 4 years of deliberate cultivation of the "compromise" approach and after the contradictory reversals of the Democrats' "trilateral" diplomacy, the Reagan Administration began to move toward a more "Americanocentric" policy in 1981, toward unilateral actions intended to restore U.S. leadership within the Western bloc. The United States is making a vigorous attempt to strengthen its dominant position in the bloc in the hope of "minimizing" the impact of the increasing independence of the West European NATO members and of their stronger influence within the North Atlantic alliance.

Nuclear 'Rearmament' and Europe

Problems connected with nuclear weapons have become a politically explosive element of U.S. relations with the NATO allies in the 1980's. Disagreements over the deployment of American medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe and the differing views of bloc members on nuclear strategy have given rise to noticeable cracks in NATO solidarity. There were three main reasons for the disagreements following the NATO Council's December 1979 decision on the deployment of American medium-range missiles in five West European countries.

First of all, by refusing to ratify the SALT II treaty, the United States changed the situation in which its West European partners considered the deployment of 572 American medium-range missiles on their territory to be desirable. The allies wanted U.S. arsenals in Europe to be linked with strategic forces and did not want total nuclear armament (on the strategic level and on the level of the European theater), which certainly will not heighten security.

Secondly, U.S. strategic plans evolved to a point at which scenarios for a regional conflict in Western Europe and battles on the European battlefield which would not involve central strategic systems began to be regarded as an extremely realistic turn of events.

From the time of the well-known presidential (J. Carter) directive No 59, and particularly after the public acknowledgement made by President R. Reagan on 19 October 1981, the NATO allies could not fail to see that the possibility of starting a nuclear conflict in Europe and trying to confine it to Europe was being considered with cynical serenity in Washington.

Thirdly, the American leadership, which had made talks with the Soviet Union on the reduction of medium-range nuclear weapons one of the main prerequisites for the nuclear "rearmament" of NATO, deliberately delayed the commencement of

the talks and then displayed no desire to reach any kind of agreement on this matter.

The effect of these three factors has been felt on the level of intergovernmental relations between the United States and the West European NATO countries and on the public level, reflected in the mass protests against U.S. nuclear policy in the 1980's.

The new Soviet peace initiatives have had an extremely strong effect on relations in the NATO camp. At the end of 1982 the USSR reaffirmed its desire to remove all nuclear weapons from Europe, both medium-range and tactical, on the Soviet side and the NATO side. It simultaneously proposed the option of the reduction of medium-range weapons (missiles and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons) on both sides by more than two-thirds. "With this option," Yu. V. Andropov said, "there would be no opposing Soviet and American medium-range missiles here, and the USSR would keep only as many missiles as England and France have. We also favor total equality on a much lower level than the present one with regard to aircraft. In short, we do not want a single missile or plane in excess of the number possessed by the NATO countries in the European zone."²¹

Earlier, when the Soviet Union pledged unilaterally not to use nuclear weapons first, it called upon all nuclear powers to follow its example and take the same pledge.

The Warsaw Pact states put forth important peace initiatives in January 1983; in particular, they proposed that the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries conclude an agreement on mutual non-aggression and the maintenance of peaceful relations.

Soviet diplomacy's peaceful initiatives have had a considerable effect on the interaction of various political forces in the Western camp. The question of medium-range nuclear weapons is one of the main topics of debates within NATO. Various points of view have been expressed on the matter. "Reagan is insisting on his own zero option, a proposal which will not allow the deployment of new 'Pershings' and cruise missiles only if the Russians dismantle all of their SS-20 missiles. But the West European leaders have said that the NATO organization must reconsider the proposal," reported an American weekly.²²

"The leaders of Italy, West Germany and even England," the NEW YORK TIMES remarked, "have begun to pressure President Reagan to find another way, in order to avoid confrontation with the Soviet Union and with critics in their own countries, and to consent to something less than the 'zero option.'"²³ Even Prime Minister M. Thatcher, who is thought to be the staunchest supporter of Ronald Reagan's foreign policy in Europe, said in the House of Commons that the American side should consent to a change in its position.

But the official position is far from a complete picture of the situation in the West European countries. It reflects an ostentatious show of loyalty to NATO and a desire to strengthen the American position in the talks. A much more serious political struggle is going on in the domestic arena. In the final analysis, what is at stake is the survival of Europe, and the Reagan Administration has quite clearly demonstrated its disregard for this.

Many people in Western Europe realize that Washington's purposeful escalation of terror and its overt and increasing pressure rest on a false foundation: Soviet medium-range missiles have already been in the European part of the USSR for 20 years, and when Soviet forces armed themselves with the new SS-20 missiles the total number of Soviet medium-range missiles actually decreased. Furthermore, during all this time neither NATO nor five American administrations saw any particular "threat" in the fact that the USSR possessed medium-range missiles.

At the same time, the West European governments cannot ignore the rising wave of public antinuclear and antimissile protest. "When the leaders of the West European countries realized that they were alienating potential voters by disregarding the peace movement and alleging that the movement was the result of Kremlin activity, they began to make public statements in which the Soviet proposals were described as serious and acceptable topics of discussion," reported England's OBSERVER.²⁴

In Great Britain the Soviet proposals received a great deal of public approval. Many people unequivocally condemned Washington's negative attitude toward the Soviet proposals on the reduction of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. Even in this stronghold of "Reaganism" in Western Europe, the influence of those who want to bring about a change in Washington's inflexible stand is growing. The English press reported that Washington's reaction to the Soviet proposals was "so vague and so stupid from the political standpoint that it will put NATO unity to the most severe test.... Never in its history has NATO been subjected to such a severe and protracted test, not only as a result of the differences of opinion of members of the alliance but also as a result of the growing influence of the peace movement."²⁵ Opposition to the hopeless policy line of rightist forces in NATO is growing perceptibly in the English political arena. "The time has come," THE TIMES commented, "to question the right of Reagan and Mrs. Thatcher to act as NATO's sole authentic spokesmen.... NATO must put forth positive counterproposals instead of simply rejecting all Soviet initiatives."²⁶ Several English press organs and politicians have acknowledged the need to begin a dialogue with the Soviet Union on the official English and French position with regard to nuclear weapons, because it would be foolish to expect the USSR to ignore French and English nuclear potential.

In spite of the French Government's official support of President Reagan's "zero option," it has always evoked great doubts in French political circles. "This proposal," wrote the well-known French political analyst T. M. De La Gorce, "was obviously unrealistic: We cannot expect the Russians to give up existing systems in exchange for the renunciation of something that is still non-existent."²⁷ Sensible people are warning that if France persists in its obstructionist approach to the Soviet proposals, it could become one of the main obstacles to the kind of acceptable compromise the other European countries are seeking.

In West Germany, which occupies a key position among the five states designated as the launching pads for the American medium-range nuclear missiles, the U.S. position on the matter is the topic of widespread public discussion and unprecedented mass demonstrations with thousands of participants.

On the whole, the West European public is realizing that it is precisely the American position, and not the Soviet one, that is threatening Europe with a fatal crisis.

At the end of March 1983 President Reagan suggested the conclusion of an interim agreement, largely under the pressure of the antiwar demonstrations in Western Europe. At a press conference in Moscow on 2 April 1983, USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko said that this interim option was unacceptable because it did not take the English and French medium-range nuclear weapons, as well as hundreds of American carriers of these weapons based in Western Europe and on aircraft carriers, into account. Besides this, it envisages the liquidation of Soviet medium-range missiles in the Asian part of the USSR, which has nothing to do with Europe.

The false premise that the English and French weapons are completely separate from American weapons cannot conceal the simple and obvious fact that all three NATO allies are interconnected. Political and military leaders in these countries have repeatedly acknowledged the anti-Soviet purpose of their nuclear weapons, and this absolutely refutes the claims of those who deny the need to consider the English and French arsenals aimed against the USSR.

Several conclusions can be drawn from an examination of the Reagan Administration's West European policy in connection with the problems of the NATO bloc. First of all, the disillusionment with the line of "West European integration" in the 1970's and 1980's caused members of U.S. ruling circles to doubt the policy of seeking compromises throughout the entire range of American-West European relations. To spite the chief allies, Americans resolved to solve all problems arising in relations with NATO partners through energetic unilateral political action (a dramatic increase in American military spending, "shows of strength" outside the NATO zone, the cessation of attempts to work out a common approach to the developing countries with the West European states, etc.). The theories advanced to substantiate this kind of unilateral action were probably the first in the postwar period to represent a serious challenge to the theory of "Atlanticism," which established stronger ties with Western Europe as the number-one priority.

Secondly, there are indicative differences in the evolution of domestic politics in the United States and Western Europe, which have stimulated mutual disillusionment with the partner's position, as well as the mistrust which has evolved during the years of the Reagan Administration into an unconcealed disbelief in the United States' ability to find the correct approach to global problems.

Thirdly, some "Atlanticists" are admitting that several previous compromises within the NATO framework were unwarranted and are seeking a new "reasonable" basis for the military-political alliance and for economic convergence under the conditions of coordinated political actions by the allies. Statements like these are made most often when Washington's unbalanced and egotistical line is being criticized.

Fourthly, the particular segment of the American political elite that is following the well-trodden path of "Atlanticism" is discovering the inconsistency

of the Reagan Administration's current policy in Western Europe, the lack of planning behind its principal initiatives, its tendency to confuse reality with its expectations and its inability to predict the possible West European reaction to various U.S. actions.

Western Europeans have no illusions about the possibility of a rapid change in the American position. During U.S. Vice-President G. Bush's tour at the beginning of the year, it became obvious that the United States does not want to know about the West European countries' foreign and domestic political problems or to take a constructive approach to these problems. The invariable nature of Washington's official position was once again clearly demonstrated at the next NATO Council session in June 1983. The American tough line will inevitably bring about conflicts of interest between the United States and Western Europe in an extremely important and vital area--the prevention of nuclear war. The governments of the NATO states are being influenced by the mass involvement of the West European public in the struggle to avert the nuclear missile threat.

It is completely obvious that the position of the U.S. administration will not only exacerbate problems in relations between NATO countries but also poses a serious threat to the cause of peace.

FOOTNOTES

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U.S. MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL MONOPOLIES: FOREIGN EXPANSION

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 83 (signed to press 15 Jul 83) pp 18-29

[Article by A. V. Buzuyev]

[Text] The significance of military-industrial monopolies in U.S. economics and politics has increased dramatically in recent years. Occupying a particularly important place in the maintenance of American imperialism's military machine, they represent the main economic, scientific and technical base of the U.S. military-industrial complex.¹ They are distinguished by a huge output of military products worth billions of dollars each year.²

For the largest weapon manufacturers, even the present colossal dimensions of the domestic arms market in the United States already seem inadequate. In the second half of the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's weapon manufacturers indulged in much more active foreign expansion and expanded the means of this expansion under the influence of the accelerated arms race in the capitalist world, in a race for maximum profits and in the hope of consolidating their position in the world capitalist arms market. The Reagan Administration has encouraged them to penetrate the markets of other countries, regarding their foreign expansion as an important way of implementing its own aggressive politico-military doctrine.

The foreign economic policy of U.S. military-industrial monopolies is influenced considerably by many economic and political factors--the potential margin and total amount of profit from the export of military products, the sale of licenses for the production weapons, the prospects of investment projects, the developmental level of the specialized military infrastructure, the size of military expenditures in different countries, tariff and non-tariff foreign trade restrictions on military products, the politico-military agreements concluded by various countries with the United States, etc.

Problems connected with the foreign expansion of American military-industrial monopolies have not been analyzed to any great extent because available statistics and documented information are fragmentary and incomplete. These problems are so broad in scale that the author of this article will examine only some of the particular aspects that have not been analyzed sufficiently in Soviet economic literature³ and are connected with the major means of foreign expansion by military-industrial monopolies--weapon sales, the export of capital and military licensing and cooperative agreements.

Weapon Exports

The foreign trade in weapons was the first and simplest form of foreign expansion by U.S. military-industrial monopolies. The manufacture of the final product--complex types of combat equipment and modern weapon systems--is still concentrated primarily within national boundaries. This has been due largely to the benefits these corporations derive from the more favorable legislation and government regulation in the United States. Their choice of this system was also influenced by purely economic incentives: the specific features of pricing and conditions for the sale of weapons, allowing them to take advantage of sizeable government subsidies and privileges (the contract system);⁴ the relatively low transport costs of delivering complex weapon systems to consumers; the absence of tariffs and customs duties on weapons in the majority of other countries, which is often of greater economic benefit to American military-industrial monopolies than the development of their own large-scale production abroad. Although there are factors stimulating the export of capital by military-industrial monopolies, exports of weapons from the United States are still a more important aspect of their foreign expansion.

The largest weapon manufacturers are expanding arms exports under the influence of an entire group of factors. One of the main ones is the desire to maximize sales volume and profits. Now that the national arms market has been divided up so exactly that its repartition could lead to devastating competition and/or the danger of prosecution under antitrust legislation, it is logical that the military-industrial monopolies are entering the international arena, primarily by means of arms exports, and that this is augmenting corporate growth potential considerably. Besides this, the export of weapons and the related growth of the mass production of certain military products reduce overhead costs per unit of product, reduce the amount of time required for the recoupment of R & D expenditures on new types and systems of weapons and thereby increase profits. Furthermore, military-industrial monopolies exporting arms receive direct encouragement from government organizations working on the attainment of U.S. global military-strategic goals (this matter will be discussed in detail below). The current intensification of militaristic trends in U.S. politics and economics is stimulating the export of weapons on a much broader scale.

Most U.S. arms transfers are now made in the form of sales.⁵ The gradual shift of the "center of gravity" from the transfer of arms as part of "military assistance programs" to the sale of weapons has stimulated the foreign trade activity of U.S. military-industrial monopolies.

The export of U.S. weapons has essentially been monopolized by a small group of corporations. According to data published in BUSINESS WEEK, at the end of the 1970's just four firms--Lockheed, General Dynamics, McDonnell Douglas and Northrop--were exporting weapons valued at over 3 billion dollars a year.⁶

The U.S. military-industrial monopolies account for the largest proportion--both in natural and in cost terms--of trade in the world capitalist arms market. They are still the leaders in most fields of military production, from submarines and large surface ships to military planes of almost all types

and artillery missile systems. During the postwar period the U.S. share of arms transfers (sales and "military assistance") in the world has ranged from 40 to 50 percent. In the 1960's their total volume averaged a billion dollars a year, at the end of the 1970's the figure was 10 billion and in 1983, according to the estimates of foreign experts, the figure could be around 30 billion dollars (in current prices).⁷ During this period the United States has supplied the armies of other capitalist countries with hundreds of military ships, thousands of airplanes and helicopters, tens of thousands of missiles, over 50,000 tanks and armored carriers and huge quantities of electronic and other military equipment and materials.

Between 1950 and 1969 more than half of all American military shipments were made to the West European NATO countries, but in the 1970's their share of these shipments decreased sharply while the share of the developing states (particularly the Middle Eastern countries) increased sharply. It is indicative in this connection that the latest detailed data on American weapon sales abroad were published in 1978 and all data published since that time have been incomplete and fragmentary (both are presented in tables 1 and 2).

Table 1

Exports of U.S. Military Goods and Services in Connection with
"Foreign Military Sales Program," millions of dollars

Recipients	1968	1970	1975	1977	1980
Total	1,392	1,501	3,919	7,079	8,231
Middle East	218	499	2,354	4,991	5,260*
Iran	86	125	1,214	2,012	...
Saudi Arabia	57	37	354	1,842	...
Israel	53	301	715	857	...
Jordan	22	35	53	107	...
Kuwait	14	88	...
West European NATO countries	775	544	824	981	2,521
FRG	231	194	373	387	...
Greece	7	21	89	253	...
Great Britain	287	175	88	126	306
Italy	69	49	60	44	...
Southeast Asia and South Korea	26	96	306	514	...

* All developing countries in Asia and Africa.

SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, 1978, No 5, p 24; 1981, No 12, pp 36, 48, 51, 54.

Table 1 shows that the markets of the developing states played the most important role in the foreign trade expansion of U.S. military-industrial monopolies in the 1970's. The export of weapons to these countries is one of the main instruments of neo-colonialism: It aids in the outright theft of their national wealth and in the inclusion of these countries in the sphere of U.S. political

and military influence. Furthermore, American military-industrial monopolies are far ahead of all their West European competitors in this region (see Table 2).

Table 2

Shipments of Complete Weapons Systems to Developing Countries,
millions of dollars, in 1975 prices

<u>Exporters</u>	<u>1962-66</u>	<u>1967-71</u>	<u>1972-76</u>	<u>1977-81</u>
United States	2,282	4,958	9,787	17,697
France	708	1,021	2,576	5,739
Italy	79	145	515	2,391
Great Britain	944	1,458	2,318	1,913

Calculated according to "World Armaments and Disarmament. SIPRI Yearbook," 1982, p 177.

In the 1970's U.S. arms manufacturers regarded Iran as one of their most important sales markets. The shah's regime absorbed American weapons worth billions of dollars. Around 40,000 employees of American military-industrial corporations and military specialists worked on the maintenance of military equipment in Iran. The fall of the pro-American shah's regime changed the state of affairs in this area considerably. After the new Iranian government decided to reduce military purchases radically, many military-industrial monopolies with contracts for deliveries of weapons to Iran took steps to neutralize the implications of this decision. Company representatives announced that cuts in orders would increase their expenditures on the completion of several ongoing sizeable programs. They threatened, for example, that if they did not receive adequate "compensation" for the AWACS program, they would have to take measures that would have a negative effect on the technical properties of these military systems. The Pentagon did not want to assume the burden of this "compensation" and began to push the AWACS planes, as well as F-16 planes and other military equipment, on the markets of other countries.⁸

Saudi Arabia is now the largest weapon sales market for U.S. military-industrial monopolies. Between 1973 and 1976 alone, it bought almost 8 billion dollars' worth of American weapons. In the second half of the 1970's it received missile aviation, other military equipment and military services worth even more. One of the latest large transactions was the sale of 62 F-15 planes, AWACS systems, 22 ground radar stations, more than 1,100 Sidewinder missiles, etc. The United States has supplied Saudi Arabia with weapons worth more than 8.5 billion dollars in line with just a 1981 agreement.

At the beginning of the 1980's the United States concluded several agreements with Pakistan on the transfer of weapons with a total value of 3.2 billion dollars, particularly 40 F-16 planes, helicopters, tanks, artillery weapons, various types of missiles and improved communication systems.

American monopolies are still finding large markets for their military products in Israel, Egypt and several other countries in the Middle East. Large shipments of weapons are regularly sent to many dictatorships in Latin America and to the United States' more zealous allies in other regions (South Korea, Taiwan and others).

The U.S. military-industrial monopolies are still the leaders in the markets of the developed capitalist countries. The export of weapons is one of the main channels of relations among the military-industrial complexes of the United States, Western Europe and Japan.

The United States' partners in NATO and other politico-military alliances are the major purchasers of American military equipment among the developed capitalist countries. Just in the next few years American monopolies will supply Canada with around 140 F-18 planes and the necessary ammunition for these planes for a sum of 5 billion dollars, Australia with a large group of F-18 planes and several FFG-7 torpedo-boats, the FRG with around 1,500 of the latest missiles of various categories, Japan with 90 M-113 armored vehicles, Great Britain with around 100 Trident strategic missiles, Greece with around 200 M-101 and M-109 howitzers and Spain with around 250 M-113 and M-125 armored carriers. American military-industrial monopolies regularly ship missiles, ammunition and spare parts for American-made combat equipment to all of the NATO countries.⁹

The arms trade has always paved the way for the export of capital from the United States to military and related branches of the economies of other countries. By broadening their military ties with the United States and increasing the size of their arms markets, it has stimulated the export of capital by military-industrial monopolies to countries distinguished by intensive commodity exchange in this area.

Export of Capital and Inter-Monopoly Agreements

The most important factor stimulating the export of capital and weapons by U.S. military-industrial monopolies is the desire to maximize sales volume growth rates and profits. The specific factors stimulating the establishment of overseas enterprises include the differing national levels of overhead costs in various types of production; easy access to government military contracts in other countries; the desire for self-sufficiency with regard to strategic raw materials needed for the production of modern weapon systems, etc. The broader export of capital by military-industrial corporations has also been due largely to the growth of militarism in the United States, the aggressive nature of American imperialism and the determination to secure economic support for its politico-military expansion.

The export of capital by U.S. military-industrial monopolies, just as by corporations in civilian branches of the economy, is the result of the intensification of problems in the reproduction of social capital, which is reflected in concentrated form in the growing tendency toward its overaccumulation. Of course, the overaccumulation of capital in the economy of the United States, just as in other capitalist states, is relative. The "surplus" capital could

be used within the country, but it is increasingly likely to be exported abroad. Capital is also exported because "it can be invested abroad with a higher profit margin."¹⁰ "Surplus" capital is present in particularly large amounts in highly monopolized branches of the economy, and military production is one of these.

The overaccumulation of capital in the U.S. military industry is of a permanent nature in all its forms--productive, commercial and monetary.

For U.S. military-industrial monopolies as a whole, the underutilization of production capacities is due to the extremely cyclical nature of orders for various weapon systems and to the government-encouraged maintenance of "reserve," virtually unused capacities, which would allow for a quick and dramatic increase in military production in the event of war. At the beginning of the 1980's the existence of "surplus capacities on the level of general contractors"--that is, the largest military-industrial monopolies--was noted at a meeting of a congressional subcommittee.¹¹ The current U.S. administration's theory of "protracted nuclear war" envisages the further growth of "reserve" capacities. High indicators are also characteristic of the monetary form of overaccumulation. For example, the percentage of bank deposits and other securities in the assets of the largest corporations is high and it is still rising. The U.S. military-industrial monopolies' portfolio of short-term government securities is valued at billions of dollars, and most of these companies have huge output volumes and other liquid assets. For example, the current assets of the Boeing aerospace firm exceed 4 billion dollars, with 40 percent in cash and easily convertible resources.¹²

In the last decade the export of capital has played a much more important role in the foreign expansion of American military-industrial monopolies.¹³ American statistics do not reveal the actual size of investments by American companies in military and related branches of economies abroad. They are based on data compiled and submitted by the companies themselves. Furthermore, investments are calculated according to different methods, and this has sometimes allowed private companies to deliberately conceal their control over certain overseas enterprises, particularly those directly connected with military production, from government agencies. Some military-industrial monopolies do not even answer requests from statistical services for information about foreign investment figures and methods. In turn, these services not only use distorted information as a basis but also take pains to camouflage the truth about American capital investments in military production abroad. Even they, however, do not deny the obvious fact that many U.S. military-industrial monopolies have several foreign branches and affiliates producing goods for military use and strategic raw materials. According to conservative estimates, U.S. military-industrial monopolies have invested at least 4.5 billion dollars in military branches of industry and the extraction of strategic raw materials abroad.¹⁴

McDonnell Douglas has built a large airplane plant in Canada and Lockheed owns several firms in the FRG, Great Britain, Greece, Belgium, Singapore and other countries. Hughes Aircraft has military plants in 13 states. Colt Industries has many branches in developed and developing countries. United Technologies has branches in Canada, the FRG, France and other countries. Some of them

produce parts, subsystems or systems of weapons, particularly engines for airplanes and helicopters, electronic equipment for military aviation, mini-computers for military purposes, radar systems, equipment for the measurement of radioactivity levels, etc.

General Electric has over 50 overseas branches and affiliates in the processing and extractive industries. They produce more than just military electronics and other products for military use. The production of jet engines, military ships and various types of aerospace products requires large quantities of fuel and a variety of metals. General Electric's needs are filled largely by shipments from its enterprises in many capitalist countries, specializing in the extraction of copper, iron and tungsten ore, petroleum, gas and uranium. Other U.S. military-industrial monopolies operate according to the same policy.

The U.S. military-industrial monopolies use various forms of capital export, depending on the specific goals of investment projects, the dimensions of their own financial base, market conditions and other economic and political factors. In general, in the production of subsystems, components and parts for military equipment and in the extraction of strategic raw materials, they usually export capital in the form of direct investments, either by establishing control over operating foreign enterprises or by establishing new ones; in the production of finished weapon systems, on the other hand, the most widespread form of capital export is not the direct investment but the portfolio type, which does not formally give them complete control and is used primarily in countries with governmental or legislative restrictions on foreign direct investments in the production of complete weapon systems. These investments can be made either by creating joint stock companies with a relatively small share of the capital or by purchasing part of the stock of an existing foreign armament firm.

For example, Hughes Aircraft established a joint military firm in Great Britain with two local companies--UKADGE Systems, producing military radar equipment. Lockheed acquired a sizeable share of the Italian Macchi military-industrial firm, United Technologies bought stock in the French SNECMA monopoly, and Northrop did the same with the Dutch Fokker firm and the Spanish CASA aerospace corporation.¹⁵

In their foreign expansion, U.S. military-industrial corporations make extensive use of various types of inter-monopoly agreements, particularly licensing and cooperative contracts, in addition to the export of capital. The most important economic reason for the intense development of a system of international licensing and cooperative agreements by these monopolies is the increasing complexity and rising cost of modern weapons, which provide much more incentive for the unification of financial and research resources in the joint development and production of weapons. Another contributing factor is the intensification of competition in the world capitalist arms market; cooperative and licensing agreements generally facilitate the penetration of arms markets in the developed capitalist countries.

The export of military licenses combines elements of foreign trade, cartel agreements and the export of capital. In contrast to the sale of weapons, the

sale of licenses for the production of weapons does not mark the end of the commercial transaction. The military-industrial monopoly continues to receive royalties for the licensed invention and often continues to control the technological process. The initial contacts between companies related by licensing agreements are supplemented by the transfer of expertise (production secrets) not recorded in documents and instructions, the delivery of certain machines, equipment, raw materials and finished models, the performance of managerial services, agreements on transfers to the markets of "third countries" and so forth. In some cases, the sale of licenses allows U.S. military corporations to establish direct control over the activities of foreign armament firms.

The U.S. military-industrial monopolies are still the leaders in the conclusion of licensing agreements for arms production in the capitalist world. In the second half of the 1970's, for example, the U.S. Government annually approved the sale of 200-300 licenses for exclusively military purposes abroad. American arms manufacturers concluded around 100 major licensing agreements just with Japanese companies, and more than half of the Japanese output of weapons is manufactured on this basis. In the aerospace industry, U.S. military-industrial monopolies concluded around 70 licensing agreements with Italian firms, over 60 with English firms and more than 30 with West German firms. They also issued many licenses in military shipbuilding and military radio and electrical equipment to the NATO allies and Japan.

American military-industrial monopolies are also taking part in many major international military-industrial cooperative programs, mainly in conjunction with companies from other NATO countries. These programs include the production of the AV-88, a new Harrier plane, with Great Britain; an entire group of engines for military planes with France; a multipurpose F-16 plane with Belgium, Denmark, Holland and Norway; an M-109 automatic howitzer and an M-113 armored vehicle with Italy; Sidewinder missiles; an FFG-7 torpedo-boat with Spain; Eagle planes and air defense control and coordination systems with Japan, etc. According to a source mentioned above, the 10 largest U.S. military-industrial monopolies alone are taking part in more than 50 major cooperative programs abroad.¹⁷ The programs involve reciprocal shipments of goods, the exchange of military research findings and even the export of capital through the formation of joint stock societies or the sale of stock to partners.

Mutual Support of Government and Monopolies

The foreign expansion of U.S. military-industrial monopolies is accomplished with the active political, financial and economic support of the government and various government agencies and establishments.

As we know, the primary goals of the American Government's increased direct interference in economic processes in recent decades have consisted, in brief, in eradicating the contradictions of capitalist reproduction as much as possible, creating the most favorable conditions for the acquisition of profits by monopoly capital and strengthening its position in the international arena. The best possible conditions are established for the enrichment of primarily

the largest corporations and for the consolidation of their position in the national and world capitalist markets. Major arms manufacturers are in a particularly privileged position. Government organizations give military-industrial corporations all types of support in the form of huge government orders, credit, advantages in the acquisition of raw materials and semi-manufactured products and all types of restrictions on foreign competition.

The State Department, the Pentagon and several other agencies have special departments engaged in the stimulation of arms sales abroad and the performance of military and police services in other countries. They find overseas clients for military monopolies, aid in the planning and fulfillment of cooperative military programs, finance transactions (through the U.S. Export-Import Bank) and issue permits for the export of weapons and the sale of military licenses. They also serve as active promoters of new congressional bills connected with the foreign expansion of American military-industrial monopolies.

The U.S. Government has been instrumental in strengthening these monopolies' diverse ties with arms manufacturers in other capitalist countries. It was under direct pressure from Washington that the NATO Council adopted an extensive program in May 1978 for the arming of the members of this aggressive bloc up to 1993. The program envisages around 100 projects for the production of new types and systems of weapons. Many are international projects, and the majority of these will be headed by U.S. military-industrial monopolies. At the suggestion of the Pentagon, a special "industrial group" was created to stimulate military-industrial relations within NATO by expanding direct contacts between the military monopolies of NATO countries. In essence, it has been assigned the functions of an international cartel, with American arms manufacturers as the cartel bosses.

Washington is also encouraging other forms of cooperation between American and foreign monopolies, such as the creation of international consortiums, the joint production of weapons, the sale of licenses and long-term export credit. In its efforts to promote the internationalization of the military business, the U.S. Government is seeking the greatest advantages for its monopolies in the international arena and is striving to guarantee them the role of general contractors. Whenever a particular weapon system is accepted as the standard, they are put in a more favorable position than foreign manufacturers of similar products and they can strengthen their influence at the expense of their rivals.

In turn, the military-industrial corporations are used by the U.S. Government in the attainment of its foreign economic and political goals.¹⁸

The export of weapons, military licenses and capital to strategic areas and the conclusion of cooperative agreements are only some of the diverse forms of foreign expansion by American imperialism. They also include the training of military personnel by American instructors in many countries with Washington-approved reactionary regimes, the assignment of military advisers to other countries, the maintenance of a network of military bases on foreign territory, the presence of a large contingent of U.S. troops in the West European NATO countries, etc. These forms of expansion rest to some degree on the military

and economic "foundation" laid abroad by American military-industrial corporations.

In its policy of strengthening aggressive politico-military alliances, especially NATO, Washington has displayed increasing interest in industrial cooperation with other bloc members in the area of arms manufacture. To strengthen its influence on NATO partners, the United States is trying to prevent the independent production of more complex weapon systems by the allies. A U.S. Defense Department directive frankly expressed the goals of programs for cooperation between American military-industrial concerns and foreign firms: to promote the acknowledgement of U.S. strategic and tactical concepts and doctrines by many countries through the use of common (that is, American--A. B.) weapons and combat equipment; to heighten the interchangeability and adaptability of weapon systems within military blocs and thereby facilitate the maintenance of American armed forces in allied countries.¹⁹ In this sense, American military-industrial concerns represent an important instrument in the U.S. attempts to dictate political and military aims in the West and control the development of the military industry in allied countries.

Military monopolies also play an important role in the pursuit of American imperialism's policy in the developing countries. One of its main instruments is the export of weapons. High-level administration staffer L. Benson said in Congress: "We have become the largest sellers of weapons in the world because we are convinced that stronger participation by allies (developing countries--A. B.) in our defense is in our interest, just as the sale of the necessary weapons to them is in our interest."²⁰ The terms put forth by American authorities regarding the export of weapons to these countries include authorization to establish military bases on the territory of developing states, the opportunity to influence their future plans, the reinforcement of pro-imperialist politico-military alliances, etc. For example, the promise of large shipments of weapons to Israel and Egypt in accordance with the Camp David agreements gave the Pentagon the right to establish a large new military base for the use of the "rapid deployment force" near the main oil regions in the Middle East.

In this way, the export of weapons and the sale of licenses by U.S. military-industrial monopolies aid in the pursuit of the economic and global political goals of American imperialism.

Some Consequences

The foreign expansion policy of U.S. military-industrial monopolies is having a profoundly negative effect on the economies of many capitalist countries, and this is one of the main reasons for the exacerbation of conflicts in relations between these countries and the United States.

For example, the intensive penetration of the arms markets and strategic industries of developing countries by these monopolies is having a negative effect on their economic, social and political development. In the political sphere, the growth of arms exports and the establishment of branches of U.S. military-industrial monopolies in strategic branches of the economies of

developing countries are making many of them more dependent on U.S. imperialism, interfering with their consistent pursuit of the policy of nonalignment and, in some cases, attaching them closely to the American military-industrial complex. The expansion of U.S. military monopolies in the developing states is heightening political instability in various regions and giving birth to serious seats of friction and conflict. "The large shipments of modern weapons to Pakistan pose a direct threat to the security of our country," said, for example, Indian Minister of Defense R. Venkataraman. Sales of American weapons are also increasing tension in international relations in other regions--the Middle East, Southeast Asia and others.

The tendency of U.S. military-industrial monopolies and military agencies to impose their own weapons and combat equipment, particularly the newest and most advanced types, on the developing countries is one of the main reasons for the high growth rate of the military expenditures of many of these countries. Their expenditure of their limited resources on weapons exacerbates already acute social and economic problems, slows down the growth of national industry and precludes the productive use of large sums of money. If the funds now used for the acquisition of American weapons were to be rechanneled into the civilian sector of the economy, many problems in the socioeconomic development of the newly liberated countries could be solved much more quickly. The weapons shipped by U.S. military-industrial corporations to the developing countries are supposed to perpetuate their economic underdevelopment and undermine their progressive social undertakings. They are contrary to the vested interests of people in these countries and will inevitably lead to the further exacerbation of conflicts in their intergovernmental relations with the United States.

The foreign expansion of American military-industrial monopolies is also exacerbating conflicts in U.S. relations with developed capitalist countries. Numerous facts can be cited as clear evidence of this.

The bourgeois press has recently had much to say about the "common economic and military interests" of the United States and its partners in Western Europe. The aerospace industry is often cited as the "ideal" example. In reality, however, this "community of interests" is quite limited and is accompanied by substantial conflicts. Competition between American military-industrial monopolies and West European arms manufacturers became quite fierce in the 1970's. The governments of the United States and other NATO countries became actively involved in the battle to protect the interests of their monopolies in the world capitalist arms market.

The struggle between West European NATO countries and the United States over the sale of American F-18 planes is a good example. The West European Panavia consortium, which produced the Tornado plane, felt that the governments of Canada and Australia would be its most probable clients outside Western Europe. But American military-industrial monopolies took the lead and signed contracts with Canada and Australia in 1982 on the delivery of F-18 planes.

Another vivid example of this kind of conflict is the case of the AWACS system (Boeing), with which the West European countries will begin arming themselves

this year. The purchase of this system was approved in 1976, but commercial contracts were not signed until late 1980 and early 1981 due to heated disagreements between partners over the method of its deployment in Western Europe. Great Britain put up the strongest resistance: Its military-industrial firms had designed (and are now producing) a similar system, the Nimrod, costing only a fraction as much as the AWACS. At conferences of NATO defense ministers, the representative from London voted for the AWACS system but the English government continued to authorize new allocations for the completion of the Nimrod project and later ordered the system for its own armed forces. Some West European countries opposed the purchase of AWACS planes, objecting to their high price (over 100 million dollars per plane). Belgium, for example, frankly declared that it would not buy the planes and later changed its mind only under strong pressure from the American administration. In this way, a new weapon system was forced on Western Europe; American firms will earn several billion dollars from these shipments.

Heated disagreements are also part of the international cooperative programs in which American military-industrial monopolies are participating. The main cause is the U.S. determination to take the dominant position in these programs and reduce partners to the level of subcontractors. In the F-16 program, the West European consortium's share of production is 10 percent of planes built in the United States for the United States, 40 percent of those built in Western Europe for Western Europe and 15 percent of planes built in Western Europe for third countries. American companies produce the rest. Obviously, they are also the ones deriving most of the profits from the program.

The dramatically more active foreign economic expansion by U.S. military-industrial monopolies is strengthening their military-economic ties with large arms manufacturers in other NATO countries and lies at the basis of the process by which an economic and politico-military foundation is being laid in the West for an international military-industrial complex with the aim of the intensive militarization of capitalist society. Regardless of the forms the foreign expansion of U.S. military-industrial monopolies takes, it not only promotes broader military-economic and military-political cooperation by imperialist states but also heightens competition. The U.S. Government is actively involved in this expansion, protecting the interests of American monopoly capital, and this is giving rise to new inter-imperialist conflicts and clashes. On the whole, the activities of U.S. military-industrial monopolies are leading to the increased militarization of the capitalist economy and the escalation of international tension.

FOOTNOTES

1. For a description of its composition and its place in the system of U.S. monopoly capital, see, for example, G. N. Tsagolov, "The Military-Industrial Complex: Some Aspects of Its Current Development," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1980, No 12--Editor's note.
2. The main criterion for the inclusion of large corporations engaged in the manufacture of weapons in the group of military-industrial monopolies, in

our opinion, is the nature of their influence on the particular branch of military production and the ability to monopolize the branch; with this approach, one of the most important indicators is the corporation's share of the total output of specific types of military goods. Since their chief client is the Pentagon, its contracts can be used to determine the actual status of a corporation in the market for military equipment and its role in the maintenance of American imperialism's military machine and in the functioning of the military-industrial complex. The Pentagon's top 10 contractors are General Dynamics, United Technologies, McDonnell Douglas, Lockheed, Boeing, General Electric, Hughes Aircraft, Tenneco, Raytheon and Grumman. The foreign expansion of these monopolies, representing the nucleus of the U.S. military-industrial complex, is the subject of this article.

3. Some aspects of these problems are discussed in the following articles: A. I. Utkin, "The Failure of the Program of 'Restraint' in the Arms Trade" (SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1981, No 4), A. V. Kozyrev, "The 'New' U.S. Arms Export Policy--A Threat to International Security" (ibid., 1981, No 12); R. Paramazyan and V. Borisov, "Economic Aspects of Reagan's Military Program" (MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, 1982, No 8).
4. For a more detailed discussion, see V. A. Fedorovich, "Amerikanskiy kapitalizm i gosudarstvennoye khozyaystvovaniye. Federal'naya kontraktnaya sistema: evolyutsiya, problemy, protivorechiya" [American Capitalism and State Economic Management. The Federal Contract System: Evolution, Problems and Contradictions], Moscow, 1979.
5. American weapons are shipped to other countries in accordance with "military assistance programs" and in commercial transactions. Most of the monopolies' weapon sales are controlled by the government and are conducted with active government participation in line with the "Foreign Military Sales Program." An insignificant portion of their military products (less than 10-15 percent) are sold by them independently on the condition of the issuance of export licenses by the appropriate government agencies. In the last decade the proportion accounted for by sales rose dramatically; in 1980, for example, it was 13 times as great as the proportion accounted for by "military assistance program" shipments (SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, December 1981, p 36).
6. BUSINESS WEEK, 24 March 1980, p 69.
7. "World Armaments and Disarmament. SIPRI Yearbook," 1975, 1977, 1982. The data of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute are not comparable to the data in Table 1 because they are calculated according to different methods, include different groups of military products and use different pricing bases.
8. FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL, 18 April 1979, p 1291.
9. "World Armaments and Disarmament. SIPRI Yearbook," 1982, pp 194-206.

10. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 25, pt I, p 281.
11. "The Ailing Defense Industrial Base: Unready for Crisis," Wash., 1980, p 11.
12. "Moody's Industrial Manual," N.Y., 1981, vol 1, p 796.
13. Any assessment of this phenomenon must include the broad-scale export of state capital, particularly through the channels of military and police assistance (totaling 600-700 million dollars a year in the beginning of the 1980's). This is a separate topic and is therefore not examined in this article.
14. Calculated on the basis of the annual reports and other documents of the Pentagon's top 50 contractors, the national business almanacs of the United States, Great Britain, the FRG, France, Italy, Spain, Holland, Belgium and Canada and the information of FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL, INTERAVIA, DEFENSE, DEFENSE INTERNATIONAL, NATO 15 NATIONS, DEFENSE MONITOR and other magazines. The data are calculated on the basis of the nominal capital of overseas firms of military-industrial monopolies (engaged in the production of military equipment and strategic raw materials), adjusted in line with their share of the capital of these firms.
15. H. Tuomi and R. Vayrynen, "Transnational Corporations, Armaments and Development," Tampere, 1980, p 142.
16. "Issues Concerning the Transfer of United States Defense Manufacturing Technology," Wash., 1977, p 27.
17. H. Tuomi and R. Vayrynen, Op. cit., p 136.
18. For more detail, see V. M. Mil'shteyn, "Voyenno-promyshlennyy kompleks i vneshnyaya politika SShA" [The Military-Industrial Complex and U.S. Foreign Policy], Moscow, 1975; "SShA: Voyenno-strategicheskiye kontseptsii" [The United States: Military-Strategic Concepts], Ed-in-Chief R. G. Bogdanov et al, Moscow, 1980.
19. "Issues Concerning the Transfer of United States Defense Manufacturing Technology," pp 6-7.
20. "Review of the President's Conventional Arms Transfer Policy," Wash., 1978, p 4.

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'ISLAMIC FACTOR' IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 83 (signed to press 15 Jul 83) pp 30-39

[Article by Ye. I. Yurkov]

[Text] The term "Islamic factor," which began to be used in connection with the widespread involvement of the people of the Muslim East in the national liberation struggle in the 1970's and the intensification of their demonstrations under anti-imperialist, anti-American slogans, has secured a permanent place for itself in Western political terminology. It signifies the extremely diverse set of international events that have been connected in one way or another with the increased activity of various forces propounding Islamic slogans.

The author of this article does not plan to analyze the essence of the slogans propounded by various Muslim countries and groups; as a speaker noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, "a liberation struggle can be launched under the banner of Islam," but "Islamic slogans are also employed by reactionary forces."¹ This is the subject of several works by leading Soviet experts.² The author of this article will try to single out what he regards as some of the most indicative descriptions of Islam in works by American researchers and to analyze their recommendations for U.S. foreign policy with which Washington has armed itself.

Since the end of the 1970's, particularly after the revolution in Iran resulted in the assumption of power by Muslim religious leaders using anti-Americanism as one of the principal ways of strengthening their domestic political position and international prestige, much has been said in the American press and in scientific literature about the "Islamic explosion," about the "Islamic revival," etc. Islam's growing influence in several African countries, such as Nigeria, the theocratic nature of conservative regimes in some Persian Gulf countries, the attempts to combine Islamic doctrine with some elements of socialism in Libyan policy, the increasingly active Muslim separatist movement in the Philippines, the terrorist actions of the Muslim Brotherhood and related organizations in Egypt and Syria, the Islamic slogans of the military regime in Pakistan, the increased activity by Islamic organizations in Turkey and the religious factor in the civil war in Lebanon--all of these phenomena, which vary in terms of their social base and political purpose, have become an

important factor of political development in recent years in the vast region stretching from Mauritania in the west to the Philippines in the east and from Afghanistan in the north to Tropical Africa in the south. "Taken by surprise, Western statesmen and politicians hastened to change their opinions in an attempt to meet the growing challenge of Islam," explained Professor R. Dekmejian, an American expert on Islam.³

Until recently, as American researcher E. Said remarks, for example, in his book on American beliefs about Islam, there was "a huge discrepancy between the academic description of Islam (which is inevitably caricatured in the mass media) and existing realities in the Islamic world."⁴

The discrepancy was reflected primarily in the tendency of American Orientalists studying Islam to proceed mainly from traditional assumptions. Researchers who study the political, economic and military-strategic aspects of the situation in the Middle East have assigned a modest place to religion in the belief, judging by all indications, that the economic development of the Muslim countries was steadily diminishing its influence. In this way, American researchers and many politicians were overlooking an extremely important feature of present-day Islam in a number of Eastern countries--its "politicization," the inclusion of the Islamic religious leaders in the sociopolitical struggle and the adoption of Islamic religious slogans by powerful social movements.⁵ This is also one of the main reasons why Americans were so surprised by the role the clergy played in the Iranian revolution of 1979.

Proceeding from established beliefs, American political analysts tried to provide their own explanation for the Iranian revolution, stressing that although it occupied a leading place among religious movements (specifically religious, according to their statements, and not social movements under religious slogans), it would remain a local phenomenon. The revolution, just as the "Islamic explosion" in general, was a reaction to excessively rapid "modernization," during the course of which the religious fanaticism of the backward masses came into conflict with the "Westernization" associated with the Western model of democracy and "certain errors" on the part of the monarchy and the U.S. agencies "responsible" for the situation in Iran. They also stressed that the conflict was supposedly primarily a matter of personalities, morals and ethics.⁶

The U.S. propaganda machine made a massive effort to depict the revolution in Iran as a purely religious phenomenon (the "purest expression of Islam")⁷ and to conceal the real causes of public indignation by pointing up the "obscurantism of the Islamic leaders," their "incompetence in governing the state," their hostility toward progress, etc. For example, in December 1979 U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT commented: "The spirit of revenge is deeply rooted in Khomeini.... The Ayatollah sees the world only in black and white.... Trusting in his own prophetic gift, Khomeini is convinced that he knows God's will and sees no reason for negotiation and compromise."⁸

Descriptions like these became typical for the American press and fueled a chauvinistic anti-Iranian campaign after the seizure of the American embassy in Teheran on 4 November 1979. The Shiah⁹ sect's traditional anti-governmental

aims were underscored as an explanation for the Iranian Muslim clergy's struggle against the shah's regime.

At the same time, the mass media took up the thesis of scientific journals that the anti-Americanism of the Iranian revolution was supposedly an exclusively Iranian phenomenon. In connection with this, members of the American administration and the President himself (then J. Carter) repeatedly avowed their respect for Islam and the traditional nature of U.S. contacts with the Muslim world in an attempt to isolate the religious movement in Iran from other Islamic demonstrations and movements. The President's message to the Congress in January 1980 said that "there are no irreconcilable differences between the United States and the Islamic people." The President also spoke of his respect for the religion of Islam and of his willingness to cooperate with all Muslim countries. When he addressed representatives of departments of Islamic studies in February 1980, Carter again declared that the United States wanted only stronger ties with the Muslim world, in spite of the increasingly acute American-Iranian crisis.¹⁰ There is no question that Washington had to consider the fact that Islam is the state religion in 41 countries (according to the list of members of the Islamic Conference) and that Muslims represent the majority of the population in around 30 countries. Furthermore, in 20 of these (Indonesia, Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, Egypt and others), Muslims constitute from 90 to 100 percent of the population.¹¹

But the "respect for Islam" in official Washington quickly began to subside during the 1980 campaign, which was conducted under chauvinistic slogans about a "strong America." Curtseys to Islam and references to the "Islamic explosion" were obviously inconsistent with the image of a "strong President" seeking re-election. After the Carter Administration's attempt to solve the "hostage" crisis with the aid of a special diversionary force failed in April 1980, the phrase "respect for Islam" completely disappeared from official statements.

As early as the beginning of 1979, the U.S. administration asked several leading scientific centers to prepare thorough studies of the state of affairs in the major Muslim countries and movements.¹² The general tone of these studies and, to some degree, their findings corresponded to the views of Z. Brzezinski, who placed special emphasis on the fact that "there will be much more incompatibility over the long range between the Muslim world and the Soviet Union than between the Muslim world and the United States."¹³ In Brzezinski's theory about the "crescent of crisis," to which he relegated much of the Muslim world, the "Islamic explosion," as one of the reasons for instability in the Near and Middle East, was connected primarily with the policy of the Soviet Union and not with the internal development of the countries of this region.

"Soviet interference in the affairs of countries (by "interference" Brzezinski meant the increasing prestige of the USSR in these countries and its broader cooperation with many of them--Ye. Yu.) where unstable social and political structures are destroyed during the process of development could create more serious problems for the United States."¹⁴ This was also the opinion of E. Rostow: "Soviet policy is a more important element of the complex situation in the East."¹⁵

Some authors said that "petrodollars" were the detonator of the "Islamic explosion." D. Pipes, for example, declared that the drop in world oil prices and the reduction of OPEC's influence would inevitably bring about the decline of Islamic activity.¹⁶

It is true that some American researchers did try to associate the "Islamic explosion" with the socioeconomic development of the Muslim countries. For example, F. Ajami spoke of the birth of "petro-Islam" in the Middle East--that is, an Islamic movement based on growing oil revenues. In essence, he saw a direct connection between the Muslim people's control of the petroleum industry and the growth of their independence in political decision making, including decisions dictated by religious beliefs.¹⁷ A short time later F. Ajami concluded that changes in the social structure of the Muslim countries and the growth of the democratic movement here lay at the basis of the "Islamic explosion": "The Islamic world is no more Muslim today than it was 10 years ago or a quarter of a century ago. It only seems that way because of the political activity of the classes and individuals that were traditionally suppressed by the government."¹⁸

Proceeding from similar assumptions, American researchers R. Newman and M. Kramer have persistently recommended "the examination of Islam in the context of the diverse societies influencing it, and not as a single entity, in spite of the common basis of development." This led to the conclusion that "there can be no single American 'Islam-politik'"¹⁹ (policy toward Muslim countries--Ye. Yu.).

In a book published in 1982, "The Economic Origins of the Iranian Revolution," American researcher R. Looney made one of the first attempt to explain why "the seemingly stable and strong regime in this oil-rich country fell into chaos." He sees the "unfair distribution of national income, inflation and disregard for agriculture" as the main reasons for the mass discontent of the Iranians at the end of the 1970's.²⁰

Judging by all indications, however, this approach to the matter did not become the prevailing one in American political science. The denial of social advances in the Eastern countries and the tendency to view Islam as a conservative religious dogma kept American political analysts of the late 1970's and early 1980's from discarding their illusions about the attainment of mutual understanding between the West and the Islamic clergy.

The thesis of the "unity of the three main religions of today's world"--Christianity, Islam and Judaism, all of which believe in a single god and a messiah--became quite popular in the United States. This was the tone of the recommendations of a special task force on the Middle East, set up by the Atlantic Council of the United States, which believed that "it would be wise to encourage dialogue between representatives of the Islamic faith in all its forms and representatives of Western religious and philosophical thought in order to broaden the basis for mutual understanding."²¹

But the main aspect of studies by American political scientists was the search for ways of eradicating conflicts between imperialism and the Islamic movements,

as well as ways of using these movements in the U.S. interest at a time when the principal policy objectives of American ruling circles were the retention of control over oil and other raw materials and the retention of the Muslim countries within imperialism's orbit. Anti-Sovietism was an integral part of the majority of these studies--in complete accordance with the general turn-about in U.S. policy in the international arena. The authors of these studies have always concentrated on such matters as the investigation of mechanisms ensuring the reinforcement of pro-Western and anticommunist trends in Islam's evolution.

American political scientists are virtually unanimous in the view that Islam could be an ally of bourgeois ideology under certain circumstances and could thereby create opportunities to counter the spread of communist ideology in the East. "Many Muslims feel much less threatened by Western secularism than by communist atheism," a study by a group of experts from the Library of Congress says.²² Some American authors have cited such arguments as an excuse for the United States to "defend Islam against Soviet expansionism." According to R. Dekmejian, for example, more intense "Soviet-American confrontation" in the Persian Gulf zone could promote the actual convergence of American and Islamic views.²³

In this way, Washington is trying to make practical use of the statement about the "incompatibility" between the USSR and the Muslim countries in its own current anti-Soviet policy.

These attempts are not new for Western political scientists, but they took the fore after the groundlessness of bourgeois Westocentric theories about Near and Middle East development became apparent.

In connection with this, the U.S. academic community and American foreign policy propaganda have tried to "discover" and exaggerate the maximum number of elements of "incompatibility" between Islam and socialism. For example, the "Muslim nature" of actions by Afghan counterrevolutionaries is constantly underscored, and the class content of the events in Afghanistan is replaced with a religious content. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT actually alleged that the war in Afghanistan was being fought by "Muslim elements" against a "communist-controlled government."²⁴

By calling the USSR's actions "anti-Islamic," American propaganda is trying to establish a politico-ideological base for a united front of neighboring Muslim states against the USSR and DRA.

The anti-Soviet tactic of playing up to the nationalist and religious feelings of backward segments of the population in several Muslim countries has become a permanent instrument of American foreign policy. For example, Washington employed it in connection with the events in the Horn of Africa, where the support of Ethiopia by the Soviet Union, Cuba and other socialist countries in its efforts to ward off Somali aggression was used by the United States to launch a campaign to create friction between the USSR and the Arab countries, particularly those sympathizing with the Muslim Eritrean separatists.

The thesis that there are many more elements of "incompatibility" between the Muslim world and the Soviet Union than between the Muslim world and the United States began to be used quite actively in American political analyses after the start of the Reagan Administration. Furthermore, various recommendations of ways of using the Muslim religion to aim the "Islamic explosion" directly at the Soviet Union in Washington's interest have been more frequent.²⁵

Therefore, an overview of the evolution of the approach taken by American bourgeois specialists to Islam's role in today's world indicates that this process has mainly taken the form of denials of theories which prevailed until the mid-1970's and were completely removed from political reality. After acknowledging the political role of Islam as a form of ideology and as a group of diverse social movements under religious slogans, American political scientists concentrated on a search for ways of using Islam in U.S. foreign policy and of reducing the increasingly negative influence of the movements propounding Islamic slogans. Their central thesis was the allegation about the Islamic East's "incompatibility" with the "atheistic" Soviet Union, which was also consistent with the intensification of anti-Sovietism in American foreign policy at the end of the 1970's.

As mentioned above, Washington has tried to use studies of Islam in its own practical policy. The Islamic religion, however, has blocked most of its efforts to draw the states with a primarily Muslim population into the West's political and economic orbit.

There are at least two conflicting but intersupplementary aspects of Islam: On the one hand, there is conservatism and the resistance of new currents, social progress and the ideology of scientific communism and, on the other, there is a specific form of struggle against foreign oppression and all varieties of imperialism and colonialism. The inclusion of some democratic ideas in Muslim theory and practice has strengthened the progressive political features of some Muslim movements whose goals often do not meet the interests of American imperialism. This has had a noticeable effect on U.S. relations with the Muslim countries.

Contradictions between the United States and the Islamic countries are pointed up quite clearly in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The United States' invariable support of Israel's expansionist behavior has aroused widespread indignation in the countries of the Arab East, which have demanded that a fair solution to the Palestinian problem be found and that Israel return the territories it has seized illegally from neighboring states, including East Jerusalem, which is one of the traditional centers of Islam. The American-Israeli alliance has long had a negative effect on U.S. relations with the Muslim countries.

This is clearly demonstrated by the relations with a Muslim state as conservative as Saudi Arabia. The "special relationship" with this country cannot eradicate several serious problems stemming from the religious nature of the government in this country. The monarchy's efforts to attain hegemony in the Arab world with the support of politicized Islam conflict with the American support of Israel's aggressive anti-Arab policy and have complicated U.S. efforts to involve the "Arab treasurer" in American policy. According to the former American ambassador in Riyadh, H. Eilts, a paradoxical situation has

taken shape, in which the very level of American-Saudi relations at a time when the United States is supporting Israel is seriously undermining Saudi Arabia's pro-American role.²⁶ The leaders of this country, just as the leaders of several other conservative Islamic states, are disturbed by more than just the military threat posed by Israel. They view Zionism as an extremely hostile ideology, alien to the religious precepts of these regimes.

Conflicts between the United States and the Islamic countries over the issue of Middle East regulation were clearly demonstrated in the results of a meeting of the heads of state of the countries belonging to the Islamic Conference in January 1981 in Saudi Arabia. In spite of U.S. maneuvers behind the scenes, the declaration adopted at the meeting contained demands for the creation of a Palestinian state with a capital in the Arab part of Jerusalem and for the return of the Arab territories seized by Israel. This obviously did not fit into the American-Israeli schemes of the Camp David bargain. The Israeli aggression in Lebanon forced the majority of Islamic states to take a more precise stand on the matter. The determination to bring about the just resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict was reaffirmed at an Arab summit conference in Pez in September 1982.²⁷ The people of the Muslim countries were made even more indignant by the United States' effective participation in the Israeli aggression in Lebanon in 1982-1983. In an attempt to quell this indignation, the United States served as a mediator in the Lebanese-Israeli "peace talks," but this gave rise to new pressing problems in Washington's relations with the Arab states.

The conflicts between the United States and the Muslim countries over the American presence in the Persian Gulf zone are particularly acute. Washington's efforts to strengthen its own military presence have not been supported by several countries in the region which do not want to be accused of setting their own policy in line with the interests of a foreign power.

The efforts to gain a U.S.-Israeli-Egyptian-Saudi "strategic consensus" also failed. According to Washington's plans, cooperation by these states on an anti-Soviet basis was supposed to consolidate American positions in the region. The failure of American attempts to make anti-Sovietism the official ideological basis of the pro-American bloc in the Middle East was largely due to the religious-nationalist nature of the policy of Arab regimes, for which Israeli expansionism still represents a major threat.

The anti-Americanism of the current Iranian leadership, which has some influence in the Muslim world, is also an important factor. Convergence with Israel is also being opposed by the Muslim Brotherhood, which is prepared to take the most resolute action against the supporters of "accord with Israel."

In the sphere of "oil policy," the United States has encountered serious opposition from OPEC, in which Muslim countries play the leading role and are striving to use the "oil weapon" for their own purposes, including those dictated by their religion. The temporary drop in world oil consumption as a result of the economic crisis in the Western countries reduced the severity of the energy crisis to some degree and thereby reduced the role of OPEC. The possibility of a new rise in oil consumption in the future, however, cannot be excluded, and this will strengthen OPEC's influence.

Certain difficulties also exist in U.S. bilateral relations with Pakistan. Islamic "fundamentalism" in the form it has taken in Pakistan is contributing to the stability of the pro-Western regime of Zia-ul-Haq; at the same time, it is impeding the development of American-Pakistani relations. The Islamic dogmas employed widely in all spheres of national life are impeding the development of capitalist relations. Pakistan's efforts to build a "tauhid economy" (based on Islamic religious principles) are making it difficult for American capital to penetrate this country and for the local oligarchy to merge with American and other transnational corporations. The egalitarian ideals of Islam are inhibiting the spread of the individualist mentality, and this is impeding the development of capitalist relations in the country. Washington relies on Pakistan as an outpost of American military-strategic plans on the eastern boundaries of the Near and Middle East and hopes to maintain an atmosphere of constant tension around Afghanistan with Pakistan's aid.²⁸ During the first round of talks between the DRA and Pakistan under UN auspices in summer 1982, however, the American press expressed the fear that Pakistan "might depart from the unconditional support" of counterrevolutionary rebels.²⁹

The leftist radical tendencies in Islam, which are clearly reflected in Libya's behavior, are a matter of constant concern to Washington. The combination of socialist and anti-imperialist slogans and principles with the basic precepts of the Koran, regardless of how unnatural this may appear at first glance, has a strong political and psychological thrust against imperialism. It is from this vantage point that the Reagan Administration views its relations with Libya. The appeal for "a struggle against Libyan terrorism" has moved from the realm of election campaign rhetoric to the sphere of foreign policy action. The tension deliberately provoked by the American side in American-Libyan relations was extremely evident in the incident in the Gulf of Sidra in August 1981, when two Libyan patrol aircraft were shot down by American aviation, in the rumors spread throughout 1982 in the press about the Libyan plans for the assassination of Ronald Reagan and in the U.S. administration's order that American citizens leave Libya. The creation of the American-Libyan crisis became one aspect of Washington policy, demonstrating, as the NEW YORK TIMES commented, obvious dissatisfaction with Libyan foreign policy.³⁰ The United States is trying to isolate Libya and to prevent the consolidation of its international influence. This was also the purpose of the provocation in the Gulf of Sidra, which occurred when Libya signed a trilateral agreement on friendship and cooperation with the PDRY and Ethiopia, and of the American naval maneuvers near the Libyan coast at the beginning of 1983, which were accompanied by the intrusion of planes into Libyan air space and new threats of aggression against Libya.

Washington is obviously disturbed by the influence of Libya's anti-imperialist policy in the Muslim world, particularly the Arab countries. It is making every effort to weaken this influence by urging Islamic conservative regimes to support the American side in the American-Libyan confrontation. According to the well-informed London weekly MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL, however, the reaction of these regimes to, for example, the incident in the Gulf of Sidra "was amazingly hostile toward the United States."³¹ The United States also failed in its attempts to incite Egypt, Sudan and other Muslim countries to make accusations and statements against Libya during the UN discussion of the U.S.-Libyan crisis in 1983.

An important part of this reaction is the knowledge that Libya's behavior is distinguished by adherence to Islamic religious standards as well as by radicalism. It is indicative that American propaganda has carefully avoided any mention of the Islamic views of this country in its anti-Libyan campaign, apparently with a view to the "Iranian experience."

The hostility which exists between Islam and Zionism has caused Israel and pro-Israeli groups in the United States to prevent the expansion and reinforcement of U.S. ties with Muslim regimes and movements to the detriment of the American-Israeli alliance. As a result of this, the American administration has encountered major domestic political difficulties in the pursuit of its policy in the Middle East. Zionist circles in the U.S. mass media have launched a campaign to discredit Islam in the eyes of the American public. In particular, they take every opportunity to imply that Israel is now the only state on which the United States can rely to defend its interests in the region. The Muslim states, especially the Arab countries, on the other hand, are, by virtue of their domestic political structure, so backward and unstable that American policy cannot rely seriously on them.

Washington policy in the early 1980's has been distinguished by a great deal of interest in Islam, attempts to use it to strengthen relations with Eastern countries and a subsequent rechanneling of efforts to stir up anti-Soviet and anticommunist feelings in the Muslim countries.

The events in Iran and several other countries proved that during certain stages of the sociopolitical development of Muslim countries, the Islamic religion can serve as a form of national consciousness and represent a powerful force in the domestic political arena, capable of influencing the nature, methods and results of social struggle.

In general, now that Washington has felt the effects of the growth of Islam's influence, its political pertinence and its occasional hostility toward the United States, it is much more likely than it was in the past to take the "Islamic factor" into account. At the same time, it is pursuing a clearly hegemonistic policy and is much less likely than the previous administration to profess its "respect for Islam" or ascribe absolute features to the political role of the "Islamic resurgence." The Reagan Administration is relying more and more on military strength in its policy in the Muslim world. Particularly eloquent testimony can be seen in the creation of the so-called Central U.S. Command, with its sphere of operations covering the vast region from Egypt in the west to Pakistan in the east and Kenya in the south. This reordering of priorities provides more evidence of the serious difficulties the United States is encountering in its attempts to control and direct sociopolitical processes in the developing countries.

A characteristic feature of Washington's current approach to Islamic regimes and movements is the precise differentiation of these forces in line with their specific political outlook, primarily their feelings about the Soviet Union, and in line with the degree to which the United States can benefit from their activity from the standpoint of the current administration's anti-Soviet, antisocialist policy line. The new approach is also distinguished by a search

for a common stand with the conservative part of the Muslim East and attempts to form an alliance with it on this basis.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1981, p 13.
2. See, for example, Ye. Primakov, "Islam and the Social Development of the Foreign East" ("Religii mira. Istoriya i sovremennost'" [Religions of the World. Past and Present], Almanac, 1982, Moscow); M. T. Stepanyants, "Musul'manskiye kontseptsii v filosofii i politike (XIX-XX vv.)" [Muslim Concepts in Philosophy and Politics (19th-20th Centuries)], Moscow, 1982; M. Mchedlov, "Religion, the Church and Politics," KOMMUNIST, 1982, No 14; R. Ul'yanovskiy, "Sovremennyye problemy Azii i Afriki" [Contemporary Asian and Asian Affairs], Moscow, 1978.
3. R. Dekmejian, "The Islamic Revival in the Middle East and North Africa," CURRENT HISTORY, April 1980, p 169.
4. E. Said, "Covering Islam. How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World," N.Y., 1981, p XV.
5. See, for example, J. Bill and C. Leiden, "The Middle East. Politics and Power. Ally and Bacon," Boston, 1974.
6. J. Esposito, "Islam and Politics," MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, September 1982, p 416.
7. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Winter 1982/83, p 477.
8. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 3 December 1979, p 26.
9. Shiah is the dominant Islamic current in Iran, now known as the official religion. In contrast to the Sunnites, who believe in the union of secular and spiritual authority (and even the primacy of government over religion in most cases), the Shiite leaders generally reject the idea of a theocratic state.
10. WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, 28 January 1980, p 198; 11 February 1980, p 284.
11. CURRENT HISTORY, April 1980, p 192; HARPER'S, January 1981, pp 25-32.
12. THE WASHINGTON POST, 20 January 1979.
13. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 31 December 1979, p 37.
14. THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, 31 December 1978, pp 11, 26.
15. ORBIS, Summer 1980, p 312.

16. D. Pipes, "Oil Wealth and the Islamic Resurgence," in: "Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World," N.Y., 1982, p 51.
17. FOREIGN POLICY, Winter 1977/78, No 29, pp 90-108.
18. F. Ajami, "Arab Predicament. Arab Thought and Practice Since 1967," N.Y., 1981, p 178.
19. M. Kramer, "Political Islam," WASHINGTON PAPERS, vol VIII, No 73 (1980), pp 6, 85.
20. R. Looney, "Economic Origins of the Iranian Revolution," Elmsford (N.Y.), 1982.
21. "Oil and Turmoil: Western Choices in the Middle East," ATLANTIC COMMUNITY QUARTERLY, Fall 1979, p 298.
22. "Saudi Arabia and the United States. The New Context in an Evolving Special Relationship. Report Prepared for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives," Wash., 1981, p 6.
23. CURRENT HISTORY, April 1980, p 179.
24. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 3 November 1980.
25. COMMENTARY, April 1980; ORBIS, Spring 1980.
26. "U.S. Interests in and Policy Toward the Persian Gulf, 1980, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, March 24, April 2, May 5, July 1, 28, and September 3, 1980," Wash., 1980, p 293.
27. For more detail, see A. K. Kislov, "The United States and the Middle East in 1982," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1983, No 1.
28. For more detail, see N. S. Beglova, "Pakistan—'Eastern Outpost' in Washington's Strategic Plans," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1982, No 11; V. A. Kremen'yuk, "United States-Afghanistan: The Intrigues Continue," ibid., 1983, No 1.
29. THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, Spring 1982, p 162.
30. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 12 December 1981.
31. MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL, 4 September 1981, p 3.

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U.S. 'PRESSURE' ON ALLIES AT WILLIAMSBURG MEETING VIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 83 (signed to press 15 Jul 83) pp 52-56

[Article by V. S. Mikheyev: "Meeting in Williamsburg: Problems and Results"]

[Text] The annual meetings of the leaders of the seven largest capitalist states--the United States, the FRG, France, Japan, England, Italy and Canada--are noteworthy events in Western political life.* Conceived by their initiator, former U.S. Secretary of State H. Kissinger, as some kind of "supra-Atlantic" institution, in which the United States could try to impose its policy on Western Europe and Japan, these meetings have invariably attracted the attention of politicians, analysts and press organs. The latest, ninth conference of the "big seven" did not go unnoticed either. It took place in the American town of Williamsburg in the state of Virginia from 28 to 30 May 1983. Numerous reports on the results of the meeting stressed its extraordinary nature: For the first time in the history of these meetings, a joint military-political statement was adopted. Previous conferences were essentially devoted to economic issues.

At Reagan's insistence, the atmosphere of the meeting was "extremely intimate." Discussions of the majority of issues were attended only by the leaders themselves, without their usual retinue of advisers. Interpreters and experts stayed in the next room and watched the proceedings on television. The foreign and financial ministers of the seven countries were admitted to the conference hall only at the end of the sessions.

An understanding of the results of the Williamsburg meeting, of what was included in its final document and why, and of what was not included and why, can only be gained from an analysis of the major conflict between the United States and its allies during the previous conference in Versailles (in June 1982) and of the prevailing problems in recent relations among the "big seven."

A fierce struggle between the United States and its allies was going on even during the preparations for the Williamsburg meeting. The Americans were

* For reports on previous conferences, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1976, No 3, p 81; 1977, No 7, p 67; 1979, No 9, p 24; 1980, No 9, p 50; 1981, No 10, p 48.

using every channel and opportunity to "test the strength" of the West Europeans and Japanese. Above all, the United States wanted to force its partners to consent to rigid restrictions on East-West trade, because in Washington's mind anything that is good for the USSR is automatically bad for the United States. As we know, this was the purpose of Presidential Directive 75, reflecting the U.S. intention to undermine the Soviet economy by combining the curtailment of deliveries of industrial equipment and the latest technology with an exhausting arms race (Reagan had already tried to "sell" the allies this idea in Versailles). In an amplification of this directive, the administration sent a bill to the Congress on 4 April 1983 which would give the President the authority to ban imports from countries ignoring Washington's demand for stricter control over exports in the interest of "national security." According to experts, the passage of this law would hurt companies in the allied countries even more than the threatened U.S. ban on deliveries of pipeline equipment to the USSR.

The EEC took decisive steps in response to the Reagan Administration's intention to push discriminatory export control legislation through the Congress and "twist the arms" of the allies in Williamsburg. First of all, an extraordinarily vehement protest was approved by the EEC foreign ministers at a session of the EEC Council of Ministers in Luxembourg in April 1983 and was sent to Washington on 28 April. In particular, it described the American administration's plans as inadmissible actions against friendly states. Secondly, session participants warned that Reagan "would complicate" the Williamsburg meeting if he tried to impose his own terms of East-West economic relations on his partners. Finally, FRG Chancellor H. Kohl went to Washington and told Reagan, on behalf of the EEC, that the North Atlantic alliance could not tolerate another fierce battle at a time when the projected deployment of American medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe had escalated tension on the continent. Kohl stressed that the jobs of many workers in Western Europe depended on exports to socialist countries. Reagan's plan to raise this question at the meeting of the "big seven" was also discouraged by G. Thorn, the chairman of the Commission of the European Communities (CEC), who said that the failure of this meeting would be a "tragedy."

In addition to being separated by the issue of technology exports to the socialist countries, the United States and its allies have widely differing views on currency and commercial problems in the world capitalist economy, which are growing increasingly severe as a result of high interests in U.S. banks and the higher exchange rate of the dollar. Besides this, there are the EEC's 10 billion dollar deficit in trade with the United States last year, the intensification of the "steel war" between the United States and the EEC, which has reached such a high pitch that American companies are taking West European exporters of special alloy steel structures to court, and the non-tariff restrictions instituted gradually by the United States on various West European and Japanese export goods, including textiles, motor vehicles, the selfsame steel, television sets and footwear (according to R. Cline, a researcher from the American Institute of World Economics, by the beginning of 1983 around one-third of the American market was protected by non-tariff barriers).

The United States made use of several sessions of various international organizations in the capitalist world and conducted preliminary conferences on the ministerial level to force the allies to accept its approach to these problems and thereby ensure the favorable outcome of the summit meeting. This series of meetings was marked by high waves of discord which made the ship of "Atlantic unity" sway precariously but provided advance indication of what might and might not occur at the Williamsburg meeting so that a common language could be found. For example, the United States submitted its own suggestions for stricter control to the Coordinating Committee for the Control of Exports to Socialist Countries (COCOM), which was founded during the cold war and is still a sorry symbol of this era. It suggested that COCOM use new criteria to determine the types of technology prohibited for sale to the socialist countries, that a military commission be set up within the committee to oversee technology exports and that the budget and staff of this organization be augmented. At the COCOM session, however, the American proposals evoked definite objections from other countries, which were wary that more rigid control, particularly of a supranational nature, would have unfavorable implications for them.

In its attempts to "twist the arms" of its allies, the United States proposed an unofficial meeting of the "big seven" and a representative from the CEC in Brussels on 28 and 29 April. The proposal was rejected, however, by the majority of countries. As a result, the Brussels meeting, held in total secrecy in the U.S. embassy building, was attended only by representatives from Japan, Canada and the CEC.

Within the framework of the International Energy Agency, during preparations for the conference the United States wanted the allies to pledge to set limits on imports of natural gas from the USSR, but it was unable to include this statement in the communique. It contains only a general statement about the inadmissibility of "excessive dependence."

A session of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris on 9 and 10 May was something like the final "test of strength" before the conference in Williamsburg. After re-encountering strong opposition from the allies, who did not want to put new restrictions on East-West trade and were trying to force the United States to give up its privileged position in economic relations with them, Washington felt it would be best not to resort to an overt conflict on the summit level. It removed the technology export "code" from the conference agenda and, as usual, all of the disagreements with the allies over trade and currency matters were concealed behind general statements in official documents, which each could interpret as he liked--Williamsburg was no exception in this respect.

The draft military-political statement, which the Americans had kept secret before the meeting, without informing the allies of its text in advance, was the "hit" of the conference. The adoption of the statement was resisted by France, which had objected earlier to the attempts to turn the "big seven's" economic conferences into a political "court of last resort."

Paris' position during the preparations for the Williamsburg meeting and during the meeting itself warrants separate discussion. During the preparations,

France was the most consistent opponent of the notorious "code," and this played an important role in Washington's decision to stop seeking approval for its plans. At an OECD Council session, F. Mitterand proposed the organization of an international conference on the highest level, like the Bretton Woods conference, which laid the basis for the postwar currency and financial structure of the capitalist world in 1944, for the purpose of revising it and setting a new world currency standard based on the dollar, the Japanese yen and the "European currency unit." Mitterand's proposal was supported by Italy, Canada, Chairman G. Thorn of the CEC and many developing countries. In his speech, Mitterand also advised the establishment of fair trade and economic exchange between the North and South, again evoking U.S. objections.

Just before the summit meeting began, the French press reported F. Mitterand's reluctance to attend the meeting, saying that he wanted to avoid "agonizing decisions for France." The fact is that the French Government's views on domestic economic and social policy and relations with developing countries, particularly in connection with the struggle of people for progressive social reforms, often conflict with American views; in an attempt to reduce these conflicts, Paris offers Washington its loyalty in matters pertaining to the politico-military aspects of East-West problems. The United States has responded by criticizing the "socialist experiment" in France, the economic policy of the leftist government and several of its moves in the international arena and has refused to make concessions to it in the economic sphere in exchange for pro-Atlantic curtsies; on the contrary, it has exerted stronger economic and political pressure on France, as a result of which Paris, as we can see, has had to retreat, once again demonstrating the inconsistency of its current policy line.

The military-political statement of the "big seven" does not say a word about international detente and does not contain a single arms limitation initiative. Soviet proposals in this area are ignored completely, including the latest proposal to negotiate a balance of nuclear potential in Europe, both in terms of carriers and in terms of warheads, but certainly with the inclusion of English and French weapons. The document contains a categorical refusal to include English and French nuclear missiles in the talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe. There is another striking peculiarity: Instead of excluding the possibility of the deployment of American Pershing-2 missiles and cruise missiles in Western Europe, the document mentions only some kind of deployment ceiling (in the event that an agreement is reached at the talks).

As soon as Mitterand returned to Paris from Williamsburg, he tried to erase the impression, created by his signing of the statement, of convergence with the NATO military organization by hastening to explain that the stand he had taken in Williamsburg was supposed to indicate that France would not move further away from, or closer to, the NATO military organization. He stressed that phrases unacceptable to France in view of its non-participation in the NATO military organization were excised from the draft statement at his insistence.

Judging by all indications, F. Mitterand and other West European leaders who attended the meeting regard their consent to adopt a statement of a military

and political nature as a necessary concession to Washington for its decision not to insist on the immediate reduction of East-West economic cooperation.

Japan eagerly joined the NATO countries in approving the statement. At its request, and under U.S. pressure, the statement included the remark that conference participants would approach matters pertaining to the "security" of states from a "global position." Japan was paid for its support of NATO by the excision of a section criticizing Japan's protectionist economic policy from the draft economic declaration of the conference participants.

In contrast to the statement on military policy, the economic declaration of the Williamsburg meeting is filled with general phrases, open to different interpretations by different countries. The United States was able to include an indefinite and non-binding statement that economic relations between East and West should be "in accord" with the interests of Western countries in the sphere of "security." France was able to include a reminder of the willingness to organize coordinated intervention in currency markets, although there was also the stipulation that this intervention would have to be judged expedient (a year ago the same type of statement was included in the document of the Versailles meeting, and although the exchange rate of the dollar in relation to the franc rose constantly and inflicted tremendous injuries on Paris' economic interests, the United States did not feel that this was cause for intervention and did not take any action). In a show of derision, the exchange rate of the dollar in relation to the franc rose again when the economic declaration was adopted at the Williamsburg meeting. The declaration also contained the vague comment that the possibility of convening the summit currency conference proposed by France "at the proper time" would be considered. Without making any actual concessions, the United States agreed to consider the need for the kind of credit, monetary and fiscal budget that would lower interest rates.

Therefore, whereas the concessions made by other countries, particularly France, to the United States on military and political matters appear quite substantial, the U.S. concessions cannot even be called concessions. Although the drafting of a "code" on technology exports to the socialist states was not on the agenda of the Williamsburg meeting, the discriminatory bill on export control is still in the U.S. Congress. Immediately after the meeting, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury D. Regan announced that the economic declaration of the conference did not obligate the United States to make any changes in its financial and economic policy. In short, as the WASHINGTON POST remarked on 27 May, from the economic standpoint the summit conferences "now seem more like annual checkups than like serious attempts to cure the obvious ailments of the industrial West." We should add that the results of the Williamsburg meeting will not do anything to lighten the burden of the 32 million unemployed people in the "big seven" countries.

F. Mitterand, who claims to defend the interests of the "weak and underprivileged," did not ask the United States for any concessions on North-South economic relations or the stabilization of raw material prices in the world market, which are dropping and are ruining the developing countries. It is not surprising that the developing states expressed such strong disillusionment with the Williamsburg meeting. An official Indian Government spokesman

declared that the major capitalist countries had not responded to the proposal of global talks between North and South on economic problems.

When the results of the Williamsburg conference are being assessed, the opinion of a politician as experienced as SPD Chairman W. Brandt is of great interest. At a press conference in Bonn, he criticized the military-political statement of the "big seven," expressing regret that it did not discuss questions connected with the policy of international detente. Brandt censured Japan's position, noting that the head of its government had signed a statement pertaining to NATO policy. The chairman of the SPD also expressed regret that the efforts of meeting participants in the currency sphere had been unproductive.

The results of the Williamsburg meeting signify that the United States, which has constructive and clear Soviet proposals lying before it on the negotiation table at the talks on the vital issue of nuclear arms limitation in Europe, has been able to impose its views on its NATO allies and on Japan. This is a serious step in the escalation of the arms race and another piece of irrefutable evidence of Washington's desire not to reach an agreement with the USSR, but to move its nuclear missiles as close as possible to the Soviet borders. By supporting these plans, the West European allies ignored the widespread protests of the European people against the deployment of American medium-range missiles and against the transformation of Western Europe into a nuclear hostage of the United States.

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SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN PRAISED

Moscow SSSR: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 83 (signed to press 15 Jul 83) pp 57-61

[Article by I. N. Shcherbakov: "The Issue of the Chemical Weapon Ban"]

[Text] The second stage of the 1983 session of the Geneva Disarmament Committee began in the middle of June. The adjournment had lasted a month and a half and was a busy period of preparatory work. Key aspects of arms limitation and disarmament were on the agenda: the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the accomplishment of nuclear disarmament; the prevention of nuclear war and a total ban on nuclear tests; a ban on new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and a ban on radiological weapons; a ban on chemical weapons; an all-encompassing disarmament program; the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and several others.

It must be said that the issue of nuclear war prevention was included on the agenda in spite of the objections of the United States and its closest NATO allies and as a result of the persistent efforts of delegations from socialist and nonaligned countries. The working document submitted by the group of socialist states on this matter expressed their willingness to start immediate talks in the Committee on Disarmament for the quickest possible planning of specific ways of preventing nuclear war. In connection with this, the following were listed as the cardinal measures: the refusal of all states possessing nuclear weapons to use them first; a freeze on the production and development of nuclear warheads and the means of their delivery and on the production of fissionable materials for the creation of various types of nuclear weapons by all states possessing such weapons, as the first step toward the reduction and eventual elimination of their nuclear arsenals; the announcement of a moratorium on all types of nuclear explosions by all states possessing nuclear weapons, leading to the conclusion of a total and universal nuclear test ban treaty. The working document stressed that delegations from the socialist countries were willing to consider other multilateral steps to prevent nuclear war, such as the prevention of the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and the exclusion of the possibility of surprise attacks.

During the discussion of the ban on radiological weapons, the socialist states proposed that the committee agenda include a discussion of ways of

ensuring the safe development of nuclear power engineering and that a special task force be created for this purpose, basing this proposal on the positive results of the discussion of a Soviet proposal at the 37th Session of the UN General Assembly on efforts to eliminate the threat of nuclear war and to secure the safe development of nuclear power engineering. It was noted that the planning and adoption of international legal measures to exclude the possibility of actions leading to the deliberate destruction of civilian nuclear installations would make a substantial contribution to the prevention of nuclear war in another important area, and that a separate discussion of this issue would promote progress in the talks on the radiological weapon ban.

These are just a few examples to illustrate the initiatory role of the Soviet Union and other socialist states in the Committee on Disarmament.

A ban on chemical weapons--one of the key aspects of disarmament, requiring immediate attention--will be one of the main topics of discussion at the current committee session. The USSR delegation put forth a series of proposals in amplification of the "Basic Premises of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," which the Soviet Union submitted to the second special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament. On the initiative of the socialist countries, the 37th Session of the UN General Assembly passed a resolution calling for the intensification of talks on this matter in the Committee on Disarmament and the resumption of the Soviet-American talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons. For this purpose, on 22 February 1983 the Soviet delegation proposed that the wording of the "Basic Premises" also include the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons, as well as a statement stipulating the procedure of monitoring the observance of this ban, including verification on the local level and on a voluntary basis. The Soviet proposal on the stricter rules against the use of chemical weapons evoked a positive response in general in the Committee on Disarmament, particularly from the nonaligned countries making up the "Group of 21."

Other proposals put forth by the USSR and socialist states also aroused considerable interest: the GDR's proposal that the draft convention include the stipulation that signatories reveal the location of installations for the production of binary chemical weapons within the first year after its adoption, and dismantle these installations within the first 2 years; the Soviet proposals that commercial enterprises not produce chemical industrial compounds containing the methyl-phosphorus bond used in chemical weapons, and that the procedure for the destruction of stockpiles ensure the uniformity of this process and not give any signatory unilateral military advantages at any particular stage.

The submission of specific and practical suggestions on important aspects of the chemical weapon ban by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries provided additional evidence of the socialist states' profound interest in real progress in the talks in the Geneva Committee on Disarmament, and in the quicker drafting of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. In an amplification of this constructive line, the delegations from the socialist states insisted, from the very beginning of the current session of the

Committee on Disarmament and the task force on the chemical weapon ban, that the editing of the convention text begin immediately and that statements on which views are unanimous or similar be formulated, with the parallel continuation of intensive talks to settle disputed issues.

What stand has the United States taken on this matter? What kind of baggage was it carrying when it arrived at the session?

When Vice-President G. Bush addressed the Committee on Disarmament to explain Washington's views on the chemical weapon ban, he spoke in general terms about the Reagan Administration's alleged desire to speed up the talks and "conclude an agreement to eliminate the threat posed by chemical weapons." But the U.S. vice-president's remarks about the desirability of progress in the multilateral talks in Geneva on the chemical weapon ban were not supported by any kind of specific proposals indicating a genuine U.S. interest in the real improvement of the state of affairs in this area. Furthermore, the high-level U.S. spokesman tried to use the committee rostrum to continue the slanderous campaign about the alleged use of Soviet chemical weapons in Afghanistan and Kampuchea. This was seen as an attempt by the American side to create friction at the talks and divert attention from real problems requiring immediate resolution for the quicker drafting of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The Soviet delegation effectively repulsed the U.S. attempts to present yet another lie in a propaganda wrapper. The committee's attention was directed to the facts of the criminal chemical warfare conducted by the United States in Indochina with huge quantities of toxic substances. The representative from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam cited statistics to illustrate the actual scales of the American military establishment's use of chemical substances during the aggression against the countries of Indochina, including dioxin--one of the most dangerous types of chemical weapons--which had long-term pernicious effects on agriculture, the environment and the health of the Vietnamese people.*

As for the essence of the chemical weapon ban talks, in this respect as well the United States is continuing its obstructionist behavior. In particular, G. Bush issued an ultimatum, making any further work on the convention conditional upon the preliminary discussion of questions of verification, stating that the drafting of the future convention would be "a waste of time unless the issue of verification is discussed and settled." This reflected the U.S. desire to assign unwarranted priority to questions of control and to resolve them in isolation from other important sections of the future convention--the scope of the ban, the disclosure of the location of stockpiles, confidence-building measures, etc. Incidentally, the discussion of control was made extremely difficult by the United States' own maximalist and unrealistic position on the main aspects of this issue and by the Reagan Administration's decision on the mass production of binary chemical charges.

* For more detail, see the materials of the International Symposium on the Use of Herbicides and Defoliants in War: Long-Term Effects on People and Nature (Hochiminh, 13-20 January 1983).

The U.S. actions in the Committee on Disarmament did not display any interest in finding solutions to unresolved problems in the projected convention or any noticeable attempts to consider the position of other states attending the Geneva talks in any type of constructive manner. This is attested to, in particular, by the document submitted to the committee by the U.S. delegation on 10 February 1983--a "detailed explanation of the U.S. position on the content of the chemical weapon ban." On the whole, this document does not seek the convergence of views on the basic aspects of the future convention or compromise solutions. It reflects the American side's desire to take an even more rigid stand--than the one it took during the bilateral Soviet-American talks on the chemical weapon ban--on important questions and to intensify the divergence of U.S. and Soviet views.

Although the document submitted by the United States does contain some statements reflecting consideration for the position put forth in the Soviet "Basic Premises," on the whole it represents a striking contrast to the Soviet document. The latter gives maximum consideration to the proposals of members of the Committee on Disarmament, including Western states, on several basic aspects of the future convention, including control. For example, guided by a desire to accelerate the negotiation process, the Soviet Union consented to the inclusion of statements about regular international verifications of local measures to destroy stockpiles of chemical weapons and the production of supertoxic chemicals for authorized purposes in a specialized facility and in negotiated quantities.

On the whole, the U.S. proposal of 10 February represents a step backward in comparison to Washington's position in the recent past, because it is aimed at slowing down, and not speeding up, the talks on the chemical weapon ban.

The obstructive behavior of the U.S. delegation at the talks on the chemical weapon ban in the Committee on Disarmament is due largely to the general policy line of the current administration, which hopes to carry out a so-called "chemical rearmament" program--that is, to update American offensive military-chemical potential by stockpiling chemical weapons.

According to Pentagon plans, up to 10 billion dollars could be spent on a massive program to prepare the United States for chemical warfare. This program, which was announced by Ronald Reagan on 8 February 1982, includes the mass production of binary chemical charges (the construction of a new plant in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, is planned), the perfection of new methods of using chemical weapons and the construction of storage facilities for these weapons abroad. Virtually the entire American chemical arsenal will be updated and supplemented, and stocks of chemical charges will be increased from 3 million units to 5 million. All of this will be added to the existing substantial U.S. stocks of chemical weapons (including 45,000-55,000 tons of toxic substances like "zarin" and "VX"). More than 3 million chemical charges, weighing over 150,000 tons, are concentrated in American warehouses in the United States, Europe, Japan and the Pacific.

The dangerous plans for "chemical rearmament" are connected with the new U.S. plans to build up strategic offensive weapons, to complete the development of

first strike potential in the 1980's, to deploy new American medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe and to begin the production of neutron weapons, as well as the general plan of attaining military superiority, especially in Europe. The European continent is becoming the chief target of the Pentagon's program of "chemical rearmament." The United States would like to involve its NATO partners in these plans, namely by locating stockpiles of chemical weapons and facilities for their production in the West European NATO countries. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger's recent directive on fiscal years 1985-1989 stated that U.S. armed forces should be ready for the "rapid use of chemical weapons" by 1985 and that airborne and naval forces should "complete the development of systems for the delivery of binary weapons by 1990."

All of this indicates that the U.S. administration's current line is undermining the chemical weapon ban talks in the Committee on Disarmament. It is indicative that even some Americans with a realistic outlook are growing increasingly aware of the extremely dangerous implications of the chemical arms race. On 15 June, for example, the U.S. House of Representatives refused to approve the allocation of 115 million dollars for the production of a new batch of nerve gas envisaged in the program for the "modernization" of the chemical weapon arsenal. Congressman J. Leach commented that the United States "has enough of this gas in stock to destroy all life on earth." Chairman C. Zablocki of the Foreign Affairs Committee stated that an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons must be reached as quickly as possible.

The work in the Geneva Committee on Disarmament is still going on. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries are making every effort to bring about a radical change in the course of the talks at this session so that work can begin on the actual wording of the future convention. A great deal will depend, however, on the willingness of the United States and its closest NATO allies to make realistic adjustments in the counterproductive line that is obstructing these talks.

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INTERNATIONAL SEARCH-AND-RESCUE SATELLITE SYSTEM DESCRIBED

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[Article by S. L. Gubarev: "International 'KOSPAS-SARSAT' Search-and-Rescue System"]

[Text] The creation of a search-and-rescue satellite system has begun at the suggestion and with the active participation of the Soviet Union. The main purpose is to organize radar search operations to assist ships and aircraft in distress. The need for this system and the timely nature of these measures are attested to by the following figures: At the end of the 1970's there were around 350 shipwrecks and at least 250 air disasters in the world each year. A Canadian government study indicated that the probability of the survival of victims of accidents was over 50 percent if search and rescue operations were conducted within 8 hours, but it fell to 10 percent if the operations were delayed for more than 2 days. The development of search-and-rescue space vehicles could save hundreds of human lives, aviation and maritime equipment and other property. The use of a rescue satellite would be particularly important in almost inaccessible alpine regions and in climatically unfavorable northern latitudes.

The Soviet "Kosmos-1383" satellite, launched on 30 June 1982, was the first element of the system. According to a representative of the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, the Soviet satellite clarified the exact coordinates of 10 air disasters and 1 sea disaster just between June and December 1982. As a result of timely assistance, 13 people were saved--4 Canadians, a citizen of Great Britain and 8 U.S. citizens. In connection with this, the American mass media reported that it took less than 6 hours in each case to determine the coordinates of the location of the accident and to send rescue teams to the area to save the victims.

The search-and-rescue system is a multifunctional set of radar equipment (see diagram) [not reproduced]. Rescue satellites, launched into orbit close to the earth, contain complex radioelectronic equipment for the detection of radar signals from ships and planes in distress. They are programmed to circle the earth four times a day. This guarantees the sufficiently frequent radio-electronic observation of each point on the planet and allows for the timely recording of distress signals and transmission of information about the location of accidents. Search-and-rescue satellites represent the technical

compatibility of all parts of the system designed in various countries. They are equipped with complex telemetric instruments, communication systems, timing devices and instruments for the determination of orbit parameters. The operation of the system is based on the use of radio-beacons, which are installed on planes, ships and many small vessels and transmit signals on specially designated radio frequencies. There are now more than 250,000 of these devices in the world. Signals received by detectors on the rescue satellite are recorded in the electronic memory of gauges determining the coordinates of the location of the disaster. When the signals are received, devices for the determination of orbit parameters establish the exact location of the satellite in relation to the source of the distress signals, with adjustments for orbit accumulation and the angular relationship to the vehicle in distress. When the satellite enters the radar zone of a ground station, it transmits the initial data it has received and telemetric information to earth through space communication channels. The location of the victims can be determined within an accuracy range of 4 kilometers by calculating the satellite's coordinates at the time the distress signals were received and the information was transmitted to earth. The coordinates of the disaster site are then transmitted with the aid of satellite communications to the ships or radar stations closest to the victims so that immediate rescue operations can be launched. The search-and-rescue satellite system is distinguished by the highly accurate determination of coordinates, the reliability and highly coordinated work of all elements of the system and the broad range of distress signal monitoring.

The practical basis for the program was laid in the early 1970's, when the normalization of Soviet-American relations allowed specialists from the two countries to begin working on scientific and technical problems of interest to the participants in the cooperation and to all mankind. One of the items discussed was a Soviet-American satellite system to assist ships and planes in distress. By the middle of the 1970's an agreement had been reached on the scales of research, on the level of each side's financial participation in the project and on the schedule for the basic stages in the creation of the satellite system. Problems connected with the technical equipping of satellites, the establishment of radar communications with them, the construction of ground stations and the method of receiving information from space were solved successfully through joint Soviet-American efforts. During the work on the project, Canada and France rendered considerable technical assistance and became equal participants in the program. On 29 November 1979 a quadrilateral agreement was signed in Leningrad on cooperation in an international project for the creation of the "KOSPAS-SARSAT" system (KOSPAS--cosmic system for the detection of ships and planes in distress; SARSAT--search-and-rescue satellite). According to the agreement, the United States would launch three rescue satellites with the aid of Canada and France in 1982, 1983 and 1985 and the Soviet Union would launch two. The agreement also envisages the construction of three radar stations in the Soviet Union, three in the United States, one in Canada and one in France. Norway has also pledged to construct a ground station on its territory. An influential American newspaper, the SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, remarked that "the creation of the KOSPAS-SARSAT system indicates how much could be accomplished if the great powers could work together on the resolution of many world problems. When the modest beginning has been brought to the point of perfection, it would be wise to take another step in the same

direction." But not all Americans are of this opinion. Washington's policy of militarizing space has led to the reduction, and in some cases the complete curtailment, of allocations for civilian space programs. Speaking in the House of Representatives, Doctor Lovelace, an official from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), remarked that "considering the administration's intention to cut allocations for space programs (non-military ones--S. G.), it is unlikely that the international KOSPAS-SARSAT system will arouse the interest of the American administration."

As soon as it took the helm, the current Republican administration began to question the expediency of U.S. participation in existing treaties and agreements in many scientific, technical and economic fields. This policy also affected the Soviet-American KOSPAS-SARSAT project. Less work was done on the program, the United States ceased to comply with the basic provisions of the Soviet-American agreement and meetings between the Soviet and American sides became extremely irregular. Funds allocated by the federal government for the SARSAT program decreased from 5 million dollars in 1980 to 2.3 million in 1981 and 1.3 million in 1982. The American side refused to launch the rescue satellite scheduled for the end of the first half of 1982. In an attempt to build its relations with the Soviet Union on a discriminatory basis, the United States tried to solve several technical problems connected with the SARSAT program at the USSR's expense and to gain unilateral advantages from the work on this joint project. During hearings before the U.S. House of Representatives, it was noted that "participation by the USSR in the SARSAT project will not only heighten the effectiveness of the program but will also make a significant contribution to the use of this system in the interest of all countries." But Washington apparently felt that the agreement signed in Leningrad authorized the use of Soviet funds and technological achievements for the acquisition of information from satellites with minimum U.S. expenditures.

The United States is incapable, however, of impeding the creation of an international search-and-rescue satellite system which is of great importance to all mankind and which must be accomplished soon. The program is being carried out successfully. This is attested to by the constantly increasing number of states making use of information from rescue satellites. This year England and Norway joined the group, and Japan and Finland have expressed an interest in doing this. Several other states are expected to participate in the program in the near future so that the network of ground stations can be broadened and the system can work more efficiently and reliably. "The success of this project," the SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER remarked, "is only the tip of the iceberg, indicating the potential results of global cooperation."

Now that the United States has witnessed the failure of its attempts to impede international cooperation in space and has felt the pain of the political and economic injuries it suffered by isolating itself from the agreement, it is looking for a "cure." At the end of March, Washington launched a rescue satellite to be used in conjunction with Soviet satellites in the program. The American government was motivated by the latest Soviet launching of the "Kosmos-1447" on 24 March 1983. This was the Soviet Union's latest step in carrying out the KOSPAS-SARSAT program, which is now in the "demonstration and

evaluation" stage. Chairman Yu. Atserov of the All-Union Morsvyaz'sputnik Association, in charge of the Soviet part of the project, announced that tests of the search-and-rescue system would be conducted throughout 1983. The decision to create an operational model of each satellite and the entire system will be made in 1984 on the basis of the results of these tests. In the future, the KOSPAS-SARSAT program could be coordinated with INMARSAT (International Maritime Satellite), created for satellite-aided maritime communications and uniting around 40 states.

The interest expressed by an increasing number of states in the search-and-rescue system testifies to the promise of its future development. Only the first steps have been taken in the practical use of space technology in this area, but they have already produced tangible results. A reliable search-and-rescue satellite system will necessitate international cooperation. It would minimize the number of victims of shipwrecks and air disasters. The organization of rescue operations is a vital issue of the present day, and the rescue satellite has a big future.

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CURRENT GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO STIMULATE U.S. EXPORTS

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[Article by V. B. Kanevskiy; passages rendered in all capital letters are printed in boldface in source]

[Text] Government stimulation of commodity exports is an important part of the system of state-monopoly regulation of U.S. foreign trade. It came into being before World War II and was later developed considerably as a major form of government support for the foreign trade expansion of American monopolies and as an effective means of maintaining their competitive potential in the struggle against the monopoly capital of other countries. In the 1970's and early 1980's the erosion of U.S. foreign trade positions, the intensification of inter-imperialist rivalry in world markets and changes in the American administration's economic policy modified this sphere of economic management considerably and made it one of the most important elements of U.S. foreign economic strategy.

This survey will examine the increasingly important role of the state in securing the growth of American exports, the mechanism of stimulation and recent changes in this system.¹

The reasons for the stronger support of the foreign trade expansion of American monopolies by the state have been analyzed sufficiently in Soviet literature,² and it therefore seems expedient to start with just a brief discussion of its main premises.

Some Premises

The increasing internationalization of economic affairs and the progressive involvement of the U.S. economy in international division of labor caused U.S. foreign trade to develop more rapidly than the economy as a whole and heightened its dependence on foreign markets. For example, there was a 6-fold increase in the U.S. foreign trade turnover (in current prices) between 1970 and 1981 (from 82.6 billion dollars to 500.3 billion), including a 5.4-fold increase in exports (from 42.6 billion to 229 billion), while the GNP increased 3.2-fold (from 922.7 billion to 2,925,500,000). According to the author's calculations, the proportion accounted for by exports in the GNP rose from 4.6 to 7.8 percent during that period.³ Some branches of industry,

particularly the advanced, science-intensive ones, were much more dependent on exports. In 1980, for example, exports accounted for 34.2 percent of the products of the aerospace industry, 28.9 percent of the computer output and 16.9 percent of the total industrial output.⁴

In recent years these tendencies have been accompanied by the further erosion of U.S. foreign trade positions. Between 1970 and 1981, for example, the U.S. share of world capitalist exports dropped from 15.4 percent to 13 percent.⁵ This was connected with the lower growth rates of U.S. exports in comparison to those of its chief competitors.

Two of the main reasons are the lower growth rate of labor productivity in the United States, which puts American goods in a weaker position in price competition, and the stronger position of other capitalist countries in non-price competition, in which the deciding factors are innovation, product quality, post-sale equipment maintenance and other factors. Another important reason for the quicker growth of the exports of the United States' chief competitors was the more active stimulation of exports by the governments in most of these countries. In the mid-1970's, for example, state expenditures on the stimulation of exports amounted to 0.83 dollars in the United States for each thousand dollars in exported manufactured goods, but the figure was 1.19 dollars in Canada, 1.31 dollars in France and 1.35 dollars in Japan. The FRG was the only one of the main capitalist countries where these expenditures were slightly lower--0.62 dollars. These differences still exist: In particular, in fiscal year 1980 in Japan, whose exports are already equal to 55 percent of U.S. exports, the number of government personnel engaged in the development of exports was four times as high as the number in the United States, and government expenditures on this activity totaled 48 million dollars in Japan, a figure 1.5 times as high as the corresponding sum allocated to the U.S. Department of Commerce.⁶

The growing competitive potential of West European and Japanese goods and the reduction--and in some cases the disappearance--of the technological gap (between these countries and the United States) allowed competing countries to push the United States out of the center of some world markets, particularly in the case of chemicals, household electronics, motor vehicles, passenger planes and the products of ferrous metallurgy.

In addition to objective economic factors, some subjective factors also had a negative impact on the growth of U.S. exports in the 1970's and the early 1980's, particularly Washington's increasingly overt attempts to use foreign trade as an instrument of political pressure and intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries. For example, the Reagan Administration's discriminatory measures to undermine the construction of the gasline from Siberia to Western Europe caused American firms to lose orders totaling 800 million dollars.⁷

All of this had a negative effect on the U.S. balance of trade and, consequently, on the balance of payments. Since 1971 the balance of trade has almost invariably been negative, with a deficit which rose from 2.3 billion dollars in 1971 to 35.4 billion in 1982.⁸ In turn, this tendency was one of

the main reasons for the declining exchange rate of the dollar in the 1970's, which escalated inflationary processes in the economy and accelerated the rise of the prices of imported goods and, consequently, the locally manufactured goods competing with them.

The foreign trade position of the major American monopolies has suffered serious damage. After all, U.S. commodity exports are mainly controlled by a few giant companies. At the end of the 1970's, for example, 1 percent of all American firms accounted for around 85 percent of all exports. Furthermore, in 1980 the 20 largest transnational corporations accounted for 35.5 percent of all exported finished goods.⁹

This heightened the interest of U.S. monopoly capital in state support for the reinforcement of its positions in world markets and the augmentation of profits. This interest was displayed quite distinctly in the second half of the 1970's. At that time, the leading monopolist organizations, particularly the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers, representing the interests of primarily the largest corporations, began to insist on stronger government support for exports. This increased the importance of various state-monopoly consultative bodies, which are supposed to make specific recommendations on various aspects of foreign trade policy.

Since the end of the 1970's the leader among these bodies has been the President's Council on Exports. Created by a presidential decision in 1973, it originally consisted only of representatives of private capital, but after its reorganization in 1979 its members also included the secretaries of state, commerce, the treasury, agriculture and labor, the U.S. trade representative, the president of the Export-Import Bank, three senators and three members of the House of Representatives. In its new form, the council became an important instrument in the hands of financial capital for export policymaking. Under the Carter Administration it took an active stand, advocating the more active stimulation of exports by the government. This was reflected in many actions taken at that time.

The changes in the council membership connected with the arrival of the Republican administration in the White House did not have any effect on its active stand in this area. The council remained an important instrument of monopoly and state interaction in export policymaking, and its activity was distinguished by a certain degree of continuity. Speaking as the chairman of the newly composed council in October 1981, P. Lighet, chairman of the board of the Sperry Corporation, said: "The United States needs an offensive export strategy. Three key elements of this strategy will involve the elimination of obstacles to the growth of exports and greater reliance on the appropriate stimuli; better forms and methods of moving American goods abroad for sale... and the encouragement of more firms to engage in overseas activity for the purpose of a broader export base."¹⁰

As a result, the government stimulation of U.S. exports grew more intense in the 1970's and early 1980's. This was reflected in the use of traditional forms of stimulation on a broader scale and the development of new forms.

Basic Areas

The government uses a variety of measures to support and encourage national exports. The main ones are programs carried out directly for the purpose of stimulating exports. These include the organizational and technical assistance of exporters, tax incentives and export financing. There are also indirect forms of stimulation--the offer of economic "aid" to other countries (importers of American goods) and currency policy; the additional exports stimulated by these programs are not their main objective, but they are a sufficiently important one.

All of these forms of stimulation, with the exception of currency policy, essentially represent various forms of covert government financing, and the only difference between them in this respect is that forms are direct budget expenditures (organizational and technical assistance and economic "aid"), others are cuts in budget revenues (tax credits) and still others increase the national debt (export financing).

ORGANIZATION AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. Although more than 10 federal agencies are involved in export policymaking to one degree or another,¹¹ the specific functions of the direct governmental promotion and stimulation of exports are concentrated in the Department of Commerce. Here the institutional structure of stimulation developed quite quickly in the 1970's. The functions and powers of the department agency in charge of foreign trade were expanded, and export stimulation became a more important part of its work. Changes in the department as a result of reorganization reflected a shift in department activity toward more energetic participation in the struggle in world markets in the interest of U.S. monopoly capital. This shift was reinforced by a substantial increase in government allocations for various programs of export stimulation, launched by the Department of Commerce in the 1970's. For example, whereas in fiscal year 1972 the budget of the Bureau of International Commerce totaled 23.4 million dollars, in 1979 the budget of its successor (then the Industry and Trade Administration) had already risen to 70 million. Furthermore, the number of personnel working on various aspects of export stimulation increased 7-fold, from 65 to 456, and allocations for this work increased 7.2-fold, from 2.7 million dollars to 19.4 million.¹²

The assistance of the department's commercial service, with its 48 branches in large U.S. cities and the department's overseas branches in 119 cities in other countries, is used widely in the implementation of export expansion programs. These programs cover four basic areas:

Propaganda to intensify the export activity of firms not yet engaged in exports (press campaigns, the public conferment of awards to firms with large export volumes, etc.);

Consultation and information services for firms interested in the development of trade with certain countries, with a view to their specific features (seminars, various types of publications, detailed information on export opportunities for specific American goods in the main world markets, etc.);

The assistance of American firms in the search for potential customers and the conclusion of contracts with them, including the provision of these firms with information about specific export opportunities connected with the construction of large industrial facilities abroad, and the rendering of assistance to American firms in the receipt of orders, the overseas distribution of information about new types of products and technology that can be purchased from the United States, etc.;

The promotion of American goods in foreign markets, including the use of 14 overseas trade centers in the world's biggest cities for demonstrations of American goods, the performance of organizational services connected with U.S. participation in international exhibits abroad, the overseas distribution of catalogues of American firms, etc.

EXPORT FINANCING. The financing of exports of American goods by the government Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) has been an increasingly significant form of export stimulation in recent years. The ANNUAL volume of bank financial authorizations increased from 5.4 billion dollars to 9.5 billion just between fiscal years 1971 and 1979, including an increase from 2.4 billion dollars to 4.5 billion in export credit authorizations.¹³ It is true that the tendency toward increased bank activity was far from constant in the 1970's. For example, this activity declined in the middle of the decade, particularly as a result of restrictions imposed on the financing of exports to socialist countries and on exports of nuclear technology. But the reduction of government export financing (mainly for the reasons mentioned above) aroused considerable dissatisfaction in the U.S. business community, and this motivated the Carter Administration to take immediate measures to encourage bank activity as soon as Carter had taken office. At the beginning of 1978 steps were taken to extend the term of its financial authorizations to 1983 and to raise the GENERAL LIMIT on direct credit from 25 billion dollars to 40 billion, and on export insurance from 20 billion dollars to 25 billion. Simultaneous measures were taken to ensure the maximum use of existing authorizations.

In subsequent years the size of bank annual authorizations was increased considerably, particularly in the sphere of credit. Nevertheless, there were not enough funds for all of the bank's export financing programs. In connection with this, it is significant that the growth of total volumes of export financing was accompanied by the growth of individual loans. For example, at the end of 1979 the bank extended the largest sum of credit in its history--1.2 billion dollars--for the shipment of equipment to the reactionary regime in South Korea for two nuclear power plants.¹⁴

It should be stressed that Eximbank activity represents one form of covert government subsidization of the exports of private companies, particularly the large monopolies. This bank can extend export credit at a lower rate of interest than private banks. For example, when the prime rate of U.S. banks rose to 20-21 percent in the late 1970's and early 1980's, the interest on Eximbank credit was only 10 percent.¹⁵ As a result, its total annual subsidies to exporters during this period were far in excess of a billion dollars.

TAX INCENTIVES. Another form of government export stimulation, tax benefits, also began to play a more important role. The revenue act of 1971 extended

much broader tax privileges to American exporters. For example, whereas they had previously applied only to exports to countries in the western hemisphere, now companies categorized as "domestic international sales corporations" (this is why the incentive is called DISC), with exports accounting for 95 percent of their turnover, do not have to pay federal taxes on their profits (regardless of geographic features) until dividends have been paid to stockholders. Furthermore, this does not mean that the company must increase its exports to 95 percent of its turnover in order to qualify for this privilege; all it has to do is set up an affiliate to export the parent company's products. The affiliate can transfer net profits to the parent company soon after the end of the fiscal year, because these profits are then subject to taxation only at the end of the next fiscal year. In this way, exporting companies are given a chance to use their affiliate export firms to obtain interest-free credit at the expense of the federal budget.

In recent years this form of export tax incentive has been used widely. The number of companies taking advantage of these incentives rose to 11,000 at the end of the 1970's, and they accounted for 75 percent of all American exports.¹⁶ According to the estimates of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the incentive will be used even more widely in the 1980's. Sufficient evidence of this can be found in official information about the profit-related revenues not received by the Treasury as a result of the use of DISC privileges by firms. Here are the figures, in billions of dollars:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Budgetary Cost</u>
1972	0.1
1973	0.46
1974	0.85
1975	1.2
1976*	1.23
1977*	0.95
1978*	1.14
1979*	1.33
1980*	1.52
1981*	1.63
1982*	1.7

* Estimates.

"U.S. Government Involvement in Commercial Exports. Programs, Goals and Budgetary Costs," Congressional Budget Office, Wash., 1977, p 6.

Therefore, the annual amount of uncollected taxes increased 17-fold between 1972 and 1982, and the total sum for the period exceeded 12 billion dollars.

FORMS OF INDIRECT INFLUENCE. One of these is U.S. economic "aid" to foreign states. The use of this "aid" for the indirect stimulation of exports is attested to, for example, by the fact that up to 85 percent of this aid is

now used to purchase goods from the United States. Furthermore, most of it is used to stimulate exports of agricultural goods, while manufactured products accounted for only around 35 percent of all the goods exported in accordance with government "assistance" programs in 1979 and 1980.¹⁷

In addition to using traditional forms of stimulation on a broader scale in recent years, the United States has been working on new forms of government activity aimed, on the one hand, at eliminating internal obstacles to export growth and, on the other, at creating additional incentives for American exporters.

At the end of Carter's term in office, his administration prepared a report for this purpose and submitted it to the Congress. It examined the restrictive effect of several American laws on the growth of exports. The document noted that antitrust legislation definitely restricted the competitive potential of American companies because it precluded the creation of export cartels; the 1977 act on overseas corruption severely restricted agent fees and commissions. Another impediment was the excessive, according to the government experts, taxation of the income of American citizens working abroad. This last factor weakened, for example, the position of American construction companies in the competition for contracts abroad,¹⁸ as a result of which U.S. potential export growth was reduced by an estimated 6-7 billion dollars a year.¹⁹

The Carter Administration did not have time to take any steps to eliminate the impediments listed in this report. The Republican administration, however, took specific measures in this area, and these will be discussed below.

A new form of government support of exports is direct participation by high-level government officials in the business meetings and talks between American and foreign private companies. In September 1979, for example, the Pullman-Kellogg company was awarded a contract for the delivery of 340 million dollars' worth of equipment to Nigeria for the construction of a fertilizer plant because U.S. Representative to the United Nations Andrew Young, who had a good reputation in Africa, took part in the negotiations. Here is another example. In March 1980 Under Secretary of Commerce L. Hodges went to Argentina and Paraguay with representatives of the Westinghouse, Allis-Chalmers and Morrison-Knudsen corporations to give them support in the negotiation of a contract worth 830 million dollars. In reference to this, L. Hodges said that "this was the first time that a federal agency administrator on this level had taken this kind of business trip."²⁰

Questions of Effectiveness

American advocates of the stronger government stimulation of U.S. exports propose that its effectiveness be measured by the additional export volume generated by a particular program. The amount of additional exports can be judged, for example, by estimates published in the American press. According to these estimates, DISC increased volumes by around 2.5-3 billion dollars a year in the mid-1970's.²¹ Export growth as a result of Eximbank activity in fiscal years 1976 and 1978 was 3.5 billion and 3.3 billion dollars respectively.²² As for the effectiveness of Department of Commerce programs, attempts to

estimate additional exports have not been productive as yet. One of the reasons is that when it calculates total sales during exhibits organized by the department, it categorizes ALL contracts as additional exports resulting from the exhibit. No consideration is given to the fact that the majority of exhibitors have either been operating in the given market for many years or have their own branches or commercial agents to market the goods of the parent company.

Available American estimates indicate that the U.S. Government did actually increase exports to some degree through the use of such forms of covert government financing as the DISC tax benefits, Eximbank credit and "aid" to other countries. In the second half of the 1970's, for example, the additional export volume, according to American estimates, averaged 6.5-7 billion dollars a year, or around 6.5-7 percent of all exports of manufactured goods.

However, when the advocates of the broader stimulation of exports assess its effectiveness, they often avoid any analyses of its impact on the load of production capacities, unemployment and the negative balance of trade--that is, the very factors which have been declared the main official reasons for stronger government support for exports. An examination of these factors reveals the contradictory nature of the influence of government activity of this type on exports.

In 1979, for example, the output of branches of physical production in the United States totaled 1.056 trillion dollars, and additional exports totaled around 7 billion, or 0.7 percent of this output--that is, a significant percentage, particularly in view of the lower growth rate of industrial production at the end of the 1970's and the decline of its absolute level in 1980. It is important to remember, however, that existing U.S. forms of stimulation contribute less to the expansion of commodity assortment than to the increased export of the products of advanced, science-intensive branches, which are already quite capable of competing in foreign markets. According to U.S. Treasury Department data, for example, exports of nuclear reactors and products of the aerospace industry account for most Eximbank credit; in particular, they represented more than half of all its direct credit in 1980.²³

As for the reduction of unemployment, if we consider that each billion dollars in additional exports can now create 40,000 jobs,²⁴ it would seem that the total impact was around 300,000 additional jobs a year, giving work to 3 percent of all the unemployed in 1981. Furthermore, the organic density of capital is higher in the majority of export branches, and the same funds would therefore create many more jobs in branches operating for the domestic market.

Besides this, government export policy cannot be credited unequivocally with reducing the deficit in the balance of trade. Under the conditions of floating exchange rates, the growth of U.S. exports, for example, could cause the exchange rate of the dollar to rise, but this would reduce the competitive potential of exports, stimulate the growth of imports and thereby neutralize the positive effect of export stimulation.

The contradictory nature of the effects of export stimulation bring up a question: In whose interest is this stimulation being intensified through the

offer of billions of dollars of government subsidies to exporters? The answer can be found in the sphere of interests of the small group of giant monopolies controlling the lion's share of U.S. exports. They include General Electric, Westinghouse, Boeing, Textron, du Pont de Nemours, Dow Chemical and other companies controlled by the largest groups of financial capital.

Of course, under the conditions of the present intensification of competition in foreign markets, government stimulation can be of decisive influence in some cases, even in leading branches. This applies primarily to export financing. After all, in other developed capitalist countries the government often resorts to the financing of national exporting firms in these branches, and at a lower rate of interest than in the United States, thereby guaranteeing them, all other conditions being equal, a strong competitive position. In the United States, however, the government finances exports even when the products of American exporters are so new and are of such high quality that they do not encounter foreign competition (for example, narrow-body planes). In this case, therefore, the extension of relatively cheap export credit is not a means of stimulating sales abroad, but one method of redistributing national income in the monopolies' favor.

Tendencies in the 1980's

Although government support for export expansion by American monopolies grew stronger in the 1970's and early 1980's in general, the development of specific forms of support was not always consistent. After all, in addition to being influenced by objective factors, which bring about overall reinforcement over the long range, each of these firms is also influenced by temporary, changing factors, such as government foreign policy actions, the pressure exerted by trade partners against Washington's use of various forms of export stimulation and, finally, changes in economic policy, which generally accompany changes in the administration. For example, soon after the start of the Reagan Administration, which had advocated the definite reduction of government intervention in economic affairs, there was a shift in emphasis in export stimulation, connected with measures to relax several governmental restrictions on the export activity of private companies; the new administration also tried to reduce the amount of direct government export financing.

But these attempts have sometimes proved ineffective. Furthermore, a close look at the evolution of U.S. export policy during the years of Reagan's term in office suggests that the general tendency toward stronger government support for exports will continue in the 1980's.

This is already reflected just in the fact that several legislative and administrative measures were taken in the beginning of the 1980's to relax restrictions on export growth. They could have been interpreted as one of the results of the Republican policy of limited government intervention in economic affairs, but it is significant that these measures were proposed to the Congress in 1980 by the Carter Administration under the pressure of big business, and that administration adhered to neo-Keynesian theory in its economic policy, based on the need for active government intervention in economic affairs.

The first step in the elimination of restrictions on export growth was taken in August 1981, when Congress lowered the taxes on the income of American citizens working abroad (in connection with the circumstances mentioned above, this measure is supposed to heighten the competitive potential of American companies, particularly construction firms). As a result, personal income (abroad) up to 75,000 dollars was exempt from taxes in January 1982, and by 1986 the minimum nontaxable income will rise to 95,000 dollars.²⁵ Congress is also taking steps to relax the export restrictions stipulated in the abovementioned overseas corruption act. In 1982, for example, the act was amended to simplify the control of the use of funds abroad by American firms to pay for commissions and gifts.

An act on export trade companies, the drafting of which also dated back to the late 1970's, was passed by the Congress on 1 October 1982 for the purpose of eliminating restrictions and creating additional stimuli for export growth. It envisages the creation of companies whose functions will include the direct export of goods and services from the United States or the promotion of such exports. They will be granted partial "immunity" to prosecution under U.S. antitrust legislation and will be issued certificates to this effect by the Department of Commerce. The law also authorizes private banks to participate in the creation of such companies (up to 5 percent of the charter capital) and to finance their activity (up to 10 percent). Although the purpose of the law is to "increase the export of products and services by small and medium-sized companies and enterprises," there is no doubt that the greatest advantages will be reaped by giant monopolies, which have an interest in the elimination of legislative restrictions on their exports and in the use of the export potential of their small and medium-sized affiliates in competition in the foreign market.

The Reagan Administration, which has essentially continued the efforts to intensify export stimulation, made every attempt during its first 2 years in office to block the adoption of a GATT decision that the abovementioned DISC tax incentives were in violation of GATT rules. When the decision was adopted at the end of 1982, the administration had to ask Congress to cancel these privileges, but it compensated for this by submitting a new bill envisaging tax privileges for the foreign trading companies of American export firms. According to the Department of the Treasury, the exemption of 17 percent of the income of these companies from taxation will give American exporters the same advantages they now derive from DISC.²⁶ It would be difficult to predict the results of this measure, but it is already clear that the Reagan Administration has no intention of giving up tax incentives for exports and that the only matter in question is the form they will take in the future.

Eximbank occupies a special place in the Republican administration's export policy. The first steps in this sphere suggested the reduction of government financing through the bank. These predictions were based on the Republican Party platform in the 1980 campaign (limited government intervention in economic affairs and totally unrestricted "free enterprise"). The immediate basis for the predictions, however, was the letter the administration sent the Congress along with its program of budget cuts for fiscal year 1982. It said: "The President believes that American business should be able to compete in

markets without being bound by unnecessary governmental restrictions, but also without any special governmental privileges."²⁷

Subsequent events proved that the administration's attempts to reduce Eximbank financial authorizations were more likely to be an example of the social maneuvering conducted by U.S. ruling circles under the pretense of reducing the huge budget deficit. When the administration cut budget social expenditures in fiscal year 1982, it also had to propose cuts in some budget expenditures intended for the private sector, including export financing through Eximbank. It proposed a limit of 3.9 billion dollars on direct bank credit in fiscal year 1982, as compared to the 5.4 billion allocated for fiscal year 1981.²⁸

It turned out later, however, that the administration's views on the matter were extremely inconsistent, and the advocates of a higher limit in Congress did not encounter any serious opposition. Furthermore, as the WALL STREET JOURNAL reported, "some members of the administration privately encouraged legislators to relax the restrictions imposed by the administration."²⁹ As a result, Congress approved a limit of 4.4 billion dollars on direct Eximbank credit for fiscal year 1982,³⁰ which exceeded the sum requested by the administration by 500 million dollars.

In fiscal year 1983 the administration again proposed the reduction of the Eximbank direct credit limit to 3.8 billion dollars in order to reduce the budget deficit.³¹ The final results of the congressional vote on this matter are not known as yet, but there is reason to believe that the Congress will again allocate the bank more funds than the administration has requested. At the end of 1982, for example, the Senate Appropriations Committee voted to increase Eximbank direct credit authorizations to 4.4 billion dollars.³²

Obviously, there are reasons why the U.S. Government cannot give up a competitive weapon as important as the direct financing of exports by the government. The main one is the keen competition from government establishments in other developed capitalist countries in the area of export financing. This is precisely why, as Reagan announced in the Congress in January 1983, the administration decided to increase the bank's direct credit authorizations for fiscal year 1984. In particular, it intends to ask Congress to set up a special fund in the amount of 2.7 billion dollars in 1984 for competition against the government-financed exports of other countries.³³ This decision actually signifies a radical change in the administration's position with regard to Eximbank as a result of pressure from large monopolies.

Furthermore, when the administration resorted to the reduction of direct export financing, it realized that this could lead to the loss of export orders in the event of substantial political risks. Under these conditions, the administration tried to broaden the use of other forms of Eximbank activity to stimulate the use of private bank capital--the guarantee and insurance of private export credit. It requested the Congress to allocate 8 billion dollars for this purpose in fiscal years 1982 and 1983, as compared to 7.4 billion in 1981.³⁴ But again, Congress found these sums inadequate and allocated 9.2 billion for 1982, and is expected to allocate around 9 billion for 1983.³⁵

An examination of the reasons for the recent intensification of U.S. government support for exports indicates that it was the reaction of American state-monopoly capitalism to the general decline of U.S. foreign economic strength in the postwar period and represents its new attempt to promote the export expansion of monopoly capital as the most powerful segment of the bourgeoisie.

Furthermore, the Republican administration is quite aware that the main reasons for the United States' weaker foreign trade positions can be found in the production sphere and stem primarily from the lower growth rate of labor productivity in the United States than in other developed capitalist countries. This was taken into account during the planning of economic policy after Reagan arrived in the White House. According to these plans, one result should be the accelerated augmentation of labor productivity and, on this basis, of the competitive potential of American exports. Many of these measures, however, are not having the desired impact. Forecasts of American economic development suggest the inevitable exacerbation of U.S. foreign trade problems. This prospect is connected, in particular, with the probability that the growth rate of labor productivity in the United States will continue to fall below the indicator for Japan and several West European countries. Furthermore, the rising exchange rate of the dollar in 1980-1983, considering the time lag which generally constitutes a period of 2 years according to American estimates, will have an additional negative impact on the competitive potential of American exporters.

All of this has heightened U.S. financial capital's interest in export stimulation by the government. For example, a recent study conducted by experts from the National Association of Manufacturers calls for the revision of administration policy in the area of foreign trade for more intense measures of government export stimulation, such as the expansion of Eximbank credit authorizations, the reduction of interest rates and adjustments to lower the exchange rate of the dollar so that the competitive potential of American goods can be heightened; it also recommends a narrower sphere of export control and the broader use of tax incentives.³⁶

Therefore, the factors which dictated broader export stimulation in the United States in the 1970's still exist, and this will certainly result in its further intensification in the 1980's.

The development of the government stimulation of exports and the continued convergence of the state and the monopolies in this sphere (as a result of the exacerbation of problems in the U.S. economy and of commercial conflicts with competitors) reflect a general tendency toward stronger state-monopoly economic regulation in the United States. The failure of the Reagan Administration's attempts to reduce the government financing of exports after they were vehemently opposed in the business community and in Congress, is a vivid example of the inconsistency of its economic policy and its efforts to reduce government's role in economic life.

FOOTNOTES

1. The author will describe only national means of export stimulation. The international state-monopoly regulation of foreign trade as one of the

forms of export support is a separate matter and has already been analyzed in literature (see, for example, A. A. Smirnova, "The 'Tokyo Round' and the United States," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1979, No 8). The government stimulation of agricultural exports will not be discussed in this survey either because it differs in a number of fundamental ways from the stimulation of exports of manufactured goods, and because it has already been discussed in the magazine (I. B. Avakova, "U.S. Expansion in the World Food Market," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1983, No 6).

2. See, for example, "Vneshneekonomicheskaya politika SShA: problemy i protivorechiya" [U.S. Foreign Economic Policy: Problems and Contradictions], edited by L. N. Karpov, Yu. A. Sergeyev and R. I. Zimenkov, Moscow, 1982.
3. Calculated according to: MONTHLY BULLETIN OF STATISTICS, November 1982, p 106; "Statistical Abstract of the United States 1975," Wash., 1975, p 798; "The State of the Economy in the Capitalist and Developing Countries," supplement to MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, 1982, No 8, p 97.
4. Calculated according to: "U.S. Industrial Outlook 1982," Wash., 1982; SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, March 1981, p 41.
5. BUSINESS AMERICA, 6 September 1982.
6. "International Economic Report of the President," Wash., March 1975; BUSINESS WEEK, 21 July 1980, p 88.
7. For more detail, see the report by T. V. Kobushko in No 12, 1982--Editor's note.
8. "Statistical Abstract of the United States 1974"; calculated according to SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, April 1983, p 17.
9. Calculated according to: FORTUNE, 24 August 1981, p 84; SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, March 1981, p 41; BUSINESS WEEK, 10 April 1978, p 65.
10. BUSINESS AMERICA, 2 November 1981, p 2.
11. For more detail, see P. M. Malakhin, "The Reorganization of the System of U.S. Foreign Trade Regulation," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1981, No 5--Editor's note.
12. "Senate Hearings Before the Committee on Appropriations. Fiscal Year 1973," Wash., 1972, p 1598; "Fiscal Year 1979," p 298.
13. For more about Eximbank, see the background material by S. Yu. Savin in No 6, 1982. Within the context of the subject of this survey, several aspects of this establishment's activity warrant examination.

14. BUSINESS WEEK, 10 September 1979, p 40.
15. Ibid., 26 May 1980, p 50.
16. BUSINESS AMERICA, 8 October 1979, p 10.
17. "Statistical Abstract of the United States 1981," p 842.
18. According to American data, the maintenance of an overseas employee in the Asian countries in 1980 cost American companies more than 30 percent more than it cost West European firms, and mainly in connection with the U.S. taxes on the personal income of Americans working abroad--U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 16 June 1980, p 68.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., p 67; BUSINESS WEEK, 1 October 1979, p 160.
21. Calculated according to "U.S. Government Involvement in Commercial Exports," p 18.
22. "To Amend and Extend the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Trade, Investment and Monetary Policy of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives," Wash., 1978, p 35; "Export-Import Bank Programs and Budget. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Finance of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate," Wash., 1980, p 103.
23. FORTUNE, 25 August 1980, p 77.
24. BUSINESS WEEK, 21 July 1980, p 88.
25. BUSINESS AMERICA, 2 November 1981, p 9.
26. BUSINESS WEEK, 28 March 1983.
27. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, 11 July 1981, p 1248.
28. Ibid., 2 January 1982, p 8; "Budget of the U.S. Government. Fiscal Year 1983," Wash., 1982, pp 5-31.
29. Quoted in CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, 18 July 1981, p 1277.
30. Ibid., 21 January 1982, p 8.
31. "Budget of the U.S. Government. FY 1983," pp 5-31.
32. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, 4 December 1982, p 2955.
33. Ibid., 29 January 1983, pp 189, 209.

34. "Budget of the U.S. Government. FY 1983," pp 5-31.
35. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, 2 January 1982, p 8; 4 December 1982, p 2955.
36. BIKI, 10 March 1983, p 1.

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MILITARY PROGRAMS AND REGIONAL INTERESTS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 83 (signed to press 15 Jul 83) pp 81-88

[Article by M. S. Kalashnikova]

[Text] The researcher who analyzes the positions taken by members of the highest legislative body in the United States on various domestic and foreign policy issues will encounter contradictory and even paradoxical behavior in the Congress. For example, an environmentalist will vote with the "hawks" for some reason, in the interest of an influential monopoly manufacturing weapons of mass destruction. In another case, a known protege of a large military-industrial corporation will suddenly oppose allocations for the manufacture of the latest weapon system the Pentagon wants. He might choose to take a liberal stand on a specific social issue, and so forth.

The explanation of this contradictory behavior can be found in the forces that put the legislator in Congress, are supporting him during his term on Capitol Hill and are capable of guaranteeing his re-election.

In this country with its strong localist traditions, members of Congress represent primarily their own electoral districts in Washington. When funds are being distributed among various federal budget programs, these men openly act in the interests of the local forces on whom their present and future depend, and not in the interest of the "fair" geographic distribution of funds or any other distribution in line with the actual needs of certain population groups, states and districts, and they certainly do not concentrate on finding optimal solutions to nationwide problems. Furthermore, these facts apply not only to strictly civilian programs (social, for example), but primarily to many military programs.

The analyst of the position taken by legislators must remember that when the congressman strives to win contracts for "his" monopolies for arms production and the construction and maintenance of local military installations, he is serving more than just the direct interests of the forces that put him in office. These contracts secure profits for local monopolies and fill their production capacities, but they also create new jobs, have an impact on the economy, evoke a direct and indirect rise in the demand for goods and services and lead to the development of an infrastructure around the military bases and

installations, which could not be financed adequately by civilian budget programs. The resulting increase in local employment and income gives the congressman a trump card in the elections and contributes to his re-election.

Another fact must also be borne in mind when the behavior of legislators is analyzed. The duality of their position is often due to the indifference with which monopolies react to the liberal statements of "their" congressmen (particularly since these statements secure their proteges' popularity and voter support in elections and increase their chances of being re-elected), as long as their position during congressional ballots does not injure the interests of the corporations. As soon as these interests are threatened, however, the congressman displays his direct dependence on his backers and votes in their interest.

These behavior traits can be traced quite clearly in the debates over military programs in the House of Representatives of the 97th Congress in 1981-1982.

Localist tendencies in the House of Representatives were reflected in the odd and sometimes even absurd wording of several proposals and amendments introduced by congressmen.

For example, Republican T. Hartnett from South Carolina's first district introduced a draft amendment to prevent the closure of Corps of Engineers headquarters if they are situated near gulfs where important military installations are located. The only reason for the extremely odd wording of this amendment is that the congressman did not want to allow the closure of a specific headquarters in Charleston, in Hartnett's district. There are probably not too many places in the country where Corp of Engineers headquarters are situated near gulfs, especially gulfs where military installations are located. Nevertheless, the amendment which was adopted by the Congress purely in response to local interests will now be in effect throughout the country. And the initiative was the interest of the business community in a single district in Charleston.

Democrat Jack Brinkley from Georgia's third district proposed that the Pentagon be obligated to render constant assistance to cities and towns (or communities, according to American terminology) which suffer from the closure of bases or the cancellation of military contracts, in line with the following criterion: The assistance would be necessary if the bases or contracts secured more than 2,500 jobs or more than 10 percent of all employment in a particular region. Where did these figures come from? The fact is that more than 42,000 people are employed in military installations in Brinkley's district. This is the reason for the initiative and for the wording of the amendment. The amendment was approved by the Congress.¹

But the economic advantages of the presence of military bases in a district do not always help to solve the local problems regarded as paramount by the majority of voters. This is reflected in the behavior of congressmen. Colorado's first district is a good example of this kind of district. Since 1972 it has been represented in the House by liberal Democrat Patricia Schroeder. There is a large air force base and air force medical and financial

centers in the district, where more than 4,500 local citizens and around 12,500 servicemen are employed. Hundreds of millions of dollars have entered the district for over a decade through the Pentagon's bases and installations here, increasing the demand for goods and services and their output. But all of these features, which appear so positive for the business community, are of little significance under the specific regional conditions that took shape in the district by the beginning of the 1970's.

Colorado's first district includes a large part of the western mountain zone--Denver and most of its suburbs. Now that Denver is becoming an important industrial, financial and research center, military installations are of secondary importance to the city economy. The district's main problems now are the traditional problems of big cities. Besides this, local businessmen regard the beauties of nature as one of their assets; the mountains, the skiing connected with them, and recreation areas represent one of the most important sources of income in the region. The work and leisure of many inhabitants are bound up with nature. All of this has given momentum to the movement for environmental protection and for the reduction of military facilities. At the beginning of the 1970's this movement became an extremely important factor in local politics. For 20 years Denver had been represented in the U.S. Congress by a conservative Democrat, but in 1970 he was "beaten" by a Republican, and the winner in 1972 was Democrat P. Schroeder; both of these politicians were active in the peace movement and the movement for environmental protection. Schroeder has taken a liberal stand on military issues for many years. In particular, in defense of local interests, she tried to get rid of a chemical weapon arsenal near Denver, and in 1981 she joined Democratic Congressman R. Kogovsek from Colorado's third district in opposing the use of grazing lands in his district as a firing range by the U.S. Army (Kogovsek was the author of an amendment to this effect).²

The protection of scenic areas against Pentagon encroachment turned out to be a common cause for congressmen from Colorado. This is why the group of liberal Democrats was supported by Republican H. Brown, who is known for his conservative views. But his party colleague, conservative Republican K. Kramer (fifth district), was the only member of the state delegation in the Capitol who approved the military use of 244,000 acres of valuable pastures. The Fourth Division of the U.S. Army (Fort Carson) is located in his district, and it was this division that needed the firing range. Furthermore, the division is located near Colorado Springs, which represents Kramer's election base. In addition to Fort Carson, there are two air force bases, the Air Force Academy and many other military installations in the fifth district. The installations here have not lost their prevailing influence in the economy, as they have in other adjacent districts, and the congressmen from this district have therefore continued to support ties with the Pentagon throughout the 1970's and early 1980's under pressure from interest groups.

Another example of a departure from the seemingly obvious interests of local business groups was an action taken by J. Coyne, a Republican congressman from Pennsylvania's eighth district who generally takes a conservative stand. During debates in the House, he proposed the cancellation of a 15-million-dollar allocation for the construction of housing for naval employees in his district. He said that the amendment was necessary because the construction would have a negative effect on efforts to balance the local budget.³

All of these examples reflect attempts by congressmen to make changes benefiting their districts in plans for military construction. It is significant that they have been effective in the overwhelming majority of cases (with the exception of Kogovsek's amendment), demonstrating the real influence of congressmen in decision making on the locations of bases and military installations.

Many legislative initiatives pertain to the production of military equipment and other military products.

In 1982 heated debates broke out over the choice and purchase of new military cargo planes. Lockheed wanted a contract to supply the Pentagon with its C-5B plane, Boeing was offering its Boeing-747 and McDonnell Douglas offered its KC-10 strategic transport plane. The arguments in the Congress broke out primarily among the congressmen in whose districts the plants producing these planes are located. Democrat N. Dicks from Washington's sixth district introduced an amendment to cancel the allocations intended for the purchase of the C-5B and suggested the authorization of 350 million dollars for the Boeing-747, alleging that this plane would be more advantageous from the financial standpoint. Actually, Dicks' district contains Boeing plants, where most of the population is employed. Furthermore, this company's plants are dominant in the economies of the neighboring first and seventh districts (it is no coincidence that senators and congressmen from the state of Washington have long been called representatives from Boeing). All of them, particularly the members of the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees, Congressman N. Dicks and Senator H. Jackson, receive huge sums from the company through political action committees. Dicks' initiative in the interests of the company was unanimously approved by all congressmen from this state and supported by the representatives from the districts in Kansas and Pennsylvania where other Boeing plants are located and where economic prosperity depends largely on the company's success in business.

Congressmen from districts where Lockheed plants are located, however, voted against the Dicks amendment. Its main opponent was L. McDonald from Georgia's seventh district, where the Lockheed C-5B planes are produced. He was unanimously supported by all other congressmen from this state, where military contracts have a substantial stimulating effect on local capital and the economy. The amendment was also opposed by congressmen from the districts including the cities of Burbank, Sunnyvale (both in California) and Plainfield (New Jersey), where many Lockheed enterprises are located.

In a similar manner, the representatives of McDonnell Douglas' interests made every effort to promote R. Badham's amendment on the use of allocations only for the purchase of the KC-10 plane. Badham himself represents California's 40th district, where McDonnell Douglas plants produce missile equipment. The KC-10 is produced in neighboring districts (the 32d and 34th). Since 1977 Pentagon orders have guaranteed high profits for the company and stable employment for the population in these districts, and their congressmen are therefore always active in seeking the renewal of contracts. The interests of the company in this matter were also served by representatives from the first, second and third districts in Missouri and the first district in

Oklahoma. The company has several plants in these regions and is one of the principal employers here.⁴ Both amendments--Dicks' and Badham's--were rejected by a majority. This testifies that matters of strategic importance, including the production of military equipment, are not settled as easily as in the first case (the location of military bases and installations); it is much more difficult for congressmen to promote decisions meeting the needs of their districts in this case. The monopoly with the greatest influence in the Pentagon generally has the last word in these matters, and the Pentagon's own special interests are another deciding factor.

Congressman A. Moffett's attempts to make changes in plans worked out in the Armed Services Committee for the purchase of a new series of attack planes also failed.

Moffett, a Democrat from Connecticut's sixth district, proposed that the funds designed for the purchase of 12 A-7K attack planes be used to purchase 13 F-16 fighter planes instead. He was guided primarily by the interests of his district and several others in his state. Many enterprises of the United Technologies company, which produces various types of military equipment and spare parts, including engines for the F-16, are located in Connecticut's first, third, fourth and sixth districts. By the end of the 1970's the company's federal contracts for their production totaled 700 million dollars, providing the company with profits and the population with jobs. In general, the economics and politics of the entire state are closely related to the activities of United Technologies, and it is therefore not surprising that the entire Connecticut delegation in the Congress unanimously supported Moffett's proposal. The amendment was nevertheless rejected, but the congressmen from Connecticut clearly demonstrated their loyalty to company interests and their determination to fight for these interests and thereby secured its support in future elections.⁵

Something else is also interesting. With a view to some of the socioeconomic, ethnic and ecological features of the state of Connecticut, its representatives in the Congress generally express liberal views in the area of domestic policy and in matters concerning the production of strategic armaments, with the exception of specific types, particularly submarines, equipped with nuclear weapons. The reason is that Trident submarines are built and based in Groton (Connecticut's second district). General Dynamics, the company which produces them, ranks second in the state, after United Technologies, in terms of contracts. This is why the observance of its interests is one of the rules of the political game for Connecticut politicians.⁶

In precisely the same way, representatives of this state did not object in general to the proposed 2-percent cut in funds for Pentagon equipment purchases and military R & D, but did try to keep the cut from affecting allocations for the production of spare parts for certain types of military equipment. Many small enterprises in this state produce these parts, and there is also a large network of repair shops and technical maintenance stations in the state.⁷

An indicative decision was made by the Congress on the purchase of A-7K attack planes for the National Air Service (NAS) under pressure from the Texas

delegation in 1981. The Reagan Administration deliberately left the funds for the plane out of the draft military budget it submitted to the Congress. Furthermore, General L. Allen, Air Force chief of staff, personally requested members of the House Committee on the Armed Services not to authorize the purchase of the new A-7K series. Top agencies in the executive branch had been urging legislators to take this course of action for more than a year, apparently because they did not feel that the acquisition of these planes was necessary to heighten the effectiveness of U.S. military potential and had other plans in mind, but also, and primarily, because they were being influenced by other suppliers of military equipment. Nevertheless, Congress forced the Pentagon to buy them each year from 1979 on, and various subdivisions of the NAS already have around 30 planes of this type.⁸ In 1981 the Congress again authorized funds for the purchase of 12 A-7K planes, against the wishes of the Defense Department and the administration in general.

This decision reflects the influence of the powerful "iron triangle." Its base is the Vought Corporation, which produces A-7K planes in plants located in Dallas (the third district in Texas). The congressmen from Texas, another side of the triangle, regard the company's financial and political support as a guarantee of their re-election and serve its interests in every way possible. Each year they use their influence and mutual service agreements with their colleagues to promote the renewal of governmental allocations for these planes. Finally, the third side of the omnipotent "iron triangle" is the NAS itself and, in particular, its lobby--the National Guard Association.

The opponents of the production and acquisition of the A-7K plane tried to break the "triangle" by proposing an alternate plan which seemed to be in the interests of the congressmen from Texas and the NAS. As mentioned above, A. Moffett proposed that the A-7K be replaced with the new F-16 fighter plane. In doing this, Moffett was serving the interests of his own state but also anticipated the support of congressmen from Texas, because the F-16 is also produced there (Fort Worth, 12th district), but by General Dynamics and not by the Vought Corporation. But the Texas delegation, with the exception of Congressman J. Wright from the 12th district and R. Paul from the 22d, voted against the amendment because the contract for 12 A-7K planes would have a much greater impact on the financial position of the Vought company (and, consequently, the economic welfare of Dallas) than the contract for the 13 F-16 planes would have on General Dynamics' status. In the first place, the latter had already sold 160 F-16 planes to the Air Force and, in the second place, it has a contract in Fort Worth for the production of FB-111 fighter planes. Therefore, business groups in the city would not lose much in either case.

Congressmen's decisions are sometimes guided by the rules of a more complex game, which are not always easy to discern. On the whole, however, the dependence of the regional economy on military allocations is one of the main factors determining the congressmen's views on matters of military policy. For example, it is indicative in this respect that Moffett's proposal was also supported by Congressman B. Young from Florida's sixth district, because the interests of his district are closely related to the functioning of MacDill Air Force Base. This is also the location of a tactical aviation subunit equipped with F-16 fighters. The National Guard Association did not support

the Hoffett amendment, however, asserting that NAS subdivisions should be completely equipped with A-7K attack planes according to plan, regardless of whether F-16 fighter planes are purchased or not. The pressure exerted by these forces turned out to be stronger....

Something else is apparent from the examination of military debates from the standpoint of the degree to which the militarization of the regional economy influences the legislative initiative of congressmen. Paul Tribble from Virginia's first district introduced an amendment to prohibit the construction or conversion of any military ships in foreign shipyards,⁹ because the economic welfare of his district is connected largely with federal contracts for the production, repair and renovation of naval equipment. Here the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company (a Tenneco subdivision), one of the largest producers of naval armaments in the country, including nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers like the "Carl Vinson," is working on Pentagon contracts totaling around 500 million dollars. Much of the district population is employed in its shipyards, repair shops and other military business enterprises. In all, the Department of Defense spends around a billion dollars each year in Virginia's first district. This is why P. Tribble tried to keep naval equipment contracts from going overseas.

Although the legislative initiative of congressmen in connection with the production of military equipment always has much less impact than initiative connected with the location of bases and installations, Tribble's amendment was among the few on military production that were easily adopted by the 97th Congress. The idea of the construction and re-equipping of naval armaments only in American shipyards corresponded to the attitudes of the majority of congressmen toward the interests of U.S. military-technical potential, and this was the reason for the amendment's successful passage. The amendment was advantageous to Tenneco and to many other companies working on similar contracts. Finally, Tribble is one of the influential members of the House Committee on the Armed Services, and this is of great significance in the success of legislative initiatives.

But what part do regional interests play when decisions are made on strategic nuclear weapons? After all, this is an area of global issues which transcend the bounds of local politics and have a tremendous impact on the international situation and on the position of the United States in the world arena.

Congressmen often rationalize their behavior by stressing that they are guided by global (and not local!) political interests. In particular, they say that the MX missile, the B-1 strategic bomber and submarines carrying nuclear weapons are "bargaining cards" in talks with the Soviet Union, a "peace-keeping instrument," a strong lever for pressuring European allies, etc. Their opponents are just as insistent in their proposals that "nuclear triad" plans be reviewed from the vantage point of all of the domestic political problems common to the entire country, with a view to the heavy burden of military expenditures and the unpopularity of the administration's strategic plans in the eyes of many voters. For example, Congressman N. Mavroules from the sixth district in Massachusetts proposed the cancellation of allocations (1.14 billion dollars) for the purchase of the first test models of the MX missile,

giving the following explanation for his position: "The MX program represents an 'act now and explain later' option, but the American nation can no longer accept it in this form."¹⁰

Consistent liberals like R. Dellums (California), J. Addabbo (New York) and P. Schroeder (Colorado), who always vote for cuts in the military budget and against any kind of weapon buildup, have acted with a view to the international situation, guided by political considerations. In particular, they felt it was necessary to cut allocations for various types of strategic weapons, prohibit the purchase of the MX, Pershing-2 and cruise missiles, the B-1 bomber, nuclear aircraft carriers and submarines carrying nuclear weapons, etc.¹¹

The position taken by these congressmen usually means that their re-election does not depend directly on the interests of the companies making up the military-industrial complex because they are either leaving their districts or have much less influence in the districts than civilian branches. In any case, purely local interests are the deciding factor. For example, C. Bennett (Florida's third district) actively supported the buildup of U.S. naval strength and opposed the Dellums amendment on the cancellation of allocations for the production of two nuclear aircraft carriers, but he introduced an amendment to cancel allocations for the construction of one Trident submarine. The fact is that his district contains several U.S. naval installations: a number of bases, including three naval air bases, a naval hospital, a fuel depot for naval ships and a training center for naval aviation pilots. The district also receives contracts from the Defense Department for the repair of naval ships. Large expenditures on the production of the Trident submarine would evidently divert funds from the Department of the Navy programs on which the prosperity of Bennett's district depends. A similar position was taken by many congressmen from districts containing the country's largest complexes for the production and basing of nuclear submarines and ships. On the other hand, the Bennett amendment was opposed by, for example, congressmen from Connecticut because, as mentioned above, it is in this state that General Dynamics builds the Trident submarine.¹²

Local biases were also apparent in the behavior of many congressmen during the debates over the B-1 bomber. For example, J. Wright, representing the 12th district in Texas, could not agree with the Addabbo amendment on the exclusion of 1.4 billion dollars from the Air Force budget, earmarked for the acquisition of B-1 bombers. But when Congressman J. Murtha (12th district, Pennsylvania) proposed not only the cancellation of the B-1 purchase but also the use of these funds for the modernization and improvement of 155 FB-111 planes, Wright supported this option because a General Dynamics plant for the production of these combat planes is located in his district.¹³

The local factor was even more evident during the debates over the MX program. Many congressmen revealed a reluctance to finance this program before the administration's final decision on its future basing method. But almost all of the congressmen whose districts were directly connected with MX production, testing or deployment (according to the original plans) categorically objected to amendments envisaging the complete rejection of the MX program. The

majority consented to the deployment of new ICBM's, but on various conditions, presupposing the preliminary choice of basing methods and locations. They preferred not to argue about the MX in principle, but simply tried to adjust basing plans in line with various considerations. The factors influencing their behavior included the hope of guarding their regions against the potential danger of a retaliatory strike and the accidental contamination of the region as a result of unsuccessful tests or accidents. Another factor was the need to consider the political mood of the majority of voters.

Of the congressmen whose districts would be affected by the MX program, only two questioned the very program instead of the basing method. These were P. Schroeder (first district, Colorado), who has long taken a consistently liberal stand on matters of military policy, and S. Conte (first district, Massachusetts), whose position is largely guided by regional interests. In Pittsfield, the largest city in his district (where most of Conte's voter support is concentrated), the General Electric company works on Pentagon orders for guidance and monitoring systems for the Poseidon and Polaris missiles and warheads for the Trident. Obviously, groups interested in this production see no advantage in giving the MX a large "chunk" of the military budget. General Electric also has plants in the sixth district of Massachusetts, where engines and components are produced for various military planes. To a considerable extent, large Pentagon contracts keep the economy of this district alive. It is not surprising that the congressman from this district, N. Myrnes, joined S. Conte in advocating the excision of all funds earmarked for the MX from the military budget.¹⁴

As we can see, the dependence of the regional economy on military allocations is an important, if not the deciding, factor determining the position of congressmen.

On the one hand, congressmen must take voters' feelings into account and strive to acquire and reinforce the kind of political reputation that meets local interests; on the other, they must consider the interests of the "nation as a whole." This is the reason for the duality in legislators' positions. This is why purely local interests have such a strong impact when Congress makes important decisions on which the future of the entire United States can depend.

FOOTNOTES

1. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT, 18 July 1981, p 1310.
2. Ibid., 13 June 1981, p 1068; 6 June 1981, p 987.
3. Ibid., 26 September 1981, p 1825.
4. Ibid., 24 July 1982, pp 1752-1753, 1798-1799.
5. Ibid., 18 July 1981, p 1310; 25 July 1981, pp 1360-1361; M. Daniels, "Jobs, Security and Arms in Connecticut," American Friends Service Committee, Conn., 1980.

6. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT, 24 July 1982, pp 1752, 1796-1797.
7. Ibid., 21 November 1981, pp 2277, 2306-2307.
8. Ibid., 18 July 1981, pp 1280-1281.
9. Ibid., 11 July 1981, p 1218; 25 July 1981, pp 1360-1361.
10. Ibid., 21 November 1981, p 2276; 24 July 1982, p 1752.
11. Ibid., 11 July 1981, pp 1216, 1264-1265; 21 November 1981, pp 2275, 2306-2307; 24 July 1982, pp 1752, 1796-1800.
12. Ibid., 24 July 1982, pp 1752, 1796-1797.
13. Ibid., 21 November 1981, pp 2275, 2306-2307.
14. Ibid., 24 July 1982, pp 1752-1753, 1796-1801.

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BOOK ON AMERICAN-ARAB RELATIONS IN 1970'S, EARLY 1980'S REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 83 (signed to press 15 Jul 83) pp 117-118

[Review by A. S. Gus'kov of book "SShA i arabskiye strany. 70-ye--nachalo 80-kh godov" by A. I. Osipov, Moscow, Nauka, 1983, 229 pages]

[Text] The subject of this review is a study of important theoretical and political aspects of U.S. relations with the Arab countries, at the basis of which lies American imperialism's desire to maintain and consolidate its influence in this part of the world. This is the second work* in which this Soviet Orientologist and expert on international affairs analyzes the forms and methods of U.S. subversive activity against the independence and sovereignty of the Arab countries and the methods and means by which U.S. state-monopoly capital is striving to keep the Arab people within the orbit of neocolonial influence and prevent their struggle for independence and socio-economic progress.

The author's discerning examination of the main goals and determinants of U.S. policy in the Middle East and North Africa is of great scientific and political value. "The neocolonial nature of the U.S. monopolies' interest in the development of American-Arab relations," the author says, "is the reason for the unprincipled and inconsistent nature of American policy in the Middle East in general and in specific Arab countries in particular" (p 13). The author has been able to reveal the deep-seated--and carefully concealed by bourgeois propaganda--motives of American policy in the Arab East.

A. I. Osipov analyzes two periods of U.S. Middle East policy: before and after Camp David. His discussion of the "Camp David phase" of the pseudo-regulation of the Middle East conflict in a separate chapter seems completely justifiable since it marked a largely new approach to the Middle East in U.S. foreign policy.

Washington's approach to the search for a political settlement in the Middle East in the late 1960's and early 1970's, the author correctly points out,

* A. I. Osipov, "Ekonomicheskaya ekspansiya SShA v arabskikh stranakh" [U.S. Economic Expansion in the Arab Countries], Moscow, 1980.

was based on its conviction that U.S. influence in this region was suffering gradual erosion. Under these circumstances, Washington tried to settle the conflict "in the American manner," leaving the USSR out of the process (pp 23, 25). The author makes the logical statement that in contrast to American diplomacy, the Soviet Union, supported by other states of the socialist community, persistently sought a fair, all-encompassing and long-term solution to the Middle East problem (p 64).

The author cites convincing arguments to prove that progressive forces in the Middle East and North Africa were able to discern American imperialism's far-reaching plans. At the end of May 1982 an NFRO [National Front for Resistance and Opposition] conference was held in Algeria on the level of foreign ministers. The conference communique called upon Arab countries to resist the American-Zionist plan to create a military-strategic bloc in the Middle East under U.S. auspices and to resolutely oppose military agreements with the United States and the establishment of American military bases in the Middle East (p 112).

A special section of the work contains a detailed analysis of problems connected with U.S. economic expansion in the Arab countries and a description of the nature and characteristics of this kind of economic policy. By penetrating the economies of these countries, government circles in the West, especially in the United States, hope to quell the anti-imperialist struggle, which broke out with particular force in these countries in the 1970's, in the sphere of politics and economics (p 166). Besides this, the monopolies are certainly not inclined to give up fabulous profits (p 201).

In the concluding section of the work, the author logically refutes many of the lies put forth by official American propaganda to serve as the ideological foundation of the U.S. economic and political infiltration of the Arab countries and as an informational smokescreen to perpetuate U.S. military-political and economic influence.

The author stresses that the growing international prestige and political and economic potential of the socialist states have been a serious deterrent to imperialism's expansionist aims. In its strategy and tactics, it now has to give more consideration than before to the active peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community and to their consistent and principled line of giving the developing countries assistance and support in the defense of their national independence and their sovereign right to institute progressive reforms.

Although A. I. Osipov's monograph is not devoid of defects, it is a profound study of American imperialism's expansionist policy in the Middle East and North Africa. The book is indisputably a noteworthy event in Soviet Oriental studies.

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BOOK ON IMPERIALIST MILITARY-POLITICAL ALLIANCES REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 83 (signed to press 17 Jul 83) p 118-119

[Review by R. G. Tumkovskiy of book "Voyenno-politicheskiye soyuzy imperializma" by B. M. Khalosha, Moscow, Nauka, 1982, 336 pages]

[Text] The subject of this review is a study of the main features and tendencies of the development of imperialist military alliances in the 1970's and early 1980's.

The book is pertinent because this period was marked by the establishment of a military-strategic balance between the United States and the USSR and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This served as an effective factor deterring imperialism's aggressive aims, particularly the American ones (pp 14-17).

The author presents a detailed analysis of this factor's influence on the state of imperialist alliances and shows how their internal stability has grown weaker and how the conflicts within them have grown more severe. The reduction of the dominant role of the United States in these alliances is examined with particular care. In addition, B. M. Khalosha analyzes all of the foreign and domestic political factors affecting the status and functioning of today's imperialist military alliances (p 23).

The author's system for the delineation of specific stages of imperialist bloc policy in the 1970's and early 1980's is of indisputable scientific interest: The first period (1970-1973) was the stage of adaptation to the policy of detente and of measures to limit its impact on the military-political role of blocs; the second (1973-1976) was marked by U.S. and NATO attempts to start a new round of the arms race by speculating on the idea of the "Soviet threat"; the third (1976-1981) was the period when the United States and NATO made several decisions aimed at the dramatic escalation of the arms race (pp 9-10).

The author of this study concentrates on the NATO bloc--imperialism's main military-political alliance, but he also analyzes the policy of "peripheral" military alliances in sufficient detail. He discusses their internal contradictions and their resulting instability, which eventually led to the disintegration of SEATO and CENTO in the 1970's. They fell apart under the strain of the national liberation movement in some of the countries making up these blocs.

The United States has made vigorous efforts to strengthen the NATO bloc and to draw all of its members into a new round of the arms race. The specific measures taken by the American administration for this purpose are examined in detail in the book: the decision of the 1978 NATO Council session in Washington to modernize bloc weapons, the decision of the Brussels session of the NATO Council in December 1979 to deploy American medium-range missiles in Western Europe and the Reagan Administration program envisaging the growth of military spending to 1.5 trillion dollars within the next 5 years (p 195).

The collapse of the "peripheral" blocs motivated the United States to take on the responsibility of protecting its "vital interests" in distant parts of the world. It was for this purpose that the "rapid deployment force" and the Central Command in charge of it were created (p 48).

The Soviet Union's consistent efforts to secure military detente in the world, especially in Europe, are examined in detail in the concluding chapter of the work. This policy has been reflected in several proposals put forth by the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries: on the conclusion of treaties by NATO and Warsaw Pact countries on military non-aggression and the preservation of peace; on a freeze on U.S. and Soviet strategic arsenals; on the expansion of confidence-building measures; on the reduction of the level of Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe to the combined level of English and French missiles, and others. The author also analyzes and reveals the negative purpose of U.S. military policy in the North Atlantic and other blocs, aimed at securing its dominant position and at creating the necessary conditions for the use of blocs in the interest of its own imperial policy (p 286).

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BOOK CRITICIZING BOURGEOIS THEORIES ABOUT CURRENT GLOBAL ISSUES REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 83 (signed to press 15 Jul 83) pp 119-120

[Review by S. K. Geyvandov of book "Global'nyye problemy sovremennosti (kritika burzhuaiznykh kontseptsii)" by G. S. Khozin, Moscow, Mysl', 1982, 279 pages]

[Text] The impact of the technological revolution on the system of international relations, particularly the new and massive problems that have arisen under its direct or indirect influence, is now of great theoretical and practical significance. Such problems, for example, as the raw material and energy crises, the eradication of the most dangerous and widespread diseases, environmental protection, the use of world ocean resources and others, concern all countries, regardless of their territorial dimensions, population size, level of socioeconomic development and social structure. The USSR, as we know, believes that lasting peace, effective international cooperation and a comprehensive approach to these global problems are essential conditions for their resolution. The Soviet approach is the opposite of bourgeois recipes for the resolution of global problems and even the development of theories about these problems, and this has turned them into the object of fierce political and ideological struggle.

This new work by G. S. Khozin is quite timely and pertinent in this respect. The author's aim was to reveal the basic content of bourgeois theories about global problems, the inconsistency and conflicting nature of many interpretations of these problems by bourgeois authors, and their attempt to isolate these problems from the struggle for peace. The author did not even hope to cover all aspects of bourgeois global studies in his system for the categorization of the main currents in this field, but he has been quite successful. We must agree with him that global studies, as a system of scientific knowledge developed through the combined efforts of researchers in the social and natural sciences, still represent an emerging field of study in our country and abroad. "But Soviet science," he points out with absolute accuracy, "is the indisputable leader in laying the philosophical and procedural foundations for the study of contemporary global problems and in analyzing the economic and sociopolitical aspects of world economic development" (p 11).

The focal point of the study is a discerning analysis of bourgeois, especially American, theories about the causes of some specific global problems and the

possible solutions: war and peace, the mineral and raw material crisis, "ecodevelopment," the food crisis, the struggle against disease, the exploration of outer space and the world ocean and the correction of the socioeconomic underdevelopment of the developing countries. The author counters the statements of apologists for capitalism with convincing and logical arguments to prove that the leading capitalist states, especially the United States, must assume the lion's share of the blame for the appearance and exacerbation of several global problems. He stresses that the principal intention of Western researchers is to convince the world public that these problems supposedly resulted primarily from "the rising quantitative parameters of human activity and are not connected with the nature of the capitalist method of economic management" (p 45). Furthermore, by avoiding any real analysis of the socio-political and economic reasons for their exacerbation, bourgeois scientists allege that capitalism can offer people acceptable ways and means of solving these problems.

As for the global issues engendered by the very development of the technological revolution, such as the exploration of outer space, the use of world ocean resources and others, the author believes that although Western recipes and forecasts are sometimes valid, they are nevertheless wholly intended to serve the interests of national and international monopolies. He quite correctly directs the reader's attention to the fact that bourgeois scientists and ideologists who formulate theories about the exploration and use of outer space and the world ocean are obviously overestimating the role the United States is playing in the resolution of these problems.

In spite of the book's carefully planned structure, its last chapter, in which the author attempts to elucidate some aspects of imperialist policy, particularly U.S. policy, with regard to global problems, deals with a broad range of isolated subjects which do not fit completely into the context of this study. It is somewhat terse and appears to be unfinished. This is particularly of the section in which the author tries to present an extremely brief explanation of the major theoretical questions connected with the development of a new foreign policy approach in the United States in the last decade-- "technological diplomacy," within the framework of which this country's views on many global problems are a prominent factor.

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SCIENTISTS' WARNINGS ON NUCLEAR WAR EFFECTS SURVEYED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 83 (signed to press 15 Jul 83) pp 121-127

[Article by A. B. Borisov: "Scientists Discuss Possible Consequences of Nuclear War"]

[Text] A World Health Assembly in Geneva this May again directed the attention of the world public to the possible consequences of nuclear war. The assembly heard and approved a report on the effects of nuclear war on human health and public health services, submitted by the International Committee of Experts in Medicine and Public Health. "Nuclear weapons," the assembly resolution says, "represent the gravest direct threat to human health and happiness." Participants concluded that the use of these weapons would lead irrevocably to a nuclear world war and the inevitable death of almost half the world's population. The resolution, an important and humane document, was supported by the overwhelming majority of participants (112 delegates voted for its adoption), and only the United States, the Chilean regime and some NATO countries voted against it, again displaying their disregard for the fate of human civilization.

The catastrophic consequences of nuclear war are well known in the United States, but the U.S. administration is still playing with fire. The scales of the arms race it started are unprecedented. Pentagon arsenals are being supplemented with more and more new types of weapons, capable of destroying all life on earth.

"Trillions of dollars are being wasted so that there can be more weapons on land, on sea, in the air and in space," Yu. V. Andropov said in his replies to the questions of a PRAVDA correspondent. "A dramatic buildup of all types of nuclear weapons has been planned. The President has also announced broad-scale measures to create qualitatively new systems of conventional weapons. In this way, he is opening another area in the arms race."¹

Now that the imperialists, especially militaristic circles in the United States, have announced a "crusade" against forces for peace, democracy and socialism, they are constantly issuing appeals for more intense preparations for nuclear war and the creation of the necessary conditions for a "victory" in this war and are defending the "right" to deliver the first nuclear strike. "These objectives go against the conscience of mankind and are incompatible with the

moral standards of civilized society," a telegram from the CPSU Central Committee to the 16th Socialist International Congress said.²

Under these conditions, mankind has no objective more important and immediate than the prevention of the kind of thermonuclear catastrophe that would inflict colossal destruction and suffering on billions of people and would even undermine the bases of life on earth by causing irrevocable changes in the development of the ecological systems constituting the natural basis for the development of human society.

An all-union conference of scientists for the protection of mankind against the threat of nuclear war and for disarmament and peace, which was held in Moscow on 17-19 May and was attended by 207 academicians and 60 corresponding members of the USSR Academy of Sciences and around 50 prominent scientists from other countries, was permeated with the idea that the use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible.

Academician Ye. P. Velikhov, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, presented a report at the conference and said that the 1980's could be described as one of the most crucial periods in mankind's history. It is a period when the struggle for peace and the prevention of a thermonuclear catastrophe is becoming the most important issue for the people of our planet."

"Unfortunately," Velikhov remarked, "we have to admit that for the first time in history modern science has created the material potential for mankind to cease its existence. The results of scientific activity have made the destruction of all achievements of human civilization and of all life on earth possible."

It is now extremely necessary for all people to recognize the weapon of mass destruction as a unique weapon, a weapon of suicide, and not simply as a more effective means of fighting a war. All people and countries must unite their efforts and solve this problem together by categorically rejecting all types of weapons.

The debates over this issue could confuse the general public: Several Western scientists have argued the need for the actual use of nuclear weapons. "Scientists must make the definite statement," Academician Ye. P. Velikhov said in this connection, "that nuclear war would be catastrophic."

In his latest statements, Yu. V. Andropov suggested that Soviet and American scientists meet to discuss questions of strategic arms limitation and, in particular, the possible consequences of a broad-scale ABM system. During the conference, Soviet scientists supported this proposal and expressed their willingness to meet with their American colleagues.

Scientific facts and estimates of the possible consequences of nuclear war have become the most important arguments of public and political forces for the prevention of nuclear war and the institution of effective disarmament measures. For example, the report by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues concludes that an exchange of nuclear strikes at a certain level could lead to the complete extinction of human civilization.

After assessing the possible long-range effects of multiple nuclear detonations, the commission concluded that they would have the most disastrous effect on the genetic fund, leading to the mass spread of cancer, not to mention their probable effect on the ozone layer, which would be followed by the destruction of plant and animal life and by climatic changes. The commission met separately with Doctors H. Hiatt and Ye. Chazov, the American and Soviet leaders of the international movement of physicians concerned about the threat of nuclear war. Their testimony leaves no doubt that the timely offer of even the most elementary medical aid to the victims of nuclear explosions would be impossible."³

In terms of destructive force, modern nuclear weapons cannot be compared with earlier weapons. The force of just a single thermonuclear bomb, as Academician Ye. I. Chazov, chairman of the Soviet Committee of Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, wrote, would be several times as great as the total force of all explosions in all wars in mankind's history. "Figuratively speaking, we are sitting on a crate of dynamite, with 10 tons of TNT for each of us, while some people are walking around it waving the torch of 'nuclear strategy,' which might at any moment, perhaps even accidentally, lead to world catastrophe," he stressed."⁴

The nuclear arms race, which has been initiated throughout all of the postwar decades by the United States and its allies, has led to the accumulation of huge nuclear stockpiles. The report of the UN secretary general on nuclear weapons notes, with reference to official data, that the number of nuclear warheads now possessed by states could exceed 40,000. The total force of all existing nuclear armaments is equivalent to the force of a million bombs like the one dropped on Hiroshima, and to 13 billion tons of TNT--that is, around 3 tons for each person on earth."⁵

Despite the oversaturation of the planet with lethal weapons, U.S. ruling circles and their allies are continuing the unrestrained race for nuclear arms. Under these circumstances, the voices of scientists throughout the world can be heard for clearly, warning of the catastrophic implications of the use of nuclear weapons.

"We are addressing this letter to all people of goodwill, and to scientists above all, because never before has the preservation of life and peace on earth been so vital an issue," the message of prominent Soviet scientists to all scientists of the world says. "Anyone with a clear view of today's realities realizes the implications of the continuous accumulation of lethal weapons and the constant development of new, increasingly monstrous means of mass human destruction.... Our future and the future of our descendants are being weighed on the scales of history."⁶

Professor G. Fuchs, president of the International Peace Institute in Vienna, warns that "a third world war would be an act of collective suicide." This opinion is shared by Academician I. Rziman of the CSSR Academy of Sciences: "Any intelligent person must know that modern nuclear warfare of any type and in any form can lead to nothing but global catastrophe. It would mean the severance of ties among living species, including the human race. For this reason, there will be no winners or losers in a nuclear war. Everything will be wiped out."⁷

New York college Professor J. Geiger, a prominent American medical expert, believes that a complete description of nuclear war-related devastation would be almost impossible because mankind has never experienced losses of this magnitude.⁸

An advisory group from the Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress has also called the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons unpredictable. After analyzing the possible effects on a nuclear world war, this group concluded that any form of nuclear warfare, even "local" and other forms of "limited" nuclear attacks, would inevitably lead to losses and destruction far transcending local limits, and that actual losses in the overwhelming majority of cases would be much more serious than those predicted by the military establishment.⁹

American studies of the possible effects of nuclear war are essentially of two types: They estimate the consequences of mass-scale nuclear war--that is, attacks on armed forces and on industrial centers and cities--and of "limited nuclear war," in which, according to the scenarios of American militarists, attacks will be concentrated against strategic nuclear forces and command points.

Some American strategists have recently cherished the impossible hope that nuclear war can be "confined" to Europe while the United States sits out the war across the ocean. Authoritative scientists assert that any kind of nuclear war would be a gigantic catastrophe for the United States itself. In the opinion of specialists from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which was expressed in the mid-1970's and was published in England's ECONOMIST magazine, a 100-megaton nuclear attack on the United States would immediately destroy 20 percent of the population, and a 1,000-megaton blast would kill at least 100 million people within the first few minutes.¹⁰

After the Disarmament Committee of the World Science Federation met in Thoiry (France) on 8-10 December 1980, it prepared a publication called "An Analysis of the Dangers Connected With the Revision of Some Premises of American Military Strategy." The authors of this publication stressed that any "limited" attack on military targets, particularly hardened strategic missile silos and underground administrative centers, would contaminate the blast site with so much radioactivity and would lead to so many losses of civilian lives that it could hardly be distinguished from a massive nuclear attack on civilian targets.¹¹

According to the estimates of the authors of "Nuclear War in Los Angeles," a report prepared by the Los Angeles Federation of Scientists, from 105 million to 165 million people would die in the first 30 days of a nuclear war in the United States, "but those who are left alive will have little chance of surviving."¹² Incidentally, the Pentagon report for fiscal year 1982 also noted that nuclear war in the United States would take the lives of 155-165 million people.¹³ According to other estimates, the figure could be even higher. For example, a report prepared for the Joint Congressional Committee on Defense Production says that four nuclear attacks on the United States with a total force equivalent to 1,300-1,400 tons of TNT would kill virtually the entire population and completely destroy industrial potential.¹⁴

The report of the Federation of American Scientists says that the United States would cease to exist as an economically viable entity after a nuclear war. "Nuclear world war, as far as we know, would almost certainly be suicidal for America as we know it, and not only for its citizens."¹⁵

Therefore, even the direct and immediate results of the use of nuclear weapons would be so destructive and devastating that they would undermine the very foundations of the existence of civilization. The long-term effects of nuclear war are just as horrifying.

Thermonuclear catastrophe would make colossal and irreversible changes throughout the world, with unpredictable but indisputably far-reaching disastrous consequences. The negligible minority of the world's population surviving a nuclear war would be threatened by leukemia and malignant tumors, and their descendants would suffer genetic defects, chromosomal abnormalities, etc. In addition, there would be the complete destruction or serious disruption of the material and technical base, the disintegration of the economy and the severance of all social links.

Besides this, the radioactive substances created by a nuclear explosion would contaminate the blast site for many years and would travel great distances. Militaristic circles in the West allege that the level of radiation would "drop quickly" after a nuclear explosion. They want to convince the population that this danger will disappear just 2 weeks or so after the blast. For example, although American General D. Graham admits that radioactive contamination poses a grave threat to life, he alleges that it would decrease quickly, supposedly by almost 90 percent within the first week after the explosion.¹⁶

These statements are thoroughly false because they ignore the fact that the accumulated dose of radiation will last a long time. The effects of radiation on the human organism are discussed in detail in the abovementioned anthology "Final Epidemic: Physicians and Scientists on Nuclear War." The book says that its impact will depend largely not only on the dose absorbed by the entire organism but also on the dose absorbed by individual organs. The only absolute certainty, the anthology says, is that children will be the first to die.¹⁷

Over the long range, radioactive fallout would have a disastrous effect on the entire world. In addition to having a direct effect, radiation promotes the spread of infections and epidemics, not to mention its severe psychological effects on people.¹⁸

Radioactive contamination is among the long-range effects that are difficult to predict, are technically uncontrollable and pose one of the greatest threats to all forms of organic life on earth. There is no question that radioactive fallout would make vast regions uninhabitable and infertile.

English researcher S. Bailey makes the following prediction in his article "Paradoxes and Predicaments of Nuclear Weapons": "There is no doubt that there will be some survivors of a thermonuclear world war, particularly in the southern hemisphere, but no one can predict how many people and animals will suffer physical and mental defects; mutant embryos will die in utero or be

delivered prematurely, animals will be stillborn, and the ones that live will not reach the age of reproduction. Mankind will return to the paleolithic age."¹⁹

As a result of nuclear war, the report of the UN secretary general says, many of the countries which now exist will simply disappear, while others will lose almost their entire population to hunger and mass migration. In addition to having catastrophic effects on mankind, thermonuclear war would inflict colossal and irreversible damage on the environment. The ecological consequences of nuclear war are among the long-range effects of nuclear catastrophe, which would last for centuries.

A group of experts from the Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress had to admit that the incalculable effects of nuclear war, including its impact on the environment, would be just as significant as, if not more than, the effects that can be measured in quantitative terms. The mass-scale use of thermonuclear weapons would destroy all life in vast regions, kill animals and plants and erode the soil. The ecological restoration of these territories would certainly be an extremely slow process. Nuclear war would deplete the ozone layer, change the temperature of the planet and severely disrupt the ecological balance of oceans. The fires caused by nuclear explosions would destroy forests, crops and property, and even the oxygen in the air.²⁰

The use of powerful nuclear weapons would disrupt the normal development of natural processes in the biosphere and thereby put the future of the planet in danger. New qualitative and quantitative changes would take place in the biosphere. Various biotic* forms would react in different ways to radioactivity. Trees, for example, would react more to radiation than shrubs and grass. As a result, vegetation would regenerate mainly in the form of grass, which would reduce the biomass and, consequently, the productivity of the ecosystem by 80 percent. Studies of the effects of nuclear tests on the atoll of Bikini, for example, prove that the regeneration of life in a blast zone is an extremely complex and lengthy process.²¹ According to the data of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Bikini will remain uninhabitable for another 100 years,²² and this is only a scale model of what might happen to vast regions of the earth as a result of nuclear war.

The differing degrees of resistance to ionized radiation could disrupt the ecological balance in natural communities, as a result of which some biological forms would become extinct while others--for example, the lowest forms of various micro-organisms--would thrive. According to American data, radioactive fallout would destroy birds but would promote the rapid reproduction of insects, especially cockroaches, which would carry disease to other countries, including those which were not involved in the nuclear conflict.²³

It would be impossible to predict the effects of this kind of ecological imbalance, but one thing is clear--ionized radiation can cause many types of mutations in plants and animals, and this could change the ecological system considerably.

* Biota: regional flora and fauna.

The authors of a report by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences feel that the most catastrophic side-effect of nuclear war will not be radiation, but the partial destruction of the ozone layer of the stratosphere.²⁴ Each nuclear explosion sends huge quantities of radioactive dust into the atmosphere along with nitrogen oxides, which are almost harmless to the human being but destroy the ozone layer by turning it into oxygen as they rise to the upper strata of the atmosphere. A 1-megaton atmospheric nuclear blast would produce 10,000 tons of nitrogen oxides.²⁵ Several 1-megaton blasts would send significant quantities into the upper strata of the atmosphere. If this should happen, they will reach the ozone layer in the stratosphere and partially destroy it by means of chemical reactions within a few months. Without this protective cover, the earth would lose its vegetation and the climate on the planet would grow colder. Even the partial destruction of the ozone layer could intensify the effect of ultra-violet rays on the earth's surface, and this would promote the spread of various types of cancer. A high concentration of nitrogen in the atmosphere would also heighten the effects of ultra-violet rays on the human being and on bacteria, insects, plants and animals.

According to Columbia University Professor S. Melman, a well-known American economist and the co-chairman of Scientists Against the Use of Nuclear Energy, an exchange of massive nuclear strikes would destroy the ozone layer, as a result of which the earth's surface would be subjected to ultra-violet radiation of such intensity that all crops planted by human beings would be destroyed down to the roots, and cancerous diseases would spread among surviving human beings on a mass scale.²⁶

W. Werner, an administrator of the Brussels Center on the Sociology of War, analyzes the possible effects of the use of nuclear weapons in his book "The Great Fear: World War III," and writes that a powerful nuclear blast could destroy from 30 to 70 percent of the ozone layer in the northern half of the atmosphere and from 20 to 40 percent in the southern half. The regeneration of the ozone screen would probably take at least 10 years, but during this period vast regions of the earth's surface could be burned up by the sun's ultra-violet rays. Even the people who are not killed immediately will die as a result of climatic changes that will have an irreversible effect on agriculture, on nature and on natural biological systems.²⁷

Physicians of the World for the Prevention of Nuclear War, a movement created jointly by Soviet and American physicians, is growing and becoming stronger. The third congress of this representative organization was held in Amsterdam from 18 to 21 June 1983 and was attended by medical researchers and physicians from more than 40 countries. They discussed the scales of the threat posed by nuclear war to mankind and the planet and described the tragic implications of a nuclear conflict.

Professor B. Lawn, the chairman of Physicians for Social Responsibility, an American organization, said that medical experts have a special responsibility to avert the danger of war and save mankind from nuclear catastrophe. Professor G. Abrams from the Harvard Medical School Radiology Department refuted the illusion that nuclear war is survivable. The threat posed by nuclear war to human life was pointed out by Academician L. A. Il'in of the

USSR Academy of Medical Sciences. The medical experts who addressed the forum were particularly disturbed by the disastrous implications of a nuclear conflict. They issued several appeals to the world community to take a completely responsible approach to scientists' warnings about the severity of the threat hanging over mankind and to fight even more actively for its elimination.

These facts, the opinions of scientists and the many studies that have recently been conducted so intensively provide irrefutable proof that nuclear war would turn our earth into a dead planet contaminated by radioactive fallout. Only one conclusion can be drawn from the study of the effects of nuclear war on people and the environment: Nuclear weapons must never be used under any circumstances.

Speaking at a CPSU Central Committee Plenum in November 1982, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yu. V. Andropov said: "The masses are more prominent now on the stage of history than ever before. They have acquired the irrepressible power to speak. They are capable of taking energetic and purposeful action to eliminate the threat of nuclear war, save the world and thereby perpetuate life on our planet. The CPSU and Soviet State will make every effort to see that this is accomplished."²⁸

FOOTNOTES

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2. Ibid., 9 April 1983.
3. For more detail, see the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1982, No 9, pp 109-110.
4. "Final Epidemic: Physicians and Scientists on Nuclear War," Chicago, 1981, pp 61-62.
5. "Nuclear Weapons. Report of the UN Secretary General," N.Y., 1980, p 8.
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25. "Dvizheniye vrachey za predotvrashcheniye yadernoy voyny" [Physicians' Movement for the Prevention of Nuclear War], Moscow, 1981, p 51.
26. "Peace in Search of Makers. Riverside Church Reverse the Arms Race Convocation," N.Y., 1979, pp 104, 158.
27. "World Climate Conference Declarations and Supporting Documents," February 1979, p 4.
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